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ABSTRACT 
During the past few decades the non-aligned movement has come to 
be recognised as the voice of the Third World in the international 
arena. In addition, the aim of securing the peace of the world 
recreates a more cohesive co-operation among the Third World countries 
themselves if their organisation within the movement is to be 
effective. 
It is in the light of the above that this study seeks to present 
the evolution of the movement through the analysis of its commitments, 
and the resolutions which emanated from its major conferences. 
The theoretical aspects of non-alignment and the points necessary 
to enable a country to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, 
such as socio-economic and political development, are discussed in the 
introduction. 
In Chapter One, the history of the movement in terms of the 
development of its ideas and potential lines of co-ordination are 
presented, with particular emphasis on the international circumstances 
around which the movement was established. The evolution of the 
movement since the Bandung conference in 1955 and the development in 
its thinking and membership are points dealt with in Chapter Two. The 
changing priorities of the movement in addressing itself more closely 
to economic problems of its member countries and the Third World in 
general are discussed in Chapter Three, with particular proposals in 
the major areas of reform for a new international economic order. The 
revitalization of one of the original principles of the non-aligned 
movement in supporting liberation movements in Third World countries is 
the subject of Chapter Four. The last Chapter concentrates on the 
contribution of one particular country, Iraq, to the non-aligned 
movement. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE THEORETICAL CONNECTIONS 
NON-ALIGNMENT/DEVELOPMENT AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT - AN OVERVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical connections: non-alignment, development and 
underdevelopment - an overview. 
One of the main issues around which the members of the non-aligned 
movement have rallied is that of development. This issue, over the 
lifetime of the movement has featured in everyone of its conferences, 
and gatherings, and in the literature of the movement. It was only 
natural to have this focus on socio-economic and political development 
because all members of the movement were underdeveloped and unless 
independance secures some form of better living, the process of 
independance itself cannot be secured and maintained. Therefore, 
development became a matter of survival for Third World countries. 
This was reflected in the thinking of leaders of the Third World 
countries and of their intellectuals. In 1956, for example, Nehru 
declared: 
"We are not going to spend the next hundred years in 
arriving gradually, step by step, at the stage of 
development which the developed countries have reached 
today. lOur pace and tempo of progress have to be much 
faster". 
Such a statement may explain the frame of mind which the leaders 
of the movement at the time were in. Not only was development needed, 
but also at a pace much faster than it had previously taken. This 
statement also leads one logically to ask: how can one define "develop-
ment"? 
Some writers believed, "Development means creating the conditions 
1) Cited in Gunner Myrdal, Asian Drama, Pantheon, 1968, p.7l6. 
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for the realisation of human personality. Its evaluation must 
therefore take into account three linked economic criteria: whether 
there has been a reduction in (i) poverty (ii) unemployment (iii) 
i nequa 1 i tyll .1 
Another view is expressed by Henry Bernstein who considered that 
lIunderdevelopmentll or IIbackwardness ll was identified with the heritage 
of imperialist rule by the independence movements of Asia and Africa, 
and saw the achievement of national sovereignty not only as an end 
in itself but as a condition necessary for IINational Development ll , 
which he defines in the following terms: 
liThe notion of Inational development" and the assessment 
of its prospects encompasses the following: 
(I) The accumulation of capital under national control, 
promoting the development of the productive forces and 
the capacity for self-sustained growth; (2) The expansion 
of productive employment and the achievement of higher 
levels of income and social welfare of health and nutrition, 
of education and participation in the political life of the 
nation; (3) The prospects of achieving national development 
are influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the posit~on 
Third World countries occupy in the international economyll. 
It seems to me that the last argument or definition is more valid 
because Bernstein gives more explanation of development. Also, we 
can conclude from the above identifications that, among the world1s 
societies, there are different groups of countries differing widely 
in their socio-economic and political circumstances. These differences 
make one ask: why and how have they come about? 
1) Seers, 1972, quoted from Souza, R.A. and Porter, P.W. ; liThe 
underdevelopment and modernisation of the Third World", Washington 
D.C., 1974, p.2. 
2) Bernstein, H., IIIndustrialisation, Development and Dependence ll , 
in : Introduction to the Sociology of IIDeveloping 
Societies", Edited by: Alavi, H., and Shanin, T., The Macmillian Press 
Ltd., London, 1982, p.219. 
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It has always been the case that underdeveloped countries blame 
developed nations for their poverty. While such an accusation may 
have some truth, it is not always the main reason for underdevelopment. 
Such truth stems from the recognition that developed nations had 
privileged access to raw materials; freedom to "impose" their products 
on Third World markets; control of world market mechanisms to their 
own advantage; ability to disrupt internal efforts at industrialisation 
by poor countries through dumping and other means, and finally; 
capacity to attract trained personnel away from the underdeveloped 
world. Most of these factors were at work in the 'forties and 'fifties 
and they are still at work now. Over the years new factors have come 
to the fore. Factors such as the blocking of the transfer of 
appropriate technology etc. This is by no means to suggest that such 
factors provide a scapegoat for all the developmental problems faced 
by Third World countries but rather to explain a state of affairs. 
Also, one may add at this point that there are many reasons that 
may be cited as causes of underdevelopment. Many underdeveloped 
countries were late starters in the development process, they neither 
have the means to develop nor have they found the necessary help to do 
so. Others had no absorptive capacities for the help they got. 
However, in relation to definitions of development and 
underdevelopment, it seems to me that it is important not merely to 
analyse reasons why underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped, but 
also having understood the reasons, to consider how they might suggest 
policies for achieving development. In other words, the aim is to 
understand how and what the non-aligned countries need to do to achieve 
their own socio-economic and political advancement. 
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Therefore, there has been a large number of approaches to 
development devised by development thinkers in the developed world *. 
These include theories such as those of The Stages of Economic Growth, 
Balanced and Unbalanced Growth, the Damar-Harrod Model of Dual Economy, 
to name but a few. It has always been fashionable among development 
economists to try to identify the major factors of growth and develop-
ment. Three major stands of thought emerged: saving and capital 
theories; human factors; and some suggested socio-economic and 
political factors. I suggest that it is a combination of all these 
factors that makes for development and growth. (For more details see 
later) • 
In the case of historical and sociological explanations of socio-
economic development, one can state that, there are two main rival 
theoretical approaches which can be seen as, on the one hand, pro-
Western and on the other, pro-Eastern, but they are not merely the 
ideologies of rival power blocs. There are in the academic world rival 
intellectual interpretations of events. One of the best known types of 
historical explanation of socio-economic development in Western social 
science is that of the "stages of economic growth". Among these 
theories I will discuss as an example Rostow's, book "Stages of 
Economic Growth". From the other type of theoretical approaches, 
broadly Marxi st, I wi 11 di scuss as an exampl e Frank' s theory of liThe 
Development of Underdevelopment". 
* For more details of such theories see: Meier, G.M., Leading Issues 
in Economic Development, first and second edition, Oxford University 
Press, 1964, and 1975. Baldwin, R.E., Economic Development and Growth, 
1966. Elkan, W., An Introduction to Development Economlcs, 1973, Also 
Chilcote, R. and Johnson, D., Theories of Development, Mode of 
production or dependency?, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1983. 
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I choose these theories of Rostow's and Frank's for many reasons 
among which are that, they are perhaps the best known and most popular 
theories on socio-economic development, and they both try to offer 
a comprehensive historical explanation from opposed points of view. 
While Rostow sees the highest stage of this process not as socialism, 
but developed capitalism, Frank's approach is clearly socialist. In 
what follows I will discuss both theories, first the pro-Western 
theory. 
W.W. Rostow, "The stages of economic growth A non-communist 
manifesto".1 
Rostow argued: 
"This book presents an economic historian's way of 
general ising the sweep of modern history ••• It is 
possible to identify all societies in their economic 
dimensions, as lying within one of five categories : 
the traditona1 society, the pre-conditions for take-off, 
the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high 
mass consumption ••• These stages are not merely 
descriptive. They are not merely a way of genea1ising 
certain factual observations about the sequence of 
development of modern societies. They have an inner logic 
and continuity, they constitute, in the end, both a theory 
about economic growth and a more general, if s2i11 highly 
partial, theory about modern history as a whole". 
By this Rostow analysed the process of economic growth into five 
stages. These were: 3 
1) Rostow, W.W., The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960, 1961, 1969 and second 
Edltlon, 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1977. 
2) Ibid., 1960, pp.1,3,4 and 12. 
3) Sources: See Rostow, W.W., op.cit. Also, Culbertson, J.M. : Economic 
Development, Donald Dewey, New York, 1971, pp.265-270 and Tadaro, M.P. 
: The Strugg1eFor Economic Development, Longman, New York, 1983, pp.28-
29. 
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(1) The "Traditional Society" stage: primitive society, productivity 
limited because of insufficiently developed economic techniques. In 
other words, it is characterised by a lack of systematic development 
of technology and productivity. A minimum of 75% of the working 
population is engaged in food production, and the national income, 
apart from consumption is wasted mostly on unproductive ends. 
(2) ThelTransitional" stage: The preconditions for take-off. 
Development of a ILeading Sector l in the economy positively influences 
other sectors; agricultural productivity increases to support leading 
sector activities; there is improvement in transportation and other 
forms of social overhead capital. 
(3) The "Take-off" stage: A period when the old blocs and resistances 
to steady growth are finally overcome and growth becomes a normal 
condition for all sectors of society; the main feature is an increase 
in the ratio of savings and investment to national income from 5% or 
less to 10% or also there emerges a political, social, and 
institutional framework to facilitate impulses towards expansion. 
(4) The "Drive to maturity" stage: A long interval of sustained if 
fluctuating progress, with 10% to 20% of the national income steadily 
invested; new leading sectors supplement older ones. There is a spread 
of growth from leading sectors to other sectors. 
(5) The stage of "High mass consumption": Structural change no longer 
takes place at a rapid rate; leading sectors shift towards consumer 
goods and services. 
A quick glance over Rostow's theory of five stages, shows that 
he attempts to define the various stages of economic growth by 
certain economic and social characteristics, but in spite of his strong 
stress on the importance of social and political factors and their 
effects on economic development - e.g. he emphasises that the 
realisation of the preconditions for take-off "requ ires a major change 
in political and social structure and, even, in effective cultural 
values" 1- it seems to me that in discussing the change he has in mind 
from what he called traditional to esssentially capitalist structures 
and values he does not reveal how, on what basis and with the agency 
of what forces this change takes place in the political and social 
structure. He does not make it clear why the propensities vary from 
society to society and even from one class to another within the same 
socfety.2 
Tomas Szentes considered this theory of Rostow's as a theory of 
the industrial revolution. He said: 
"This theory of five stages is practically a theory of the 
industrial revolution interpreted in a particular way, 
in which the first two stages are seen as being preparatory 
to the industrial revolution and the last two as its result, 
i.e. self-sustained growth. The fact of the industrial 
revolution, of the "take-off", however, can only be inferred 
from its result, from sustained growth' 3 Thus the "take-off" has only seemingly a positive definition" 
Besides the above, Rostow concentrates on the growth of productive 
forces, or on certain manifestations and prerequisites for this growth. 
1) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., p.157. 
2) Szentes, T., The political economy of underdeverlopment, Akademia; 
Kiado, Budapest, 1973, p.90. 
3) Ibid., p.90. 
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Also, he investigates the growth of productive forces from the 
aspect of social development and by illustrating the historical changes 
in this growth, and he attempts to present capitalism as the highest 
stage of social evolution. 1 In opposing this argument, Magdoff 
considers that capitalism is not the highest stage of social evolution 
but takes the form of imperialism and he divides imperialism into five 
stages as follows: 2 
1. From the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the 
seventeenth century: the rise of commercial capital and the rapid 
growth of world commerce. 
2. From the middle of the seventeenth century to the later part of 
the eighteenth century: commercial capital ripens into a dominant 
economic force. 
3. From the late eighteenth century to the 1870s: the rise and 
eventual victory of industrial capital under the spur of the industrial 
revolution. 
4. From roughly 1880 to the end of the first world war: the rise 
and victory of monopoly capital, the territorial division of the globe 
and the first struggle for redivision. 
5. Since the end of the first world war: the beginning of socialism 
as a rival social system, eventual decolonization and the rise of the 
multi-national corporations. 
1) Szentes, T., op.cit., p.a9. 
2) Magdoff. 1974. p.7. quoted from R. Sav. Unequal exchange. 
imperialism and underdevelopment, Oxford University press. 1978. pp.5-7 
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He added that "the tactics of imperialist exploitation have also 
changed with the stages".1 
Also Rostow supposed that the state of 'backwardness', which in 
fact results from exploitation, was an original primitive state. Such 
an interpretation is not justified. On this point, A.G. Frank argued: 
"Rostow's stages and thesis are incorrect primarily because 
they do not correspond at all to the past or present reality of 
the underdeveloped countries whose development they are supposed 
to guide. It is explicit in Rostow, that underdevelopment is 
the original stage of what are supposedly traditional societies; 
that there were no stages prior to the present stage of 
underdevelopment. It is further explicit in Rostow that the now 
developed societies were once underdeveloped, but all this is 
quite contrary to fact. This entire approach to economic 
development and cultural change attributes a history to the 
developed countries but denies all history to the underdeveloped 
ones. The countries that are today underdeveloped evide2tly 
have had a history no less than have the developed ones". He 
added: "It is impossible, without closing one's eyes, to find in 
the world today any country or society which ha3 the character-istics of Rostow's first, the traditional stage". 
As for the "preconditions for the take-off" stage, Frank says 
this stage can be ignored. He says "if Rostow's first, traditional 
stage cannot be found in any underdeveloped country today, his second 
stage, which contains the preconditions for take-off into economic 
development, is even more conspicuous by its absence". 4 In the same 
view Habakkuk argued: 
"In many cases the increase of agricultural output and the 
creation of overhead social capital are not conditions whose 
pre-existence explains the acceleration of growth; tgey are 
part of the acceleration which needs to be explained". 
1) Ibid., P.7 
2) Frank, A.G., Sociology of development, 1971, op.cit., p.19. 
3) Ibid., p.20. 
4) Ibid., p.21. 
5) Habakkuk's, H.J., "Review of Rostow's stages of economic growth", 
in Szentes, T., op.cit., p.92. 
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Cairncross considered that the definition of the various stages 
and the overlapping of their characteristics was incorrect. He argued 
"If the various stages overlap, what is then the meaning of a 
stage".1 He also points out the tautological character of the 
definition of "take-off" 
"A definition in these terms tells us nothing about the 
factors at work since we can only deduce their existence 
from the fact of take-off, never the likeliho2d of take-off 
from the ascertained fact of their existence". 
Frank also criticizes the third stage of Rostow's theory, namely 
the "take-off stage". He argued: 
"Rostow would have us believe that in his third stage, the 
take-off, he has theoretically synthesized the dynamic 
qualitative change between the structure of underdevelopment 
and that of development. However, his theory is not dynamic 
and he does not isolate structural characteristics or change. 
Least of all, does he incorporate the real structure of 
underdevelopment and development into his theory. On the 
contrary, he fails to consider it altogether. Like most, but 
not all, stage theories of history, Rostow's is an exercise 
in comparative statics. While he identifies stages of 
development, he does not say anything about how to get from 
one to the other. This is no less the case for the third 
stage than it is for the four others. The unreality of 
Rostow's dynamic should not surprise us: for as we have seen, 
even his statics are entirely unreal; his stages correspond to 
no reality in the underdeveloped countries at all. How, then, 
could his development from one sta§e to another correspond to 
the underdeveloped wor1d's rea1ity?". 
In addition to the above criticisms of Rostow's theory. 
Culbertson pointed out four problems with Rostow's approach which could 
be summarised as fo11ows:-4 
1) Cairncross, A.K., cited in Szentes, T., op.cit., p.93. 
2) Ibid., p.93 
3) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.23. 
4) Culbertson, J.M., Economic Development: An Ecological Approach, 
New York, 1971, pp.266-68. 
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1. Rostow does not seem to justify the specification of discrete 
stages. What are called stages may not involve structural changes 
in the economy that have significance for causal analysis, but may 
merely involve description of what things look like at different points 
in a continuous process. 
2. The Rostow framework does not seem accurate even as a description 
of symptoms. The inadequacy of efforts to fit broad historical 
processes into a set of stages has often been noted. The vagueness 
of the specification of Rostow's stages has been criticised: the take-
off can only be confidently identified retrospectively; one can only 
tell if growth is going to be self-sustaining if in fact it has been 
sustained for a long period. Counterexamples to the theory abound 
cases of societies seemingly at the take off stage but somehow not 
taking off, of societies seemingly having achieved self-feeding 
development, which then proved abortive. 
3. In the Rostow characterization of economic development, special 
importance is given to the distinction between pre-take-off and post-
take-off societies. Thus this approach might have been represented 
as basically a two-stage or dualistic theory. The proposition that 
economic development, once attained is not only irreversible, but 
inevitable is readily testable, and we are immediately struck by the 
extent to which such a proposition is inconsistent with experience. 
4. Rostow's definition of the conditions required for the focal act 
of take-off involves some difficulties. 
s. Kuznets, also critised Rostow's theory by emphasizing that1: 
"Any division of growth into "stages" sets the minimum requirement 
that a given stage must display empirically testable characteristics; 
the characteristics of a given stage must be distinctive, the 
analytical relation to the preceding stage and to the succeeding stage 
must be indicated, but Rostow's classification does not meet this 
requirement. The characteristics of the individual stages are far 
from being distinctive. Yet much of what Professor Rostow would 
attribute to the take-off has already occurred in the precondition 
stage. The line of division between the take-off and the following 
stage of self-sustained growth or drive to maturity is also blurred; 
given the distinctiveness only in the statistical level of the rate 
of productive investment, there is no solid ground upon which to 
discuss Professor Rostow's view of the analytical relation between 
the take-off stage and the preceding and succeeding stages". 
He added that:-
lilt seems to me that Rostow •• defined these social phenomena 
as a complex that produces the effect he wishes to explain and 
then treats th~s identification as if it were a meaningful 
identification". 
However, two decades after he first published his theory of the 
stages of economic growth, and despite the many criticisms made by 
scholars against the principles he set forth, Rostow does not seem to 
be convinced that over that period academic researches and analysis 
have brought any evidence strong enough to make him change his mind 
about his basic approach. 
1) Kuznets, 5., cited 1n: Meier, G.M., : Lead1ng 1ssues 1n development 
economics, London, 1964, 1st ed., pp.25-33. See also, Szentes, T., 
op.cit., p.92. 
2) Kuznets, 5., in: Thirlwall, A.P., : Growth and 
development, 2nd ed., London, 1978, p.46. 
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Also, Rostow believed that Professor S. Kuznets has led the 
attack on the stages of growth on this question of the appropriate 
degree of disaggregation; and quite properly his extraordinary 
scholarship as a statistical analyst of growth has influenced 
others. 1 Therefore, Rostow took this argument adopted by Kuznets: 
"Thus Kuznets concluded, "All that is claimed here is that 
aggregative data for a number of countries do not support 
Professor Rostow's distinction and characterisation of the 
'take- off' stage. On the other hand, the fact that the 
evidence is confined to aggregative data does not limit their 
bearing. Economic growth is an aggregative process; sectoral 
changes are interrelated with aggregative changes, and can be 
properly weighted only after they have been incorprated into 
the aggregative framework; and the absence of required 
aggregative changes severely limit~ the likelihood of the 
implicit strategic sectoral changes". 
To which Rostow rep1ied: 3 
"With this I disagree. Modern economic growth is essentially 
a sectoral process. It is rooted in the progressive diffusion 
of the production functions modern technology can provide. 
These changes in technique and organisation can only be studied 
sectionally." 
He added: 4 
"In presenting the notion of the take-off, I pointed out the 
following factors which might alter what we might call 'pure 
Arthur Lewis' (or 5-10 per cent) behaviour of the investment 
rate during the take-off. (1) variation among nations in the 
rate of population increase. (2) variations in the level of 
investment required for social overhead capital (mainly 
transport) in the pre-take-off and take-off decades. (3) 
variations in the capital output ratio. (4) The enclave case; 
that is, a high rate of investment in a narrow region or export 
sector, with very damped effect, if any, on the economy as a 
whole". 
1) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., second ed. 1979, px. 
2) Kuzents, S., represented in Ibid, p.191. 
3) Ibid, p.191. 
4) Rostow, W.W. op.cit., p.192. 
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However, despite the criticisms levelled at his theory, Rostow 
insists on believing the approach used in the "stages" is not only 
legitimate but fundamental to making the analysis of growth a useful 
science. 1 He does not appear to have made any considered reply to 
the basic Marxist argument that the world market system is exploitative 
and the real cause of underdevelopment. Also he argued: 
"I am not inclined to alter the basic approach to the stages 
of growth; and I regard the evidence accumulated over the past 
decade on the past and on the contemporary world as, on the 
whole, reinforcing not weakening, the concept of stages of 
growth".l 
Rostow defended his above argument by asking and answering two 
questions: The first question he asked was: what is basic about 
economic growth? He believed that all agreed growth is the consequence 
of the progressive, efficient absorption into the economy of new 
technologies. In his own words: 3 
"I believe, we all agree: growth is the consequences of the 
progressive, efficient absorption into the economY of new 
technologies. Or, as Kuznets put it: 'Behind all this is 
the increasing stock of useful knowledge derived from modern 
science, and the capacity of society, under the spur of modern 
technology, to evolve institutions which permit a greater 
exploitation of the growth potential provided by that 
increasing stock of knowledge". 
The second question Rostow asked was: what is universal about 
the process of growth? His answer is: "Technologies are, essentially 
uniform at particular times in modern history".4 (for more details 
about this point see, Rostow op.cit., in Appendix B). 
1) Ibid., p.179. 
2) Ibid., 1977, Preface, pix. 
3) Ibid., p.179. 
4) Rostow, W.W., op.cit., pp.179-180. In opposition to Rostow's above 
argument see for example: Schumacher, E.F., Small is Beautiful: A Study 
of Economics as if People Mattered, Blond and Brlggs Ltd., London, 
1973, reprinted 1983. 
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Finally. Rostow tried to present capitalism as the highest stage 
of social evolution 1. I disagree with Rostow's claim that developing 
and underdeveloped countries must follow the capitalist system to 
achieve their development. simply because they need to gain economic 
independence from foreign influence and following the capitalist model 
leads to deeper involvement in the world market system within which 
the underdeveloped countries are at a serious disadvantage. (for more 
details see later). 
Having discussed and critised Rostow's theory an attempt will 
be made to discover the economic roots of underdevelopment of the Third 
World countries. and additional factors including the impact of 
developed capitalist countries will be taken into account and 
consideration. 
The pro-socialist theories and thinkers consider the 
underdevelopment of today's Third World resulted from the relationship 
between the capitalist developed world and the underdeveloped one. 
Since Marx's discussion of foreign trade and the expansion of 
capitalism. his theory has been variously elaborated by many scholars. 
the better known amongst whom are Lenin. Paul Baran. I. Wallerstein 
and A.G. Frank *. Those thinkers referred to a two-way connection 
between the development of both the developed and underdeveloped world. 
1) Szentes. T., op.cit., p.89. 
* Lenin. V.I. : Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lawrence 
and Wishart, London, 1916. Baran, P.A. : The political economy of 
growth, 4th ed. Review Monthly Press. New York. 1967. See also. 
Wallerstein. World-systems analysis. Theory and methodology. Beverly 
Hiils, 1982, and Frank, A.G., 50C10logy of Development, Monthly Review 
Press, London, 1969. 
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They considered that the West developed precisely because it was 
"underdeveloping" the Third World on the one hand, while on the other 
hand, the Third World became underdeveloped by being obliged to aid 
the ascendancy of the West. Also, they considered this relationship 
unfolded in three distinct stages: a mercantilist - capitalist stage; a 
colonial stage and a neo-colonial stage. 1 
Because the above scholars have adopted a broadly similar point 
of view, I will choose as an example, Frank's theory, because he tried 
to expand Lenin's theory on the one hand, and on the other hand, his 
theory has been widely influential in recent years. 
A.G. Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 1969 
Frank, as a Marxist, seeks to discover what the "contradictions" 
are in the social structure he is studying. By contradictions he means 
the opposing tendencies leading to conflict and change. In common 
with other Marxists, he holds that a fundamental contradiction in the 
capitalist system is that of the expropriation and appropriation of 
economic surplus, i.e. a class of non-producers which owns the means 
of production is seen as expropriating value (wealth) from a class 
of producers whose work creates that wealth; and then they appropriate 
the wealth to their own benefit. This view is then applied to nations 
as well as to classes within nations. He also put forward the idea 
of another contradiction which takes the form of a metropolis-satellite 
polarization 2. Also, Frank believes that: 
1) Hoogve1t, A.M., The Sociology of Developing Societies, Second Ed., 
The Macmillan Press, London, 1978. 
2) Frank, A.G., op.cit., 1971, p.32. 
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"It is capitalism, both world and national, which produced 
underdevelopment in the past and which still generates 
underdevelopment in the present. Extractive industries, 
a sharp division between country and industry, poverty and 
finally starvation, are not unfortunate accidents in the 
capitalist control of wjalth in Ipoorl countries, but 
inevitable products of it". 
It is obvious from the above argument that, Frank believes 
capitalism produced underdevelopment in the undeveloped countries in 
the past and maintains it in the present. To substantiate this point 
Frank also, on the one hand, divides the history of international 
economic relationships between developed and underdeveloped countries 
into three distinct periods, and on the other hand, he asserts that 
there is in the world capitalist system at any point in time an 
international metropolis, i.e. nowadays the United States of America, 
which possesses national and international satellites. 2 By this 
he means, the United States not only possesses her own country, cities 
and towns, villages etc., as any nation does but also, she possesses 
other international satellities, i.e. Third World countries 
incorporated into the world capitalist system. 
We can summarise Frank's theory of metropolis/satellite 
contradictions as follows:-3 
(1) Satellite states have always been subject to a high degree of 
external and internal monopoly; 
(2) The structure of the world capitalist system as a whole, as well 
as that of its peripheral satellites, has been highly monopolistic 
throughout the history of capitalist development; 
1) Ibid., Preface. 
2) Moridi, S., Foreign Trade and Theories of Development, with Specific 
Reference to Iran, M.A. Thesis, Keele University, 1976, pp.37-38. 
3) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.31. 
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(3) The monopoly capitalist structure and the surplus 
expropriation/appropriation contradiction run through the entire 
satellite states' economies past and present; 
(4) This exploitative relation extends the capitalist link between 
the capitalist world metropolis and national metropolises of the 
state11ite states and then to regional centres, and from these to local 
centres, from local centres to towns to villages and from villages 
to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small 
peasants and tenants. On this point, Frank argued: 
"The metropolis/satellite contradiction exists not only 
between the world capitalist metropolis and peripheral 
satellite countries; but it is also found within these 
countries among their regions and between 'rapid develop-
ment of the towns and industrial centris and lagging 
and decline in the agricultural distincts'''. 
Frank, means by the above argument that, the international 
satellites are national metropolises in their own countries. The 
metropolis/satellites relationship encompasses provincial, regional 
and local levels allover the world capitalist system. Therefore at 
the bottom of this system, a few villages are the satellites of a 
local commercial centre. Considering this hierarchical system, 
Frank argues that in the metropolis/satellite relationship the 
development of the metropolis is at the expense of, and 
therefore causes the underdevelopment of its satellites. In 
other words, the economic surplus flows out of the satellites and is 
directed to the development of the metropolis. 
1) Frank, op.cit., p.34. 
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As previously mentioned, Frank refers to this flow of 
economic surplus as another "contradiction" , as expropriation/ 
appropriation in the world capitalist system.! 
(5) At each step along the way, the relatively few capitalists above 
exercise monopoly power over the many below, expropriating some or 
all of their economic surplus and, to the extent that they are not 
expropriated in turn by the still fewer above them, appropriating it 
for their own use; 
(6) As a result of this, at each point, the international, national 
and local capitalist system generates economic development for the 
few and underdevelopment for the many. 
Also, according to Frank, the history of international economic 
relationships of developed and underdeveloped countries is divided 
into 1 (a) The mercantilist era, when international trade backed 
by military force was monopolised by the metropolitan countries (b) 
The nineteenth century or liberal era, the basis of metropolitan 
monopoly became industry and textiles. Satellites were permitted now 
to trade, but not to produce industrial products; (c) At the turn of 
the twentieth century, light industries as the basis of monopoly were 
replaced by monopoly production of capital and intermediate goods. 
Satellites were denied the right to produce these goods; but they were 
permitted and even forced to produce light industrial goods by 
metropolitan factories set up on their soil. In order to produce 
textiles and other light industrial goods, the satellites had to import 
machinery and equipment from metropolitan countries. 
1) Frank, A.G., represented 1n Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.34-39. 
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Therefore the export of these goods, since it was 
monopolised by metropoles, led the satellites to be dependent on 
the monopoly of capitalist countries, and (d) From the middle 
of the present century, the basis of the metropolitan monopoly 
changed from the monopoly of heavy industries to the monopoly of 
technology. From this point onwards, satellite countries could even 
establish factories to produce capital goods. However, due to 
the metropolisation of technology by the metropolis, the 
metropole/satellite structure remains the same that is, through 
technology satellites are dependent on the metropolis. 1 
One can see here that, Frank in his above theory retains the 
fundamentals of Marxist/Leninist theories and supplements it with a 
metropolis/satellite contradiction in the world capitalist system. 
Frank, considered that the relationships between the developed and 
underdeveloped countries was "inherently exploitative" and that this 
was the main obstacle to the development of the underdeveloped 
countries. These relations were also, an essential part of the 
structure and evaluation of the capitalist system in the world. Thus 
Frank argued that: 
"Capitalism's essential internal contradiction between 
the exploiting and the exp~oited appears between nations 
no less than within them". 
By this Frank means that, underdevelopment in the satellite 
countries is generated by the same process that produces the 
development of capitalism in the advanced countries. 
1) Moridi, 5., op.cit., pp.34-39. 
2) Frank, A.G., Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, p.227, 
represented in Laclau, E., Pol1t1CS and Ideology 1n Marx1st Theory, 
Lowe and Brydone printers limited, London, 1977, p.22. 
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This exploitative relationship between the two groups, i.e. 
Metropolis and Satellite is, he believes, the main contradiction in 
capitalist imperialism. From this argument, Moridi derived two 
conclusions, on the one hand, class contradiction is supplemented by 
the contradiction between metropolis and satellite and on the other 
hand, the contradiction between exploited and exploiters remains the 
main characteristic feature of the capitalist mode of production. 1 In 
opposing Frank's above argument, Laclau considered that not only 
capitalism but also every class society has been characterised by the 
contradiction between exploited and exploiters. In his own words:-
"But this does not take us very far, since not only 
capitalism, but feudalism and indeed every class 
society has been characterised b1 the contradiction between exploiters and exploited". 
Also, Laclau believed that Frank's theory is weakened by 
its exclusion of the mode of production in the definition of capital-
ism. In his own words:-
"Frank's claim that his conception of capitalism is the 
Marxist one seems to be based on nothing more than his 
desire for this to be the case. He was accused precisely 
of ignoring the mode of production in his definition of 
capitalisml/. 3 
Frank replied with two quotations from Marx which he claimed, 
proved his case:-4 
II In the second class of colonies - the plantations, which are 
from the moment of their inception, commercial speculation 
centres of production for the world market - a regime of 
capitalist production exists, if only in a formal way, since 
slavery among the negroes excludes free wage - labour, which 
is the base on which capitalist production rests. However, 
1) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.30-39. 
2) Laclau, E., op.cit., p.22. 
3) Ibid., p.25. 
4) This quotation 1s taken from the History of Economic Doctrines: 
See Ibid., p.25. 
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those who deal in slave trading are capitalists. The 
system of production introduced by them does not 
originate in slavery, but was introduced into it. In 
this case the capitalist and the landlord are one person". 
In reply, Lac1au argued: 1 
"In reality, the quotation proves exactly the reverse of what 
Frank intends, since what Marx says is that in the plantation 
economies the dominant mode of production is only formally 
capitalist. It is formally capitalist because its beneficiaries 
participate in a world market in which the dominant productive 
sectors are already capitalist. This enables the landowners in 
the plantation economy to participate in the general movement of 
the capitalist system without, however, their mode of production 
being capitalist, but what is the essential condition for such a 
situation is its exceptional character". 
The second passage from Marx quoted by Frank was: 2 
"However, this error is certainly no greater than that of 
e.g. all philologists who speak of the existence of capital 
in classical antiquity, and of Roman or Greek capitalists. 
This is merely another way of saying that in Rome and Greece 
labour was free, an assertion which those gentlemen would 
hardly make. If we talk of plantation owners in America 
as capitalists, if they are capitalists, this is due to the 
fact that they exist as anomalies within a world market 
based upon free labour". 
Lac1au argued: 3 
"By no means. Feudal dependence and urban handicrafts 
remained the basic forms of productive activity. The 
existence of a powerful commercial class which greatly 
enlarged its stock of capital through overseas trade 
did not in the least modify the decisive fact that this 
capital was accumulated by the absorption of an economic 
surplus produced through labour relationships very 
different from those of free labour". 
1) Lac1au, E. op.cit., p.2S. 
2) Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, London, 1964, pp.118-19, 
cited 1n Laclau, 1bid, pp.25-26. 
3) Lac1au, E., op.ci!., p.26. 
The particular issue between Frank and Laclau over whether or 
not the colonial plantation mode of production is feudal, is not 
important from my point of view, but the main pOint is that Laclau 
thinks Frank's argument does not sufficiently analyse the mode of 
production within colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Also, Laclau explained 'mode of production' as follows:- 1 
"We understand by 'mode of production' an integrated 
complex of social productive forces and relations linked 
to a determinate type of ownership of the means of 
production". 
He added: 2 
"From among the ensemble of relations of production, we 
consider those linked to the ownership of the means of 
production to be the essential relations, since they 
determine the forms of canalization of the economic 
surplus and the effective degree of the division of labour, 
the basis in turn of the specific capacity of the productive 
forces for expansion. Their own level and rhythm of growth 
depends in turn on the destination of the economic surplus". 
He therefore designates as a mode of production the logical and 
mutually co-ordinated articulation of: "(a) a determinate type of 
ownership of the means of production; (b) a determinate form of 
appropriation of the economic surplus; (c) a determinate degree of 
development of the division of labour; (d) a determinate level of 
development of the productive forces".3 
1) Ibi d., p.34. 
2) I bid., p. 34. 
3) Ibid., p.34 
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It has to be mentioned here that, most criticisms of Frank's 
approach have concentrated, as he himself recognised, on the following 
points* : 
The first is that Frank's approach emphasises 'external
' 
exchange 
relations to the virtual exclusion of 'internal ' mode of production. 
On this point concerning his exclusion of the mode of production he 
proposed to analyse dependence through the 'internal ' relations if 
not the mode of production, accounting for their mutual determination 
of and relations to 'external ' relations of exchange, particularly 
though not exclusively with the metropolis. 1 
The second point is that it does not take adequate account of 
the differences in various parts of Latin America and the world or 
of different levels of development. On this point, he attempted to 
examine the 'internal ' determining dynamic of the historical process 
of capital accumulation or de-accumulation and its distinguishable 
stages of development or underdevelopment. 2 
The final point is mostly Frank's own criticism which he pointed 
out in a new preface to his work written in 1978, in which he stated 
that it was necessary to study the historical development of the single 
world capitalist system. 
* Frank recognised the importance of these critiques. He regarded 
them as inadequate but consequently, he attempted to face these three 
critiques simulatenously in his work in 1978: See: Frank, A.G., 
Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. The Macmillian Press Ltd., 
London, 1978. --
I) Ibid., pp. preface, xii-xiii. 
2) Ibid. 
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Criticism on this particular point emphasised the failure of Frank1s 
approach to achieve a dialectical dynamic analysis of the world-wide 
historical process of capital accumulation in which both metropolitan 
economic development and dependent peripheral underdevelopment should 
be analysed as part of a single process. 1 On this point, he seems 
to offer an answer to the criticism by combining the first and second 
points above, that is to place all these elements within the single 
historical process of the development of a single world capitalist 
system, which he said:-2 
IIMeant emphasising the process of capital accumulation 
but so far as possible examining its different modalities 
in the various parts of the world simultaneously at each 
stage of the single world historical process, instead of 
dOing the regional or country histories serially one after 
the other, each only tangentially related to the process 
as a whole and not at all related to each other. 
In order to develop, according to Frank, there is no other choice 
for the underdeveloped countries except to break out of the 
metropolis/satellite relationship. This is because, on the one hand, 
the relationship which is based on expropriation/appropriation of 
economic surplus by the metropolis, has actually limited the 
potentialities for development of these countries, while on the other 
hand, as the history of the economic relations of these countries has 
shown, they cannot remain in the world capitalist system and at the 
same time not be subjected to this metropolis/satellite relationship. 
Frank argued that: 
1) Amin, 5., L1Accumu1ation a 1 IEche11e Mondia1e, Anthrops, Paris, 
1970, (Accumulation on a world scale) cited in Frank, 1978, op.cit., 
preface. 
2) Frank, A.G., op.cit., preface. 
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liThe only way for an independent development to 
occur, is to break out of the existing capitalist 
world system, and adopt a socialist form of 
development, like Ithe Soviet Union l (which has) 
broken out lof the capitalist system by socialist 
revolution". 
Indeed, I agree with Frank, that the underdeveloped countries 
must liberate themselves from the capitalist system1s domination by 
taking full control of their own economies and natural resources and 
by taking political decisions independently of the super-powers I 
influence. Having done that they can learn from the experiences of 
any developed country and begin to create their own paths to 
development in co-operation with each other *. 
On the other hand, if Frank1s argument implies that liberation 
from the world capitalist system and following a socialist policy of 
development means close alliance with the Soviet bloc, then I disagree 
with him, because if the underdeveloped and developing countries follow 
the Soviet model they will in my view become satellites just as much 
as with the capitalist one. This is because they will be identified 
by the West as being politically committed to the Soviet bloc and would 
become sucked into the political - military rivalry of the super-powers 
and be forced by Western hostility into military and even economic 
dependence on the Communist world, as seems to have happened in the 
case of Cuba. 
In addition, I disagree with both Frank and Rostow, in their above 
arguments, because what may be valid for the United States of America, 
or the Soviet Union, may not necessarily be valid for Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. 
1) Frank, A.G., 1971, op.cit., p.81 and 346. 
* For more details see later. 
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The structural conditions of the Third World economies do not resemble 
necessarily those of today's developed countries in their earlier 
stages. 
It seems to me that it is strange to find even the well educated 
planners in these countries, in their endeavour to develop their 
countries, very quickly taking over development theories evolved in 
the West for the West as the only appropriate models of development, 
without questioning their applicability to their own conditions. 
I believe that underdeveloped countries, and particularly those 
of the non-aligned movement, have their own structural problems which 
need to be tackled in their own terms, whether it be because of the 
exploitation of the old colonial rulers or not. There is a need for 
co-operation on the one hand between developed and developing countries 
with an open, though suspicious, mind being kept by the latter, and on 
the other hand. between developing countries themselves to overcome 
their own difficulties together. The developed world of course also 
has an interest in what happens. In such a framework there is an 
important role for the non-aligned movement in forming the bridge for 
this co-operation. 
From this discussion, one must conclude that, a genuinely 
indepedent foreign policy i.e. "non-alignment" needs a genuinely 
independent economic/social and political policy. In other words, 
in order for it to be possible for a country to be genuinely non-
aligned, it needs to achieve development under its own control and on 
its own terms and to break free from influences which cause the 
development of her underdevelopment. 
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To do that, the non-aligned countries must take what they find 
appropriate from both capitalism and socialism and also, they must co-
operate with each other, taking account of each others' experiences in 
achieving their development. 
What I mean by taking what is appropriate from both systems is 
that America, Britain, Western Europe, Japan, Russia and Communist 
China have experienced the national incomes that development and 
industrialisation engender. What can a non-aligned country learn from 
the economic history of the developed economies that might help them 
to understand what development is at present underway in the Third 
World? For example, the Japanese development was based on many 
components which could still serve as a model for today's developing 
countries *. Among these components are: widespread agricultural 
improvements; a high rate of capital investment (financed principally 
from domestic profits and taxation); the rapid growth of export 
industries and a consequent ability to import advanced technology; a 
highly literate and skilled population capable of technological 
ingenuity and finally, a capable political leadership committed to 
development and industralisation. It also created a modern banking and 
taxation system and initiated sweeping social changes to accommodate 
commercial and industrial needs, etc. 1 
Another example from which the non-aligned countries could 
profit is China. 
* For more details see: Kunia, Y., Japanese Economic Development, 
Oxford University Press, 1979. 
1) Dalton, G., Economic Systems and Society, C. Nicholls and Company 
Ltd., London, 1979, p.209. 
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The Chinese government adopted its own principles to achieve 
development such as nationalism - to rid China of interference and 
exploitation by foreigners, and socialism to bring about reforms and a 
better life, especially for the millions of Chinese peasants. Also, 
the Chinese government adopted an Agrarian Law in 1950, by which almost 
all the land was collectivised, most of it in the form of communes, 
which originated in 1958 and which grouped the collective farms into 
larger units for more thoroughgoing economic organisation, linking 
agriculture and industry and, at the same time, providing units for 
local government, education and Marxist indoctrination. In addition, 
one of the Chinese government's actions was to bring banking and trade 
under government control and to halt the inflation which had set in 
under Chiang Kai Shek. 1 
Indeed, one can say here that, development went on in China, power 
supplies developed rapidly and industrial complexes grew in the 1960s 
in several parts of the country. The emphasis was still on capital 
goods rather than consumer goods and in many ways China remained a 
developing country. Nevertheless, at the UNCTAD Conference of 1972, 
for example, she was able to offer some aid and technical assistance 
to some poor nations such as Zambia and Tanzania in Africa. 2 
In referring to the internal and external factors which impede 
the development of the developing and the underdeveloped countries, 
one cannot specify typical underdeveloped countries because the 
differences among more than the hundred such countries are too wide. 
1) Watson, J., Success in Twentieth Century World Affairs, Fletcher 
and Son Ltd., London 1981, pp.229-236. 
2) Ibid., pp.229-236. 
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The more underdeveloped a country is, the more likely it is to have 
low output per capita (G.N.P.); heavy reliance on agriculture; low 
literacy rates and life expectancy and early marriage. Birth rates 
and death rates in underdeveloped countries today are roughly twice 
as high as in developed countries, which means a larger proportion 
of children and fewer women in the wage earning labour force, etc. 
One cannot quantify the economic costs of such divisions, but it is 
certain that they seriously impede development. 
To the above points should be added the super-powers' influence 
in the Third World countries in the past during the colonial rule, 
and their domination of the international monetary system, trade, the 
transfer of technology and energy use in the present which give the 
imperialist countries new ways and means* of dominating the Third World 
countries. These points together act greatly to the disadvantage of 
underdeveloped and developing countries. 
To solve these problems and achieve development the Third World 
countries, particularly those of the non-aligned movement, must adopt 
and follow:-
Firstly, pursuit of political and economic independence by 
national leaders and national movements, because the country will not 
be able to achieve any appreciable level of development if it is still 
subject to external influences. On this point Tom Nairn has argued:-
liThe concept of nationalism is a glnerall y necessary stage 
of development for all societies ll • 
* For more details see Chapters Three and Four of this thesis. 
1) Nairn, T., IINationalism and Development ll , in: Alavi and Shanin, 
op.cit., p.430. 
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Secondly, government control. By this I mean, the government must 
adopt planning to achieve the desired level of development on the one 
hand, and the government role should not be merely to the extent of 
formulating the plan but also of securing the implementation and 
monitoring of the plan by creating the necessary organisation, with 
qualified personnel regulating and controlling the foreign trade 
sectors, controlling the banking system and credit facilities, and 
regularising and determining the participation of any permitted private 
sector in the economic development process. The government must do 
that because leaving such things to market forces would not be 
desirable, i.e. because such a policy would lead straight back to 
dependence and continued underdevelopment. 
In addition to political and economic independence there is a need 
for strategic planning for development by means of productive 
investment and trade. In other words, the underdeveloped countries led 
by appropriate national leaders must control and use productive 
investment in a useful and successful way. The level of this 
investment must be sufficient to provide for a rise of national income 
in excess of the rise in population, but this discussion leads one to 
ask: where can a country get the initial investment from and how can it 
allocate the investment in order to ensure development? 
There have been two major economic approaches to development 
devised by development thinkers in the developed world, namely the 
theories of Balanced and Unbalanced Growth. Balanced Growth theory 
advocates widespread government intervention in economic activity 
within the compass of an economic plan to offset the effects of the 
price system. 
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This policy was advanced by Rosenstein-Rodan for the first time in 
1943. 1 
Unbalanced Growth theory, recommends large scale government 
investment in key sectors of the economy and relies on the price 
mechanism to allocate investment to different sectors of projects. 
Also, the thinkers of this theory suggested three choices for an 
underdeveloped country pursuing a policy of unbalanced growth. 2 
The first is to invest directly in productive activities, e.g. a steel 
mill or other factories; the second choice is to set up "Last stage" 
industries, i.e. investment in the final stages of industrial 
activities such as the assembly of industrial products; finally, the 
choice to invest in the social overhead capital or infrastructure and 
services. The aim of this policy is to supply services and facilities 
which in one way or another will induce investment in the production 
of industrial products. These services and facilities are usually 
provided by the central government or public authorities and are free 
to citizens. 
We can conclude in relation to these theories that the choice of 
which one is preferable has to be left to the leaders of individual 
countries according to their local conditions, but in choosing they 
need to be constantly aware of the need to avoid economic dependence 
on more powerful developed or developing countries. 
1) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.15-30. 
2) Moridi, S., op.cit., pp.15-30. 
It is known that the Third World countries I natural resources have 
been and often still are dominated by the multi-national corporations. 
Also, there are countries enjoying good returns from exporting their 
one or more raw materials, for example, the oil producing countries, 
and there are other countries which receive less return than those 
of the oil exporting countries which already have the financial ability 
to provide the required investment. Where such countries I exportable 
resources do not exist or exist in only small quantities they have 
to go through a period of austerity in imports i.e. cutting down of 
imports of consumer goods. These countries sometimes need foreign 
aid to provide part of the needed investment, which is a great risk 
to their independence, because aid is often used as a weapon of the 
foreign policy of the 'donor ' country. For example, President Kennedy 
said:-1 
"Foreign aid is a method by which the U.S.A. maintains a 
position of influence and control around the world, and 
sustains a good many countries which would definitely 
collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc. 11 
Therefore, the non-aligned countries must recognise such aims 
and weapons and must keep themselves free of the 'donor ' country's 
influence. Also, after getting foreign aid, the problem which has 
sometimes faced and still faces the underdeveloped countries is how 
to allocate investment so as to secure socio-economic and political 
development. One can say here that, to solve this problem, the Third 
World countries and particularly those of the non-aligned movement 
must adopt strategic investment planning. 
1) President Kennedy, Speech in 1961, cited in: Teresa Hayter, Aid as 
Imperialism, london, 1971, p.S. 
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Also, as previously mentioned, they must take into account other 
allocations for their development, such as investment in agriculture 
to increase food production in order to feed the part of the population 
working in industries and transport, the production of industrial goods 
directly; and investment in industries producing consumer goods. This 
investment is necessary because as industrial employment expands, 
demand for these goods will expand as a result of a rise in the 
standard of living on the one hand, and on the other these two kinds of 
investment are necessary because it will not be good for the country to 
meet the demands for these goods by increasing imports.! In addition 
to these investments, there are other investments needed such as in the 
infrastructure of the country, i.e. roads, transport and communication; 
and in training, education, etc. 
Finally, the governments of underdeveloped countries must 
recognise the role of foreign trade and its influence on their develop-
ment. The terms of trade are considered a serious obstacle to the 
development of the underdeveloped countries. The trade gap between 
developed and underdeveloped countries is continually widening, (for 
more details see Chapter Three of this thesis). The recognition of 
dependency in the world markets and the need of the non-aligned 
countries for close co-operation and unity in the United Nations to 
apply pressure within the current institutional framework that governs 
world trade should also be taken into account. Specifically this means 
that GATT and UNCTAD, as mechanisms in world trade, may need re-
constructing if the world trade situation is to be prevented from 
further deterioration. 
1) Puttruss, B.A., The performance of the Iraqi National Development 
plan 1970-1974, IAn (conomlc Analysls', M.A. Thesls, Oniverslty of 
Birmingham, 1978, p.10. 
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Also, I need hardly add that these organisations need to be freed 
from the domination of the developed countries and to be transformed 
into means for promoting development in the Third World, which they are 
not at the moment. 
The above discussion must lead one to conclude that, if any 
developing country wishes to be genuinely non-aligned, it needs to 
solve these problems by achieving socio-economic and political 
development, taking into consideration that the aim and goal is to 
become a genuinely independent country. A good example nowadays, as 
I see it, of a country achieving such things is Iraq. 
However, these ideas will be subject to discussion and detailed 
argument in the later chapters of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ACCOMPANYING THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND NON-ALIGNMENT? 
THE AIMS AND IDEAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. 
CHAPTER ONE 
The international Circumstances Accompanying the Emergence of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. How do we understand Non-Alignment? The Aims 
and Ideal of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Introduction it was argued that for any Third World country 
to be able to become genuinely non-aligned in its foreign policy 
towards the super-powers and their military blocs it was necessary for 
it to possess certain characteristics chief among which is full 
independence in the socio-economic as well as the political sense 
through successful achievement of socio-economic development. 
At this point, however, it is necessary to ask what is meant in 
this thesis by "genuine non-alignment"? I wish to make it clear that 
for the purposes of my argument in this thesis "genuine non-alignment" 
is seen as an ideal and a goal formulated by the founders of the Non-
Aligned Movement which means far more than mere membership of the 
Movement. It is a principal contention of my theoretical argument that 
the actual practice of countries which are members of the Movement has 
tended to diverge from the ideal since the disappearance of the 
Movement1s founders. The reasons for this divergence will be looked at 
in chapters which deal with the development and expansion of the 
Movement, changes in the world economic conditions and the strategies 
of the main power blocs. But the principal aim is to show not simply 
why countries fail to live up to the ideal but to examine the socio-
economic and political conditions which are conducive to a country1s 
successful pursuit of the ideal. In my view these are conditions to 
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which only a small minority of the Movement's members have approximated 
so far. 
It is in the light of the above that this chapter seeks to present 
the identification of what political ideas have been put forward under 
the name of non-alignment. Also, in this chapter the world-wide 
circumstances within which the non-aligned movement emerged are 
described. The review covers the characteristics of the "Third World" 
at the time historic, political, economic or otherwise. 
In section one, the history of the movement in terms of the 
development of its ideas and potential lines of co-ordination are 
presented, with particular emphasis on the international circumstances 
around which the movement was established, namely, the Cold War. This 
is because the Cold War was one of the main reasons which led to the 
foundation and established of the non-aligned movement. The United 
Nations' foundation and its structure are pOints dealt with in section 
two. The importance of this discussion lies in the fact that, the 
U.N.O. is considered a very important organisation for the Third World 
countries in many ways, the most important of which is that directly 
after getting independence, a new country normally joins the United 
Nations because this sets the final seal on its independence with the 
achievement of international recognition and the granting of formal 
equality in the U.N. 
There is disagreement among historians in explaining the non-
aligned movement, or identifying it. Therefore, the definitions of 
non-alignment in international affairs will be the subject discussed 
in section three. Before the birth and rise of the non-aligned 
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movement in the international setting, most of the Third World 
countries were occupied and -their economies exploited by colonial 
powers, such as Great Britain, France, Spain, Belguim and Portugal. 
The second half of the twentieth century particularly after World War 
II, has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of liberation movements 
against colonialism, seeking or struggling for the independence of 
their countries. Also, the leaders of the non-aligned countries 
realised that alliance with any of the existing military pacts would 
bring them under the direct control of the super-powers. Because of 
these points beside others, the founders of the non-aligned movement, 
such as Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Sukarno, established the non-aligned 
movement under the aims and ideals of: Anti-colonialism and Anti-neo-
colonialism, which are the subject of sections Four and Five; Section 
Six, will then discuss and explain the confusion between the concepts 
of Non-Alignment and Neutralism. This is followed by concluding 
remarks. 
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a radical 
change in world politics and the emergence of new political and 
military strategies in a merciless race which divided the world into 
military camps. This happened because of fear of and defence against 
the opposing blocs. More explicity the world, particularly since 
the Second World War has been dominated by two major blocs, led by 
the two super-powers. The first includes most of Western Europe and 
the United States of America, under the military organization called 
N.A.T.O.*. The second under the leadership of the Soviet Union, in 
* N.A.T.O.: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S.A. and West, 
1949. 
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the military pact called the Warsaw pact*. Both blocs, i.e. the 
Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, as they are sometimes called, have 
been involved in an arms race and the struggle between the two has 
been going on since the second world war and the failure of Hitler's 
Germany to dominate the world. 
The great antagonistic struggle between these two powers trying 
to dominate the world led them to attempt to ally other countries with 
them, especially 'developing' and newly independent nations. To do 
so, the super-powers have followed many methods. Firstly, there has 
been fighting between them within the Third World countries, (for 
more details see later), and secondly, they have used indirect 
involvement by employing economic dependence, weapons supply, food 
supply, etc., as tactics towards the Third World countries to ally 
them to their side**. 
In what follows therefore, I would like to shed some light on 
the origins of this rivalry in the cold war between the super-powers. 
* Warsaw Pact: Military alliance between the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, 1955. 
** More details see: Chapter Four, (The non-aligned movement and 
the N.l.Ms.) 
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1.1:1 THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Many writers trace the origins of the cold war back as far as the 
mid 1940s. For example, N.D. Shulman argued that: 
"The matrix of the cold war is to be found in the years 1945 to 
1950"1. 
Towards the end of April 1945 the advancing Russians met their 
American and British allies in the centre of Germany, and a week later, 
Hitler shot himself. By May 7th, the war in Europe was allover. 
Germany surrendered to her enemies, but Japan was still fighting on. 
Two atomic bombs were then dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki killing 
many thousands of people. After that the Japanese government 
surrendered and World War II was over, and all peaceloving people hoped 
that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. would work together in friendship in 
the United Nations to improve world relations. But it soon became 
clear that they were bitter rivals, their differences made it almost 
impossible for the Security Council to do its job.* 
In 1945, the United States of America and the Soviet Union were 
clearly the most powerful nations in the world. The United States of 
America was especially strong because she had the atomic bomb besides 
other advantages such as material wealth and no war damage. The Soviet 
Union had the largest army in the world but had no atomic bomb at 
that time. 
1) Shulman, M.D., Beyond the Cold War, London, Newhaven, Yale 
University Press, 1966, p.2. 
* The U.N. was to be a kind of World Parliament. The work of peace 
keeping would be carried out by a smaller body called the Security 
Council. Security Council, Five members (countries) including the 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were to be permanent members. 
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However, the Soviet Union had swept over East Europe; Germany and 
France and to a lesser extent Britain, lay in ruins, all three of them 
were in need of help. For that matter, the United States of America 
was the only country in the world which World War II had made better 
off. She had plenty of all the things that Europe needed, such as food 
and raw materials, but Europe was too poor to buy them. To get round 
this, the American government put forward a plan of aid, the Marshall 
plan.* Moreover, the Americans gave millions of dollars, and food, raw 
materials and machinery flowed into West Europe. The Americans also 
gave similar help to many other countries in Asia and Africa. It could 
be said that the Americans' aim was to win friends for the United 
States. That is patently obvious when we consider that in 1949, after 
two years of the Marshall plan aid, President Truman invited most West 
European Countries to join the United States in a military pact called 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.), and most of those 
invited to do so signed the Treaty. 
However, the Soviet Union did not like the Marshall plan because 
the plan involved interference in the home affairs of the recipient 
countries. In 1949, the Soviet Union discovered how to make the atomic 
bomb. They had pratically recovered from the damage of the war and 
they too began to send help to poor nations in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Consequently the United States had lost her greatest advantage. 
However, both great powers spent millions of pounds in other 
countries in the hope of winning their friendship and support. 
Furthermore, in reply to N.A.T.O., the Soviet Union organized 
* The Marshall plan was launched in 1947 and named after the man in 
Charge of Americas' foreign affairs General George Marshall. 
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the Warsaw pact in 1955, an alliance of the Communist nations of 
East Europe who joined with Russia. Having briefly described the 
background we may then ask why all these things happened and what were 
the international world-wide consequences of the setting up of the 
military pacts? 
I would say that the behaviour of the Americans and Russians may 
be explained by the fact that each believed the other guilty of 
trickery and deception. The Russian leader Stalin *, as a Communist, 
believed that a nation's land and factories - what are called its means 
of production - should be owned by the state as they were in Russia. 
The U.S.A. however was a Capitalist country, its way of life being 
based upon II free enterpri se" • In government too, there were bi g 
differences, in America people had a choice in deciding who should rule 
them, but in Russia only Stalin and his fellow Communists had any say 
in running things. 
To Truman, the Communist way of running things was cruel and 
wrong. He intended to do his best to stop it from spreading. Stalin 
disliked Capitalism because it was thought to be based on exploitation 
and he believed that the United States of America's need for help 
against Hitler had made them friendly towards Russia and now that 
Hitler was finished, he thought that they might turn on Russia and 
attack her. In addition, these differences divided Europe which even 
in the 1980s is still divided into these two armed camps. But what 
about the other countries in the world in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America? 
* Stalin: For more details and information see: Laine, David., 
Socialist Industrial States, London, 1978, p.143. 
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In China in 1949, Mao-tse-Tung and his Communist armies defeated 
Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang. Russia gave some help to Mao, while 
America helped the Kuomintang both on the mainland and in Taiwan. 
During World War II, Korea was part of the Japanese empire but when the 
war ended, American troops moved into the country from the South and 
Russian troops from the North and Korea stayed divided. In the South a 
government favoured by the Americans took over; in the North the 
Russians set up a Communist government. During the Korean war in 1950-
1953, the Americans struggled with the North Koreans and the Chinese 
inside Korea, and both sides claimed that they had won, but whoever 
won, the people of Korea certainly lost. Millions of them were made 
homeless and many of them were killed. Moreover Vietnam in South East 
Asia, after the end of the war between the French and the Communists in 
1954, was divided into two, The Communists ruled the North and Non-
Communists the South. The United States of America supported South 
Vietnam while the Soviet Union supported the North. 
In addition, the United States of America joined other alliances 
namely, S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. She aimed to stop the spread of 
Communism in the Middle East and in Asia, in the same way that N.A.T.O. 
was thought to have done in Europe. The influence of the super-powers 
in the Middle East was very strong, if we take examples in the Arab 
World during the 1950s and the 1960s, we find a difference in policy 
over the representation of the people's Republic of China in the 
Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, as 
Table 1.1, shows, some Arab governments like Jordan and Saudi-Arabia, 
(who favoured the United States of America), voted for the represent-
ation of Taiwan (i.e. Nationalist China), while others such as Egypt 
voted for the Peking Government's admission. In the case of Egypt this 
was because under Nasser she favoured the Soviet Union. On the other 
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TABLE NUMBER 1.1 
THE MAIN QUESTION: TAIWAN OR PEKING? 
SELECTED FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ; THE ARAB WORLD (COUNTRIES) 
Country 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
ALGERIA P P P P P P P 
IRAQ p P P P P P P P 
JORDAN T T T T T T T T 
KUWAIT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEBANON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LIBYA T T T T T T T T 
MOROCCO P P P P 0 0 p p 
SAUDI ARABIA 0 0 0 0 T 0 T T 
SOUTH YEMEN P 
SUDAN P P P P P P P P 
SYRIA P P P P P P P P 
TUNISIA 0 P P 0 0 0 0 0 
EGYPT P P P P P P P P 
YEMEN (NORTH) P T P P P P P P 
U.S.A. T T T T T T T T 
SOVIET UNION P P P P P P P P 
T In favour of representation of Taiwan. 
P In favour of representation of Peking. 
o Abstained, did not participate in the vote or absent. 
Non member in the United Nations. 
Chinese representation in the Security Council and the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, by Bailey, Sydney, D., first series, number one, 
University of Sussex, Table No.2, p.24-25. 
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hand there were some Arab States who voted in favour of Peking but at 
the same time were unsympathetic towards the Soviet Union, but were 
sympathetic towards Egypt especially since Nasser's Egypt was a leader 
in the Arab world and in non-aligned countries, particularly countries 
such as Sudan. 
By the end of the 1960s the world had been living with a 'hot' war 
rather than a 'cold' war, in Hungary, Vietnam, in the Middle East and 
many other places. But a leadership clash between Russia and America 
had been avoided and many more people who might have died, lived. 
In the light of the above discussions, it is understandable that 
in their search for self-identity, the Third World countries have found 
a common ground in dissociating themselves from the domination of the 
two super-powers.Among the things these countries have in common, their 
similar socio-economic conditions have proved conspicuously decisive in 
the ideological orientation of non-aligned countries. While the non-
aligned countries represent over 70% of the worlds' population they 
acquire less that 20% of the world's wealth 1, therefore containing 
among themselves the poorest countries in the world. This is in spite 
of possessing huge deposits of raw materials which are being exported 
to the industralised world at unstable and low prices. 
By contrast, developing countries in general, in their attempt to 
move up the ladder of industrialisation, depend to a large extent on 
1) Alwan, S.A., (Tatawer Haraket Addam Al-Inhyaz), Political 
Development of the non-aligned movement, Iraq, 1978, p.13. (In 
Arabic). 
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the importation not only of the necessary technology for development, 
but also manufactured consumer goods from the industrialised world. 
Therefore as a response to this prevailing situation, a new movement 
emerged called "non-alignment" which ve~ rapidly became of world-wide 
importance, because it included countries with more than 70% of the 
world's population as we said earlier. Also, the non-aligned member 
countries joined the United Nations. However, before we define non-
alignment it seems to me that it is important to shed some light in the 
United Nations' foundation and its structure and so on. 
1.1:2 THE UNITED NATIONS 
The United Nations came into being officially after the San 
Francisco conference in 1945, which brought together fifty-one 
countries. All the governments represented at San Francisco signed the 
Charter of the United Nations, which says that the international 
organization was established: 
"To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our life time has brought untold sorrow to mankind and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, 
and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in large freedom and to practice tolerance and live 
together in peace with one another as good neighbours and to 
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, 
and ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution 
of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the 
common interest and to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples 
etc." 
1) Department of public information, Charter of the United Nations and 
Statute of the Internal Court of Justice, reprinted in United Nations, 
1956, p.l. 
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While the basic aims of the United Nations as stated in its 
Charter were noble ones acceptable to everyone who attended the 
conference, it was obvious from the start that there were two groupings 
among which differences appeared. On the one hand, there were 
differences between the great powers, notably the United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, and other newly 
independent Third World countries such as Egypt, India, Ethopia, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Liberia, etc. 1 On the other hand, there were two different 
ideologies, which perceived the role of the international organisation 
differently, i.e., the communist one led by the Soviet Union, vis-a-vis 
the capitalist one led by the United States of America. 
Ever since the United Nations Organization was established, the 
latter division of nations based on the above mentioned ideologies has 
been clearly recognised in that supporters of each ideology have tried 
to make gains at the expense of the other on the world scene through 
the United Nations. As previously stated, as early as 1947 the United 
States of America~ for example, launched the Marshall plan for the 
reconstruction of Europe. This was followed later in 1949 by the 
establishment of the N.A.T.O. alliance. 
On the other hand, the U.S.S.R.'s counter move was the establish-
ment of the Warsaw pact in 1955. Since then, the two powers have 
engaged in different forms of confrontation most notably the Cold War. 
Not only have the two alliances divided the world at large into two 
distinct camps, but there have been several instances when they divided 
some nations into two separate states, Korea, Vietnam and China are the 
most obvious examples, as Chart Number 1.1 on the next page shows. 
1) Jansen, G.A., Afro-Asian and non-alignment, London, 1966, p.14. 
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CHART NO. 1.1 
THE SUPERPOWERS INVOLVEMENT IN SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (THE COLD WAR) 
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Despite the increase in membership of the world organization, 
brought about particularly by the newly independent countries of the 
Third World, the super-powers were able to safeguard their interests by 
using their veto option. Thus it became clear over the years that no 
matter how many new members joined the United Nations, the democratic 
process of the World Organization was neutralised in the sense that the 
interests of the super-powers could not be jeopardized. 
Moreover, the right of veto made sure that the super-powers not 
only secured their own interests, but directed the outcome of the 
United Nations resolutions to help their own causes. 
It was only natural for some newly independent countries of the 
Third World which fought Western colonialization in their respective 
countries, to side with the Eastern bloc. However, some countries 
considered their own interests as well as those of the world in not 
siding with either bloc, particularly Egypt, India and Yugoslavia. 
The following chart should clarify the position (see next page) Chart 
No. 1.2. 
The super-powers' domination of the whole organization through 
their right of veto in the Security Council was seen with 
dissatisfaction by Afro-Asian leaders. They feared that such a 
domination would reduce the World Organization to no more than a great 
powers' club and hence would end up like its predecessor the League of 
Nations. 1 
1) Jansen, G.H., op.cit, p.41. 
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CHART NO. 1. 2 
/ 
THE UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS DURING THE PERIOD 1945-19505 
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------------------1-------- N.A.T.O. West Europe 1 
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1 1 19405 1 1 
1 -------------1 and 1-------------1--------1 1 early 1 1 
1 1 1950s 1 1 
Egypt 
Yugoslavia 
-------- 1------
---.----
1 
U.S.S.R., Easternl 
U.S.S.R. 
------------------1-------- East Europe Europe & China 1 
1 China 
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However, over the last three decades the organization has 
experienced considerable expansion on two fronts, namely the number of 
member countries and the widening scope of its operations through a 
wide and varied range of institutions covering almost all international 
economic and social needs. 
Over the years, not only has the structure of the organization 
changed, but the relative importance of its organs has changed, 
particularly in the eyes of the developing countries. Because of these 
changes, more recently the attitude of developing countries towards the 
World Organization has altered. 
The fact that these countries, through their own groupings have 
been gathering strength within the World Organization1s structure may 
have strengthened the United Nation1s ties to the Third World. Here 
the non-aligned movement, as the most important grouping representing 
the Third World1s views within the organization, has an important role 
to play. 
In the fifties and sixties, as was said before, the developing 
countries viewed the outcome of the organization1s organs l attempts to 
gear their operations to benefit the Third World. The non-aligned 
movement through its voting power has been the driving force behind 
this redirection, however small it may be. A good example of this is 
the tole played by the IIgroup of 77 11 in the GATT, ILO, FAO, and other 
U.N. organisations*. 
* For more details about the United Nations Organisations, see for 
example: Hajal, P.I., Guide to U.N. Organisation, Documentation and 
Publishing, for Students, Researchers, Llbrarians, New York, 1978, 
p.xxx. 
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However, after discussing the cold war and the influence of the 
super-powers among the United Nations structure and the appearance of 
the non-aligned movement, the question which is to be asked at this 
juncture is: How do we understand "Non-alignment"? In what follows 
therefore, our analysis will examine the definition of "Non-alignment". 
1.2 HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND NON-ALIGNMENT? THE DEFINITION OF 
NON-ALIGNMENT 
A quick glance over the goals and the structures of the military 
pacts shows their danger or threat to world peace and security, in 
contrast to human values and freedom. But could we say that non-
alignment constitutes another military pact opposing or against 
N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw and other pacts? Or could we define it as an 
ideology different from the capitalist and the communist ideologies? 
Or even an instrument of foreign policy for its members? 
It seems that non-alignment cannot be defined as a unified 
i deol ogy1. If we take a closer look at the membership of the non-
aligned movement we find it is composed of nations, with different 
policies and ideologies, nations from Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
with capitalist and communist ideologies and policies. It includes 
among its members "Socialist" countries such as Cuba, Syria and others 
with Western capitalist policies such as Pakistan and some Arab 
Countries. 
It is difficult also to say that it could be considered an 
1) Singham, A.W., Non-alignment and World Politics, U.S.A., 1976, 
preface p. II. 
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economic system. On the other hand, it could not form a military pact 
against the other military pacts, because it includes among its 
members, countries which have strong relationships with the Warsaw pact 
such as Cuba and South Yemen, as well as other countries such as Saudi-
Arabia, Pakistan and Jordan which have relationships with the opposing 
pact, N.A.T.O.1. 
It is obvious therefore that this movement differs completely from 
the well known military pacts. It has two very different meanings in 
international affairs. On the one hand, non-alignment refers to the 
participation of a state in the formal non-aligned movement, whether it 
is closely aligned with a super-power or not. Cuba for example, has a 
close alignment with the Soviet Union bloc and yet it gained in 1979 
the chairmanship of the non-aligned movement. 
On the other hand, according to its principles in short, we may 
describe non-alignment as a social and political ideal. It is perhaps 
more accurate to describe it as a contemporary ideal and aim of 
changing the system of economic and political relations at present 
prevailing among the world community of nations to be more oriented 
towards the needs and demands of a human society based upon freedom and 
equality, among all nations allover the world. 
Through its orientations and activities the movement which has 
grown from this ideal tackles the main problems concerning social 
development, and argues that these problems can be solved only within a 
1) Kimche, D., The Afro-Asian Movement, Ideology and Foreign Policy of 
the Third World, Jerusalem, 1973, pp.64-65. 
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new world-wide system based upon reciprocal help (and aid) between 
nations, and equality, democracy and peace instead of military grouping 
and pacts. 
In the light of the foregoing definitions of non-alignment, I 
would say that it is a contemporary social phenomenon which has 
appeared in recent times, it is an ideal and hope for the future, 
expressing strong and fundamental needs of the nations which have long 
suffered the threat and the experience of colonial domination and the 
exploitation of their wealth, their national personalities and their 
national cultural heritage amongst other things, under the guise of 
protection and other forms of old colonialism. Another no less 
important aim for this movement is the achievement of economic 
development, political independence, and positive participation in the 
world community. 
Having discussed earlier the origins of the Cold War and the 
United Nations' structure, also the definitions of the non-aligned 
movement, it would be very helpful now to shed some light on the aims 
of the non-aligned movement. 
1.3 THE AIMS AND IDEAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ANTI-COLONIALISM 
AND ANTI-NEO-COLONIALISM: AND ALLIANCE OR NON-ALIGNMENT 
There is disagreement among historians in explaining the non-
aligned movement, or identifying it. While some have found the Cold 
War a suitable stimulus for the birth of the movement1, others have 
1) Al-Azies, A., Al-Mossa, "Non-aligned Movement and the Role of Iraq", 
Al-Jamhoriah, Iraqi Newspaper, May 12, 1981, p.3 (In Arabic). 
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simply not identified any beginning for the movement other than the 
Belgrade summit conference of 1961.1 Similarly there are contentions 
which attribute the birth of the movement to the cause and effect 
relationship which characterized the struggle between the eastern and 
western ideologies and led to the outbreak of the Cold War. This view 
seems to imply that the non-aligned movement was a "legacy" which 
international political developments of recent centuries had largely 
helped to shape. 
Despite this inaccuracy about a precise identification of the time 
horizon at which the non-aligned movement appeared, there is neverthe-
less wide agreement that the movement is essentially a social, economic 
and political response to contemporary international political events. 
The most distinguished founders of this idea of non-alignment were, 
Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of 
Indonesia.* Those founders came together and established the non-
aligned movement on the following basis:-
Firstly, the essence of the policy of non-alignment was a 
deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or 
political commitment with any of the super-powers or to permit foreign 
military bases on one's territory. The positive objective of this 
refusal was to retain substantial freedom of policy and action in 
international affairs, especially in relation to the policies and 
actions of the super-powers. 
1) Willetts, Peter., The Non-aligned Movement, London, 1978, p.3. 
* For more details about these founders see later • 
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On the other hand, the non-aligned countries did not seek to 
establish a third bloc or force of nations, as they themselves were 
stridently opposed to the bloc system of international politics. 
Secondly, most of the non-aligned countries were economically 
underdeveloped and their people had a very low standard of living. 
Therefore, it was a major goal of their foreign policies to promote 
rapid economic development for which, however, they lacked capital and 
technical skills. For this reason, their external economic policies 
were directed to the acquisition of both these needs from whatever 
source was willing to provide them and able to offer them without any 
strings. 
From the above discussion we can draw out the following points. 
Firstly, the non-aligned countries adopted non-alignment in opposition 
to colonialism and neo-colonialism. Secondly, after getting their 
political freedom, the newly independent nations were looking for 
economic development and wished not to be aligned with super-powers. 
Therefore, in what follows we will examine the meaning and devote some 
analysis to these aspects. 
1.3:1 ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ANTI-NED COLONIALISM: 
The issue of colonialism and neo-colonialsim is considered a very 
important one. It is one of the major problems from which most of the 
Third World countries were suffering or had suffered and there are 
still countries which are suffering from direct dependence on and 
dominance by a foreign power at the present time. 
Therefore, some writers have described neo-colonialism as the 
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survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of 
political independence in emerging countries, which have become the 
victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, 
economic, social, military or technical force. 1 Others see neo-
colonialism as an economic force and they list its characteristics as: 
"Continuing economic dependence on the colonial powers, 
integration into colonial economic blocs, economic infiltration 
through capital investment loans, aid, unequa1 2concessions and finances directly controlled by colonial powers". 
However, whatever the definitions of colonialism and neo-
colonialism, it seems to me that it is not important merely to know the 
above definitions without also knowing the motives of neo-colonialism 
and its relation to the non-aligned countries. Our aim is to know why, 
among the societies in the world that remained traditional longer than 
the West, some have made the transition to economic development sooner 
than others. This has happened despite the fact that technical 
knowledge adequate for economic growth has theoretically been available 
to any society in the world since at least the end of the eighteenth 
century. 
It could be said that this has happened because colonial and neo-
colonialist powers occupied and dominated other nations. The colonial 
powers would not require to be positively set in motion after the 
grant of independence, but they would have to be positively stopped by 
the successor government if the ties of economic as well as political 
dependence were to be loosened. 3 In other words we could say that 
perhaps most of the mechanisims of neo-colonialism work automatically. 
1) Barrat-Brown, M., The Economics of Imperialism, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1974, p.256. 
2) Ibid., p.256. 
3) Ibid., p.256. 
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Therefore, some writers see that colonial rule, wherever it was 
imposed, created extreme psychological pressures on the subjected 
people not only as a result of deliberate policy, but also inescapably 
by virtue of what the colonial administrators were and what their 
presence in the colonial area represented. 1 Others also saw the 
result of neo-colonialism as the use of foreign capital for the 
exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed 
parts of the world: 
"Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreas2s the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world". 
Nkrumah added and traced back colonialism and neo-colonialism to 
the capitalist system, and considered that colonialism declined because 
of the appearance of nationalism and its revolt against the capitalist 
systems on the one hand, and the appearance of the communist system in 
the world supporting nationalism against the capitalist systems on the 
other hand. 3 
Others saw neo-colonialism as existing in order to further the 
economic interests of the Western, developed capitalist states. These 
economic interests are served by a transfer of resources to the West, 
through the international banks, multi-national companies, interests on 
financial resources and unequal trading relationships, based on high 
priced manufactured goods being exchanged for low priced primary 
products. 4 As a result, according to Willetts: 
1) Hagen, Colonialism and economic growth on the theory of social 
change, U.S.A., 1962, Chapter 17, p.411. 
2) Nkrumah, K., Neo-colonialism, the last stage of Imperialism, London, 
1965, pp.IX-XII. 
3) Ibid., p.225. 
4) Willetts, P., The non-aligned movement, op.cit., pp.213-214. 
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"Western economic and political power in alliance with 
whatever domestic interests there may be that benefit 
from the system, will be used to maintain governments 
that support the capitalist system and in order to 
maintain ideological consistency, governments under 
neo-colonial control will have a pro-western foreign 
policy. 
It seems to me that the above argument "governments under neo-
colonial control will have a pro-western foreign policy" is true in the 
case of regimes which took power supported by the colonial power (the 
puppet regimes). This idea is unacceptable to the nationalist leaders 
in the non-aligned countries, because the main aims of the nationalist 
leaders were to pursue an independent foreign policy, not following a 
pro-western or pro-eastern policy. In line with the following 
therefore, one of the non-aligned founders, namely Nasser, President of 
Egypt argued that: 
"One of the fundamental aims of Arab nationalism in independence 
means freedom to make our own 2ecisions, freedom to keep outside 
anybody's sphere of i nfl uence" • 
Non-alignment can be seen therefore as essentially a manifestation 
of a primordial urge for freedom. It is an expression of a perennial 
attitude of opposition to foreign domination and resistance to the 
great powers' spheres of influence. These orientations influence most 
1) Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.213-214. 
2) Nasser, "Where I stand and Why", Washington D.C., U.A.R. Embassy 
Reprint, 1959, p.2. 
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developing countries to adopt the formal principle of non-alignment, 
but with differences between one country and another and from time to 
time. 
However, while some writers saw post-war nationalism and anti-
colonialism and the pressing problems of economic underdevelopment as 
the background circumstances in which non-alignment has flourished1, 
others saw no room for, or tolerance of states that attempt to remain 
neutral or non-involved in bloc conflict. 2 In what follows therefore, 
we will shed some light on the concept and identity of non-alignment. 
1.3:2 THE CONCEPT AND IDENTITY OF NON-ALIGNMENT ALLIANCE OR NON-
ALIGNMENT. 
There are many different arguments about the motives of non-
alignment. While some writers have seen the poverty in developing and 
underdeveloped countries, the urgent need for increasing standards of 
living, and the consequent importance of industrial growth as strong 
motives for non-alignment,3 others saw some non-aligned countries as 
adopting non-alignment as a means of obtaining maximum economic 
concessions from both blocs. 4 In other words the latter argument 
means that the motive of non-alignment is to playoff one power against 
the other and thus to acquire economic and teChnical assistance not 
otherwise available. 
1) Burton, J., International Relation: A General Theory, London, 1967, 
p.186. 
2) Holsti, K.J., International Politics, second edition, London, 1974, 
p.l08. 
3) Burton, J., op.cit., p.193. 
4) Holsti, K.J., op.cit., p.108. 
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It seems to me that the first argument above is true simply 
because most developing nations are struggling and have struggled to 
get their independence and to develop their countries. 
The second argument is superficial because the aid received by 
some non-aligned countries has been small compared with aid reaching 
those that were aligned. For example, U.S.A. aid over the ten years up 
to 1961 was: Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, $28.8, $15.00 and $13~0 million 
respectively, while aid received by some non-aligned countries from the 
U.S.A. in the same period was only: Indonesia $6.70 million, India 
$6.20 million, Burma $4.80 and Iraq $3.30 mi11ion. 1 It is therefore 
obvious that the first argument is valid. This situation therefore 
lead one to consider and discuss -the meaning and the aims of alliances. 
There are always several reasons for alliances other than economic 
ones. 
From time to time states co-operate with each other under certain 
conditions. This co-operation may take various forms. One obvious 
form of co-operation among states is the creating of military 
alliances. The essence of every military alliance is that it aligns 
one set of countries against another and is called collective 
defence. 2 
The term 'alliances' generally denotes the commitment of a certain 
number of states under certain conditions: they will act against 
another state or set of states, and this is the main feature of an 
I} Published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1962, 
p.199. 
2) Joyce, J.A., End of Illusion, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1969, p. IX. 
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alliance between states. The clearest example of alliances are in the 
form of agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(N.A.T.O.) and the Warsaw Pact. 
There are many forms of co-operation among states which can take 
the form of one set of states against another state or set of states 
without being formally allied, but the non-formalised co-operation 
between two states or more by means of a treaty is usually called 
alignment. 
For instance there is the case of a small state that depends on a 
great power in almost all its economic and military needs or receives 
political orientation directly or indirectly. Thus we may say this 
small state can be or is considered as an aligned state with that super 
power, it is "said to be aligned with it rather than allied with 
it".1 
In contrast, the new states provide perhaps the best example of 
rejection of this form of co-operation when they do not tie themselves 
with either military bloc in the Cold War. But in fact each of these 
non-aligned states finds itself under a certain amount of pressure from 
the super-powers to make it leave or move away from non-alignment, 
because when a nation moves away from the Western bloc, it could of 
course be welcomed by the Eastern bloc and vice versa. 2 
1) Edwards, D.V., International Political Analysis, New York, 1969, 
p.206. 
2) Liska, G., Nations in Alliance, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 
1962, pp.26-41. 
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In the light of the above discussion it might be argued that 
states need to join alliances for several reasons and aims at the same 
time. That is to say, because alliances between states though usually 
shaped by military functions, often function in non-military domains 
to. Therefore, states follow an alliance policy in order to construct 
military alliances, as they assume that they cannot achieve their 
goals, protect their national interests, and stop any threat to them 
without entering alliances to mobilize their own capabilities for it is 
clear to them that they face problems similar to those of their allies. 
Accordingly, traditional alliances have been considered to perform one 
or more of the following functions: 
"A" allies with "B" because: 
(1) "A" does not want "Bill s power to be added to "A"' s enemy. 
This formula is [A C - B]; 
(2) "A" for the purpose of using "BillS territory for its 
strategic considerations. 
The reason for alliance, therefore, is that it adds to an allied 
state's power, the power of other states and vice versa. The common 
perception of a common threat is probably the most obvious urge for 
creating military alliances, that can preserve the existing political 
and social structure. N.A.T.O. can provide an example, when the 
European countries were threatened by the expansion of the U.S.S.R. in 
Europe after the Second World War. 
The second reason for forming alliances is a geographical one. 
When states want to form an alliance they aim to disperse their 
rival's power in order to fight it on two or more fronts. 
The third reason for forming alliances is that some small states 
choose alliances because they have no other choice, they join an 
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alliance because in the case of any confrontation between the super-
powers, they would be subjected to occupation. 
The fourth reason is that the super-powers· decision makers may 
seek from forming alliances with small powers both political and 
military advantages, while small states may seek from alliances with 
super-powers assistance in domestic matters such as aid in protecting 
the existing regime from collapse. 
It might be argued that alliances are also not the norms of 
international relations, partly because most states are not allied, nor 
have they been so in the past, and partly, because an alliance policy 
has never been effective in keeping peace nor has it been successful in 
eliminating external threats. On the contrary, it has always had the 
opposite effect, as the creation of an alliance even for defensive 
purposes will be perceived by others as offensive and that leads them 
to create a counter-alliance. This opens the way for an arms race and 
probably an increase in conflicts has always been the case between East 
and West. 
There is always an arms increase, each wants to increase its 
capacity in order to deter its rival. This race results from the 
feeling of insecurity from both or all sides involved in a struggle for 
power and this in turn makes them feel threatened rather than secure. 
Therefore, it seems that states following a non-aligned policy avoid 
alliances not by entering a different alliance but by following the 
non-aligned policy which is only a response to alliances. 
The non-aligned policy is neither defensive nor offensive, seeking 
co-operation and avoiding and rejecting alliances and arms races. 
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It may be valid to remark that the non-aligned movement follows ideal 
policies in a far from ideal world. 
However, in the light of the above discussion, we must conclude 
that the Asian, African and Latin American nations struggled and are 
still struggling against colonialism and imperialism. On the other 
hand, the newly independent nations are looking towards non-alignment 
as they do not wish to be aligned with super-powers. The most 
important fathers of this idea of non-alignment are, Nasser of Egypt, 
Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Sukarno of Indonesia. In what 
follows, therefore, we will shed some light on those founders. 
1.4 THE FOUNDERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
The second half of the twentieth century particularly after World 
War II, has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of liberation 
movements against colonialism, seeking or struggling for the 
independence of their countries. The United Nations Organization 
provided an ideal place from which the voice of these liberation 
movements could be heard and where the leaders of the Third World could 
come into contact. While aware of the incapacity of their countries to 
enter into confrontation with the super-powers, they also realised that 
alliance with any of the existing military pacts would bring them under 
the direct control of these powers. They decided to keep a neutral 
position vis a vis the conflicting powers in the world. 
The most distinguished founders of this idea of positive non-
alignment, as we saw earlier were:-
G.A. Al-Nasser, President of Egypt. 
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J. Nehru, Prime Minister of India. 
A. Sukarno, President of Indonesia. 
J.P. Tito, President of Yugoslavia. 
These founders came together and established the non-aligned 
movement as we saw earlier under the basis of refusal to enter into any 
military or political commitment with any of the super-powers and anti-
colonialism and neo-colonialism and so on. Because of the importance 
of these leaders in their theorizing for the non-aligned movement, a 
brief consideration of them is warranted. 
1.4:1 G.A. AL-NASSER, PRESIDENT OF EGYPT 
Egypt has always been of importance on the world stage, even 
before Nasser came to power. This is particularly so simply because of 
its geo-strategic position in the Middle East, which is bound to allow 
it to play some role in the area. Because of this reason, Egypt has 
always been subject to threats of foreign domination for many reasons, 
perhaps not least since 1869, because of the importance of the Suez 
Canal. 
In its recent history, Egypt was successively dominated at one 
time or another by France, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain. 
Britain's main interest was the domination of the Suez Canal as a 
strategic and commercial route. 1 
1) Allen, Philip M., and Segal, Aaren, op.cit., p.159. 
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When the Cold War began casting its shadow over Egypt, that 
country was still passing through the last phase of its national 
liberation struggle. The question of unity of the Nile valley and the 
question of evacuation of the British bases in the Suez Canal Zone were 
dominating Egyptian domestic and foreign policies. 1 No Egyptian 
government could have retained its legitimacy if it had acquiesed in 
the British presence either in the Sudan or in the Suez Canal Zone. 2 
When Nasser came to power on July 23, 1952*, he was faced with 
immense problems among which were huge unemployment, the highest rate 
of population growth in the world and meagre resources. Added to this 
was the international interest in dominating Egypt in order to secure 
the use of the Suez Canal, particularly for military purposes. 
Moreover, the question of national economic development also influenced 
the domestic and foreign policy of Nasser. 
Initially, Egypt's economic links were mostly with the Western 
countries, particularly Britain. For the economic development of 
Egypt, Nasser preferred to seek economic assistance from the West. The 
most visible demonstration of that policy was the Egyptain willingness 
to seek loans for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan from the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America and the World Bank, but 
Egypt received a public rebuff from the U.S.A. and her allies. 3 
Egypt then developed trade relations with the Soviet Union in 
1) Singh, K.R., "Egyptian non-al ignment", Journal of international 
studies, volume 20, number 1-2, January-June, 1981, p.316. 
2) Ibid., p.316. 
* In July 23, 1952, Nasser with a group of officers deposed King Faruk 
and sent him into exile (Initially the revolution was headed by M. 
Negib) • 
3) Singh, K.R., op.cit., p.317. 
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1955, and the Czech arms deal was officially acknowledged in September 
1955. After a great deal of negotiation, the Soviet Union finally 
agreed to finance partly the construction of the High Dam at Aswan. 
Thus Nasser's policy involved a refusal to align with the West. 
Nasser's greatest anti-imperialist victory was his nationalization of 
the Suez Canal in the face of the tripartite agression of Britain, 
France and Zionism in 1956. Indeed, his participation in the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 and his visit to some non-aligned countries like 
India boosted his popularity. As Nasser himself admitted: 
liMy visit to India was a turning point in my political 
understanding. I learned and recognised that the only wise 
policy for us consisted in adopting positive neutralism and non-
alignment. On my return home, the reception that greeted this 
policy convinced me that it was the sole possible policy t~at 
could attract the broadest support of the Arab people". 
As a result of this, Nasser became a hero not only to the Arab 
people, but throughout the Third World, and Cairo emerged as the Mecca 
of revolutionary leaders, particularly those from Africa. 
Nasser understood non-alignment not to be forming a bloc or a 
"Third Force" in the world, but as a gathering of states to work for 
easing the tension of the cold war and laying the foundations of peace. 
Such a policy (non-alignment) had to support the right of self-
determination and so on. He argued that: 
II We do not wish to insinuate directly or indirectly that the 
states foll~wing the policy of non-alignment aim to create a 
Third bloc". 
1) Bahgat, Korany., Social Change, Charisma and International Behaviou, 
Geneva, 1976, pp.265-266. {2} Nasser's sppech at the Conference of the 
non-aligned movement at Belgrade, 1961, Belgrade 1961, p.44. 
2) Nasser's speech at the conference of the non-aligned movement at 
Belgrade, 1961, Belgrade, 1961, p.44. 
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He added: 
liAs for our international policy, it is one of work for easing 
tension now that humanity has reached a stage where it has become 
a necessity to end the cold war and lay the foundation of peace. 
We support the right of self-determination; we stand by all the 
nations that are struggling for their independence and work 
towards ending the power policies pursued by the big powers. We 
work for the liquidation of the spheres of influence, bearing in 
mind that the independence gained be real so that the smaller 
nations would not be toys in the hands of the big ones. We are 
struggling for the prevention of atomic weapons and for 
disarmament so that all efforts can be directed towards 
development".1 
From the above setting, Nasser emerged as a potentially natural 
leader of the non-aligned movement, and certainly his foreign policy 
was designed on three doctrines, that is: Anti-imperialism, Arab 
Nationalism and Non-Alignment with either of the two super-powers. 
1.4:2 J. NEHRU PRIME MINSTER OF INDIA 
Nehru the then Prime Minster of India, is also regarded as one of 
the first people to call for non-alignment by avoiding the bloc systems 
and international confrontations and conflict. He did not mean non-
alignment as neutrality and a negative policy, but he meant non-
alignment with the military blocs. He once said in this respect that: 
II We have proclaimed during these past years that we will not 
attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do 
with neutrality or anything else or passivity. If there is a big 
war, there 1s no particular reason why we should jump into it. 
Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to 
be neutral •.• we are not going to join a war if we can help it, 
••• we have sought t2 avoid foreign entanglements by not joining 
one bloc or another". 
1) Nasser's speech to the General Co-operation Conference, November 17, 
1958, pp.54-55, Cairo, 1958. 
2) Poplai, S.L., Select Documents of Asian Affairs: India 1947-1950, 
Volume 11: External Affairs (Oxford University Press, 1959), p.l. 
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The above statement shows clearly Nehru's conviction in favour of 
non-alignment even before it was solidly established. He condemned for 
example the British, French and Zionist invasion of Suez as a "naked 
aggression" in 1956 and the Soviet Union's interference in Hungary in 
1956.1 In addition, Nehru conceived non-alignment as not entering 
into military alliances with any country and in particular with any 
country of either the western or the communist bloc. He also conceived 
it as an independent approach to foreign policy, not being tied down to 
any particular line of action because of membership of a cold war bloc, 
and finally, he considered it as an attempt to maintain friendly 
relations with all countries, whether belonging to military blocs or 
not. All the above conceptions were clear in his argument when he was 
defining non-alignment in the following speech: 
"When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously, it 
means non-alignment with military blocs. You cannot have a 
negative policy. The policy is a positive one, a definite one, 
and I hope a dynamic one, but in so far as the military blocs 
today and the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves 
with either bloc. That in itself is not a policy; it is only a 
part of a policy ••• one has to lay stress on the fact that we 
are not parties to the cold war and we are not members of, or 
attached to, any military bloc. The policy itself can only be a 
policy of acting according to our best judgement and furthering 
the principal objectives and ideals that we have ••• " He added 
that "non-alignment2 meant trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries". 
However, despite the fact that India was one of the first 
countries to lead the non-aligned movement, it was still a member of 
the British Commonwealth. 
1) Appadorai, A., "Non-alignment:Some important Issues", International 
Studies, op.cit., p.5. 
2) Nehru, J., His Speeches, September 1957-April, 1963, Delhi: 
Government of India, Minlstry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Publications Division, 1964, Vol.4, p.381. 
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Thus it could be said that, India was not strictly following the 
fundamental principles of the non-aligned movement. 1 It is well to 
bear in mind, however, that Nehru did not see the Commonwealth organ-
ization as an equivalent to the major blocs, and therefore saw no 
conflict in India's membership of the Commonwealth and its major role 
in laying down the foundations for the non-aligned movement at the same 
time. 
As one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement, India 
foresaw its role as a country looking not only for peace and freedom 
for itself, but also as helping other countries to achieve their own 
independence from the dominance of the imperialist countries. 
Some writers interpreted Nehru's intentions as a need for him to 
lead other small countries. 2 Being aware of such interpretations and 
the damage that may be caused to the newly established movement, Nehru 
strongly rejected such an idea. In his own words: 
"Our policy is not a passive policy or a negative policy ••• 
certainly we have done nothing in India to merit leadership of 
anyboqy. It is for us to lead ourselves, then only can we lead 
others properly and I do not wish to place the caje of India at 
any higher level, we have to look after ourselves". 
This clearly indicates that while India was looking outwardly to 
encourage the Third World countries to organize themselves in the non-
aligned movement, it was at the same time looking towards the building 
of its own society if it was to play any significant role on the 
international stage. 
l} A 1 Mo s sa, A., 0 P • c ; t., p. 3 • 
2} Willetts, P., op.cit., p.6. 
3) Pola, S.L., op.cit., pp.24-26. 
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1.4:3 AHMAD SUKARNO PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA 
Indonesia gained independence at the end of 1949 and joined the 
United Nations a year later. There was a combination of factors which, 
taken together played an important part in shaping the Indonesian 
approach to international relations. Such factors included, for 
example, the Japanese anti-western indoctrination particularly during 
the Second World War, and their own struggle for independence in the 
immediate post-war period. 1 These factors among other things, helped 
to direct Indonesian foreign policy into alienating itself from the 
world blocs on the one hand and into becoming anti-imperialist and 
anti-colonialist on the other hand. This is obvious from the words of 
President Sukarno when he stated that: 
"We know a colonialist when we see one. We shall deal as 
effectively with new colonialism as we have dealt with and are 
dealing with the old ones. Do not try to divert our attention 
from the present cancers attacking our bodies ••• we shall be 
equipped to dial with any new imperialism that may try to rear 
its ugly head". 
It is clear from the above that from the start, Sukarno in a way 
committed Indonesia to fight all colonialism and imperialism in the 
world at large, whereas by contrast Nehru was in favour of world peace. 
It is perhaps true to say that Sukarno's drive against colonialism 
was helped by certain internal factors on the domestic front. On the 
one hand there was his desire for a close, friendly relationship with 
China. 
1) Kimche, D., The Afro-Asian Movement, Jerusalem, 1973, p.41. 
2) Sukarno, Dr. A., The Conference of Heads of State or Government of 
non-aligned Countries, September 1-6, 1961, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 
pp.26-3D. 
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On the other hand, there were grave economic, political and 
security problems from which he intended to distract the public's 
attention. 1 These internal factors played their part in projecting a 
militant image of Sukarno at least in so far as world affairs are 
concerned. 
These internal factors were magnified by domestic party squabbles. 
At first, there was a coalition government dominated by the Muslim 
Masjumi Party which was headed by Muhammad Nazir. This government by 
nature was more inclined to follow a policy of Muslim solidarity. 
Later a new government was led by the National Party in a coalition 
with the Socialist Party. The two parties in the new government 
represented a, much more militant and anti-western mood and therefore 
were more inclined towards regionally and internationally directed 
foreign policy. In that sense, the government tried to gather around a 
number of countries with similar international views particularly those 
with neutralist views.* 
Indeed, Indonesia started asserting itself in world affairs on 
issues concerning Asia and Africa. The outcome of these efforts was 
the first Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April, 1955, described 
as "a milestone in Asian-African solidarity".2 
According to David Kimche in The Afro-Asian movement, the 
1) Kimche, D., op.cit., p.41. 
* For an in depth analysis of the world views held by the Indonesian 
ruling elite belonging to the three generations of 1928, 1945 and 
1966, See: Weinstein, Franklin B., Indonesia Foreign Policy and the 
Dilemma of Dependence : From Sukarno to Socharto, New York and 
London, 1976. 
2) Arora, B.D., "Indonesian non-alignment", International Studies, 
op.cit., p.278. 
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foreign policy of Indonesia in the 1950's-1960's was as follows:- 1 
(1) Indonesia renounced membership of any bloc or military pact. 
(2) It favoured Asian problems being solved by the Asians themselves 
including the question of Vietnam. 
(3) Indonesia always supported every struggle for independence 
whichever it was; the strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity was 
the principle part of the independent and active foreign policy of 
Indonesia, a policy which was anti-imperialist and anti-
colonialist. This was in conformity with the firm policy of 
Indonesia in respecting and applying the ten principles of the 
Bandung Conference. 
The above shows clearly that Sukarno was one of the leaders to 
introduce the main principles of non-alignment into the framework of 
his country's foreign policy, in addition to his preaching such 
principles to the world at large. 
1.4:4 J.P. TITO PRESIDENT OF YUGOSLAVIA 
Tito was known as one of the most distinguished fathers of the 
non-aligned movement but, as Peter Willetts argues, Tito's non-
alignment came as late as the beginning of the 1960's. "Thus until 1961 
the key concept in Yugoslavia's foreign policy was not non-alignment 
but peaceful and active co-existence". 2 In another passage he 
suggests that the major reason which made Tito opt for non-alignment 
was the fear of the Soviet Union's threat to Yugoslavia. This argument 
of Peter Willett's does not seem to correspond to Tito's declaration 
in the United Nations in the early 1950's when he said: 
"We oppose the division of the World into blocs ••• and the race 
for armaments; which tends to create a state of supremacy ••• for 
the solution of some problems through the use of force. T~is 
would surely lead to the creation of a state of confrontation" 
1) Rimche, D., op.cit., pp.230-236. 
2) Willetts, Peter., op.cit., pp.230-236. 
3) Shariefy, Bo. Alam., "Tito the hero of freedom and non-alignment". 
Almajahed, volume 1031. May 9. 1980, p.19 (In Arabic). 
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Tito's adoption of socialism did not divert his attention from 
seeking the independence of his country and he was able to keep 
Yugoslavia in a neutral position as regards N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw 
pact. His ideology was communist but he broke from Moscow in 1948 for 
many reasons, some of which, according to David Lane, were the 
following:-* 
(1) The Yugoslavian Socialist leaders, Tito and his followers, 
believed in the triumph of communism, and that the party should be the 
ideological vanguard and the organizer of the workers' movement. 
(2) They criticised the development of Socialism in the Soviet Union, 
especially under Stalin, whom they had previously admired, because of 
its over-centralisation and bureaucratic control. 
(3) They split from the Soviet Union because they believed that the 
Soviet model had become distorted but did not attempt to find out what 
were the principle causes of that distortion. Instead they formulated 
a system that sought to overcome the deficiencies of the Soviet model, 
such as bureaucratic over centralisation. 
(4) They rejected the authoritarian dominance of the communist party 
of the Soviet Union over communist parties in other countries. 
(5) They rejected the idea that the Soviet model of development could 
be the only model. It was true for them that the Soviet had developed 
their own socialism, but they held that there were possibilities for 
other roads to be followed in the development of socialism. 
(6) They accepted co-operation with the democratic socialist parties 
in advanced capitalist countries. On this point David Lane says: 
"In advanced capitalist countries", argue the Yugoslavs, "the 
forces of socialism are much stronger than they were before the 
Second World War, and social democratic parties and trade Unions 
have an important part to play in achieving Socialism. In this 
situation therefore, communist parties should co-operate with 
social democratic parties". 
During the 1950's Tito had a close relationship with Nasser of 
Egypt. He supported Egypt against the aggression of Britain, France 
* For further reading on the split of 1948 between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union, See for example, David Lane, The Socialist Industrial 
State, London, 1976. 
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and Zionism following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956; 
and he was of much help and support to the movements of liberation in 
the world such as the Algerian revolution against French colonialism in 
1954-1962.1 In addition he was against the interference of countries 
in the internal affairs of others and so he broke off his country's 
relations with Zionism after its 1967 war against the neighbouring Arab 
countries and the occupation of some of their territories. 2 
The above outlines, though very briefly, the grounds on which the 
leaders met to build the base for the non-aligned movement. It was 
perhaps not only their own aspirations for the independence of the 
small countries in the Third World, but also the historical 
circumstances with which they were confronted either domestically or 
internationally, which were vital factors for them in finding common 
grounds for the establishment of the non-aligned movement. 
However, after having discussed earlier the definition of non-
alignment and the theoretical basis in relation to non-alignment and 
the founders of the non-aligned movement, we may ask, what are the 
differences between non-alignment and neutralism. In what follows we 
will see the main differences between these. 
1.5 THE NON-AlIGNED MOVEMENT AND NEUTRALISM 
The study of neutralism in international relations gains con-
siderable importance particularly in the attempt to understand non-
alignment as a concept. This importance comes about because sometimes 
there seems to be some confusion between the two concepts. 
1) Shariefy, Bo. Alam., op.cit., p.ll. 
2) Willetts, P., op.cit., p.17. 
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We have already defined non-alignment in the present chapter as a 
"socia1 and political movement aiming at changing the system of the 
present economic and political relations in the wor1d". By contrast 
Black for example, defines a neutral state as fo110ws:-
"A neutral state is one whose political independence and 
territorial integrity are guaranteed permanently by a collective 
agreement of great powers, subject to the conditions that the 
neutralized state will not take up arms against another state 
except to defend itself, and will not assumj treaty obligations 
which may compromise its neutralized status". 
Now, in reading the above definition, one could find distinctive 
aspects of neutralism. For one thing the neutral state's territory is 
guaranteed by a collective agreement of great powers. On the other 
hand, there are specific conditions to be met for a country to be 
neutral, particularly the fact that such a country must not take up 
arms against others except in self defence. Also, it must not enter 
into another agreement which contradicts its neutral status. 
The above clearly shows that neutralism and non-alignment are 
quite different concepts. Having established the basic conditions for 
neutralism, it is important to note that neutralism does not apply only 
to states, but also to uninhabited areas such as waterways and such 
like. 
As was said before, for a state to be neutralized there needs to 
be an agreement between two or more great powers to guarantee its 
neutral status as the diagrams No. 1.1 and No. 1.2 on the next page 
show. 
1) Black, Cyril E., Fa1k, Richard, A., Neutralization and World 
Politics, New Jersey, U.S.A., 1968, p.13. 
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In addition, in the case of waterways there is usually more than 
one great power, hence a bilateral or multilateral agreement is reached 
among interested countries so that the waterway in question can be 
neutralised. Diagram No.1.2 on the first page explains this idea. 
However, while the above mentioned cases, that is, the case of a 
territory or that of a waterway, may be within an internationally 
recognised state, yet a third kind of neutralism may be found in 
inhabited areas without international recognition as in the case of 
Kashmir. 
Moreover, while neutralism could be seen to playa negative role 
in world activities, non-alignment by contrast is viewed as playing a 
positive role particularly in its support for liberation movements 
either against colonialism or any other sort of suppression. 
From the view point of a neutral state, the effect of 
neutralisation is to support its military security and neutralisation 
may stop them from engaging in military actions. A neutralised state 
must not adhere to any treaty, icluding defensive alliances and must 
not join a customs or economic union, which might in any way jeopardize 
its independence of political action. 1 
In addition, some writers have argued that "a neutral state cannot 
join a military alliance in time of peace, because in so doing it would 
destroy its ability to remain neutral in time of war". 2 Further, a 
1) Ogley, R., The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth 
Century, London, 1970, p.184. 
2) agley, R., op.cit., p.41. 
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neutral state must bar foreign military bases from its territory and 
its military capability may be positively used as part of the peace 
keeping forces of the United Nations and regional organisations. 
It could be said that, from the viewpoint and definition above the 
neutral states will not take up arms, but then the question that should 
be asked is who will be responsible for the neutral states if any 
aggression arises? 
It is obvious that it is the responsibility the other signatory 
powers, when the neutralized status of that state has been violated by 
deliberate aggression. The signatory powers will support them in three 
ways, collectively, individually or both. While the guarantor must 
support them against any aggression, he must not support any domestic 
revolutionaries against the government of a neutralized state or vice 
versa. 
Finally, the difference between the neutralized state and non-
alignment is clear. Whereas neutral states are concerned with keeping 
out of war when it comes, non-alignment is an active policy in the 
sense that a non-aligned state, unlike a neutral one, can fight its own 
wars and still be non-aligned, as India has done with Pakistan in the 
1970s and Iraq with Iran in the 1980s while neutral states cannot do 
that. 
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It was argued in this chapter that the second half of the 
twentieth century witnessed a radical change in world politics and the 
emergence of new political and military strategies in a merciless race 
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which divided the world into military blocs. The Western bloc and 
the Eastern bloc, have been involved in an arms race and the struggle 
between the two has been going on since the Second World War. They 
attempted to ally other countries with them, especially 'developing' 
and newly independent nations. The super-powers followed tactics of 
direct and indirect involvement towards the Third World countries to 
ally them to their side. They divided some nations such as Germany, 
Vietnam, Korea and others under claims of stopping other ideologies. 
Also, in the United Nations Organization, the super-powers were, 
as they still are, dominating the whole organization through their 
right of veto in the Security Council and through their financial 
support. Given these facts, despite the increase in membership of 
the world organization, brought about particularly by the newly 
independent countries of the Third World, the super-powers were able 
to safeguard their interests. 
In opposing the Cold War and the super-powers' attempts to ally 
other countries with them, the Third World leaders such as Nehru, 
Nasser, Tito and Sukarnu, came together and established the non-aligned 
movement. This movement is different completely from the well known 
military pacts. The non-aligned movement as the most important 
grouping representing the Third World's views within the United 
Nation's Organizations, has an important role to play through co-
operating with each other and negotiating with the super-powers if 
they can, aiming for changes, or gaining more representatives in the 
Security Councilor such like. 
Non-alignment has two different meanings, on the one hand, it 
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refers to the participation of a state in the formal Non-aligned 
Movement, whether it is closely aligned with a super-power or not, 
such as Cuba with the Soviet Union bloc. 
The other meaning, based on its founding principles I would say 
is that it is a contemporary social phenomenon which has appeared 
in recent times, in the form of an ideal and hope for the future, 
expressing strong and fundamental needs of the Third World nations 
for disassociation from the major power blocs, achievement of economic 
development, political independence, and positive participation in 
the world community. 
This movement was established under the following aims: 
Firstly: The essence of the policy of non-alignment was a 
deliberate and calculated refusal to enter into any military or 
political commitment with any of the super-powers or to permit foreign 
military bases on one's territory. 
Secondly: The non-aligned countries adopted non-alignment in 
opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. Also, after getting 
their political freedom, the newly independent nations were looking 
for economic development and wished not to be dependent on super-
powers. 
They followed the above aims and ideals because most of the Third 
World countries were suffering or had suffered, as some countries 
still suffer, from direct dependence on and domination by a foreign 
power. 
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It seems to me that to achieve the above aims and ideals as we 
saw earlier in the introduction the non-aligned countries need national 
leaders whose aims and ideal are to be genuinely non-aligned and 
independent in foreign policy as was the case with Nehru, Nasser, 
Tito, and Sukarnu. 
Those founders of the Non-aligned Movement came together and 
established the Movement as a vehicle of a positive foreign policy 
different from that of neutralism. 
The differences between the concepts of Non-alignment and 
neutralism were explained as follows:-
(1) Neutral states are concerned with keeping out of war when 
it comes, while non-alignment is an active policy. In other words, 
neutrality involved abstention from all conflicts, whereas, non-
alignment only involves abstention from the cold war between the super-
powers. 
(2) The neutral state's territory is guaranteed by a collective 
agreement of great powers. Also, such a country must not enter into 
another agreement which contradicts its neutral status. Whereas non-
alignment is an independent foreign policy. 
(3) Neutralism does not apply only to states, but also to 
uninhabited areas such as waterways and such like, while non-alignment 
applies only to states. 
Having discussed the meanings of non-alignment, its aims and 
ideals, the reasons which led to the establishment of the Movement 
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and the major differences between the concepts of neutralism and non-
alignment, our analysis will concentrate in the following chapter on 
examining the evolution of the movement from the Bandung Afro-Asian 
Conference in 1955 until the early 1980s. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ITS AIMS, PROBLEMS 
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT WHICH EMERGED FROM ITS SUCCESSIVE CONFERENCES 
CHAPTER TWO 
The evolution of the non-aligned movement: Its aims, problems, and 
its developments which emerged from its succesive conferences 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one the world-wide circumstances within which the 
ideal of Inon-alignmentl emerged were described and also it was argued 
that Inon-alignmentl should not be equated with neutralism, but seen 
as a more active independent foreign policy in world affairs. 
Furthermore, the founders of independent foreign policy, i.e. non-
alignment, aimed to achieve socio-economic and political development 
by following their aims of anti-colonialism and anti-neo-colonialism 
and non-alignment to the military power blocs. Also, we saw the 
differences between non-alignment according to its original principles 
and non-alignment as membership and participation of a state in the 
formal Non-aligned Movement whether it was clearly aligned with a 
super-power or not, as was the case with Cuba. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent the 
non-aligned countries have followed the ideal and aims of genuine 
non-alignment. In other words, we will see in this chapter whether 
the Non-aligned Movement have put the principles of non-alignment 
into practice or not. 
In section one, our analysis will be to examine and concentrate 
on the beginnings of non-alignment as a group of countries defined 
and discussed their aims and principles of non-alignment at the Afro-
Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. The founders of the Non-aligned 
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Movement went on to establish their movement, not against any 
particular type of social system or against any blocs, Western or 
Eastern, but rather the non-aligned states perceived the actions of 
both groups, i.e. the West and the Communist bloc in similar terms. 
These points are dealt with in section two. 
The Non-aligned Movement was not a stationary organization, but 
rather a movement that responded to developments in the world's 
affairs. While the changes in the movement's thinking and orientation 
changed during the 1960s to accommodate both internal and external 
changes, i.e. from within the movement and from the rest of the world, 
yet further changes that appeared during the 1970s warranted a fresh 
look on the part of the movement at the new issues. Hence, section 
three, focuses on the response of the movement to developments during 
the Seventies. 
Also, during the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen 
which may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement 
and its continuity. One such issue is the Iraqi-Iranian war. This 
war between two member countries has certainly brought to the fore 
two issues:-
Firstly, that some of the movement's member countries aligned 
themselves directly or indirectly with one of these countries against 
the other; and, 
Secondly, this war put the credibility and authority of the 
movement to solve its internal problems at stake. 
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It is therefore rather important to discuss such developments, 
even though the period is a relatively short one, because the outcome 
may affect the future of the movement. This discussion will be in 
section four. 
The fact is that, over the last three decades or so, the subjects 
addressed by the movement have appealed to most of the Third World 
countries, because they concerned each and every country separately 
and all countries collectively. Moreover, the movement has become 
an international forum for developing countries, since the movement's 
membership has increased several times whether the new members are 
following the principles of non-alignment or not. This is the subject 
of section five. This is followed by concluding remarks. 
The Afro-Asian Conference (The Bandung 1955 Conference) 
At no time in the history of the conferences of the Afro-Asian 
countries has non-alignment been discussed so seriously as in the 
early period. The views in these conferences showed different 
tendencies as to what should concern the camp's policy. It;s worth 
noting that in this Conference three different directions of thinking 
emerged which affected the later history of the Non-aligned Movement. 
On the one hand, some new marxist writers saw most if not all, Third 
World countries as being bound to the West by a complex network of 
links to maintain capitalist exploitation.1 This approach builds its 
basic idea on the West's maintaining a new form of economic colonialism 
even after such countries have achieved some sort of political 
independence. 
1) Willetts, P., The Non-aligned Movement, op.cit., p.209. 
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On the other hand, others postulated that each state had its own 
interests and therefore had a degree of alignment with the West 
depending on the particular government's perception of such 
interests. 1 
In view of the above, it is clear that in the Bandung conference 
such differences were in the forefront of the debate. Some countries 
were inclined to the West, and the holders of this view were the 
Philippines, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Thailand, 
Pakistan, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Liberia.* The second group i.e. 
North Vietnam and the representatives of the Republic of China was 
adamant in rejecting the idea of aligning the movement more to the 
West. 
In addition to the above tendencies, there was a third group which 
represented a different attitude, preferring non-alignment as defined 
in Chapter One and these were, Egypt, India and Indonesia. 
Despite the fact that there were different degrees and variations 
from one country to another, some of the countries which attended the 
conference were still either under colonial rule or members of 
alliances such as SEATO or CENTO. The number of fully independent 
countries, i.e. neither colonies no dependencies, who attended the 
conference was relatively small compared to the subsequent conferences 
of the non-aligned movement. Because of the importance of the Bandung 
conference, in what follows the countries represented at the conference 
in April 1955 are listed. 
1) Ibid., p.209. 
* Romulo, C., The meaning of Bandung, Chapel Hill, N.C. 1956, pp.3-4. 
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The Bundung conference was held from 18 to 24 April 1955, in 
Indonesia and twenty-nine Afro-Asian countries were called to attend. 
Twenty-three countries represented Asia and only six countries 
represented Africa, because most African countries were under Western 
colonial rule. The Bandung conference was attended by representatives 
of the governments of:-
Indonesia 
Burma 
Laos 
Iraq 
Lebanon 
Nepal 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
Ceylon 
Ethiopia 
Japan 
Libya 
Sudan 
Yemen 
Afghani stan 
India 
Iran 
Jordan 
Liberi a 
Thailand 
Nth. Vietnam 
The Republic of China 
Egypt 
The Phil i ppi nes 
The Gold Coast 
Syria 
Saudi Arabia 
Sth. Vietnam 
Cambodia 
This gathering took into consideration some very important issues 
concerning the members of the movement and all other less-developed 
countries. The discussions revolved around three, main issues: The 
identity of non-alignment, colonialism, and economic co-operation. 
These three issues, represented the common denominators shared by the 
Afro-Asian countries. 
The issue of colonialism was considered a very important one. It was 
one of the major problems from which most of the partiCipating 
countries were suffering or had suffered, from foreign dependence and 
dominance. However, it was felt that there was disagreement over the 
definition of the concept of colonialism and the determiniation of its 
nature. 
Some delegations saw colonialism as the result of Western 
domination only, that is, colonialism in the sense that countries lack 
political independence. Red China for example stated that, "The sin of 
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colonialism was peculiar to the West and that they were above it ll .! 
Others saw colonialism as more general and attacked communism as a 
form of colonialism: IIFadhel Jamali of Iraq then unlimbered his guns 
for a withering attach on communism, as a form of colonialism more 
deadly than the 01d ll • 2 Also, Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of 
Ceylon attacked IIcommunist colonialism". He declared himself against 
all forms of colonialism, including communist domination of satellite 
states in Europe. 3 Colonialism for others, such as Egypt and India, 
was any type of dominance either from the East or the West. 
However, the debate over defining colonialism continued until it 
was agreed to use the term "colonialism" in the more general sense. 
This agreement brought about a solution to the differences among the 
participants in such a way that since then, colonialism as a concept 
has been treated as a single undivided issue, that is, all forms of 
aspects of colonialism from whatever quarter they come are dealt with 
on the same basis. 
When debating the concept and identity of non-alignment there were 
big controversies about the meaning of the concept of alliance and non-
alignment, because many of the participating countries saw the 
necessity for their own alliance to one of the super-powers. They were 
very much influenced by the consequences and the general climate left 
by the cold war and its effects on the Third World countries. 
1) Romulo, C.P., The meaning of Bandung, op.cit., p.IS. 
2) Ibid •• p.22. 
3) Ibid •• p.27. 
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This idea was defended by Fadhal Jamali, the delegate of Iraq, 
Charles Malek, the delegate of Lebanon, and General Romulo of the 
Philippines. Their argument was based on the following points:-1 
Firstly, some small countries have no choice, but to ally with one 
of the big powers to protect themselves; they are not big enough as 
India is, to manage to protect themselves on their own without alliance 
with any other country. Secondly, the Afro-Asian countries which 
gathered in Bandung did not represent an alternative to the military 
pacts, which other countries could join. Therefore, they found a 
justification for their alliance to pacts of other, militarily 
stronger, countries. 
The other group, represented by Nehru, stood very firm in 
defending the idea of non-alignment, stating clearly the danger and 
humiliation which could result from the alliance of any Afro-Asian 
country to the conflicting super-powers. At that stage Nehru argued at 
the Bandung conference that: 
"We are not yes men sitting here saying "yes" to this country or 
that, saying "yes" even to each other. We are great countries, 
who like having freedom without dictation in the future. No "yes 
men" in Asia or Africa. We have had enough of that in the 
past". 2 
However, in an effort to end the long-lasting arguments, the 
conference finally reached a relatively satisfactory solution 
acceptable to both groups, that is, the recognition of the policy of 
pacts. This has meant the recognition of the right of each country to 
1) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., p.58. 
2) Babaa, K.I. and Crabb, C. JR., "Non-alignment as a deplomatic and 
ideological credo", liThe Annals of the American Acadel1\Y of Political 
and Social Science, Volume 363, November 1965, p.? 
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defend itself individually and collectively, according to the United 
Nations Charter. 
On economic co-operation, the Afro-Asian conference focused on the 
necessity of promoting economic development and economic co-operation 
between the Third World countries, but in areas of interest to each 
nation, to the extent that it would not interfere with their individual 
integrity and sovereignty. 
In addition to that, the countries stressed the need for economic 
co-operation, the flow of more resources, stabilization in world trade, 
i.e. commodity prices and demand, changing the nature of demand for 
primary commodities and the development of infrastructures. In 
pursuit of that aim the influence of member countries present at the 
United Nations resulted in the creation of a Special United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) and the establishment of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), within the framework of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRID), to 
promote equity investment i.e. capitalism and joint ventures in the 
Afro-Asian countries. 1 
The non-aligned countries were already looking to the United 
Nations and the World Bank to promote their economic development. In 
addition, some countries while recognising the political and 
ideological differences among the wide range of member countries, 
argued very strongly at the Bandung conference that close co-operation 
and co-ordination among them within the movement was not only feasible, 
but necessary. This was reflected for example in Chou En Lai's 
1) Watson, H.A., The Non-aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit., 
p.135. 
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statements: 
"We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries we do 
have different ideologies and different social systems, but this 
does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being "United" 
"We should leave aside our different ideologies, our differing 
state systems, and the international obligations which we have 
assumed by joining this side or that side. We should instead 
settle all question which m~y arise among us on the basis of 
common peace and co-operation". 
Despite the fact that there were diverging trends and tendencies, 
the conference made a great effort, and achieved many positive results. 
The conference as we have already stated contained pro-western as well 
as pro-communist countries, but it succeeded in not only narrowing the 
gap between these two diverging trends, but also succeeded in 
convincing some countries such as Iraq to change their policies (from 
pro-western to pro-Soviet when the Qasim regime took over in 1958) and 
others to take a milder position towards their alliances. 
The decisions reached at the Bandung conference were stated in an 
official publication on April 24th, 1955. The decision emphasized an 
increase in mutual aid between the Afro-Asian countries in order to 
find the best ways to confront their economic crisis. It also called 
for cultural aid, because it said, colonial domination was delaying 
this aid or making it impossible. Today when most countries have 
become politically independent it is now possible to make available 
increasing aid by establishing universities, professional and 
specialized centres. 
While the points discussed above are general and necessarily cover 
a wide range of issues, it is clear that in the Bandung conference, the 
1) Uinacke, H.M., "The Annals of the American Acadamy, op.cit., p.116. 
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movement was looking for a definite identity. This is particularly 
apparent if one notices the regional flavour of most of the issues 
presented and tackled in the conference. 
The final communique of the conference identified the "Ten 
Principles of Peaceful CO-Existence", which in a sense laid down the 
basic principles on which the movement would start. These principles 
are summarized as follows:-
AGENDA NO. 2.1 
The Bandung Conference Principles*, April 1955, (Bandung-Indonesia) 
1. Respect of the basic rights of man and the aims and principles of 
the United Nations Charter. 
2. Respect of the sovereignty and integrity of the lands of all 
states. 
3. Recognition of equality among all races and states large and 
small. 
4. Refraining from interference in the internal affairs of other 
states. 
5. Respect of the right of every state to self defence individually 
or jointly according to the United Nations Charter. 
6. Refraining from using joint defence arrangements fro the benefit 
of any of the super-powers, and any state to refrain from using 
pressures on any other state. 
7. Refraining from threat, aggression or use of force against the 
integrity of lands or the political independence of any state. 
8. Resolving all international differences by peaceful means, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
9. Encouragement of joint interests and co-operation. 
10. Respect of international friendship and commitments. 
* In addition, the conference discussed other things, such as 
problems of dependent peoples and cultural co-operation. 
SOURCE: See C. Romulo, op.cit, pp.91-102 
The period between the Bandung conference and the Belgrade Summit 
conference, 1955-1961, witnessed a close relationship between Nasser of 
Egypt, Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia. particularly after the 
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Suez crisis. They worked together as non-aligned countries. They held 
a meeting between all of them in July 1956 in Yugoslavia. This 
meeting was important because subsequently it had a wide ranging impact 
on the development of the movement as already hinted in Chapter One. 
Yugoslavia was a communist European country and by becoming non-
aligned it widened the international context of the movement. On the 
other hand, it meant that the movement was not only for the countries 
which had suffered direct colonialism, but was also open to all the 
countries not wishing to enter the military pacts of the super-powers. 
Also the acceptance of the membership of Yugoslavia, introduced new 
policies different from those of both East and West. 
The meeting of the leaders of the non-aligned countries, held in 
July 1956 in Yugoslavia, between Nasser. Nehru and Tito, resulted in 
the call for a preliminary meeting for a conference at Belgrade. Also, 
they adopted "positive neutralism" as their definition of non-
alignment, by which these states declared they were not going to be 
involved in the cold war. One of the many things that these three 
founders of non-alignment had in common was their opposition to Great 
Powers alliances. For example, Egypt and India were opposed to the 
Baghdad pact and SEATO, while Yugoslavia was opposed to the Warsaw 
pact. 
As we saw earlier, the non-aligned countries at the Bandung 
conference were divided into three groups, pro-western, pro-eastern and 
the genuinely non-aligned group. In the 1960's, the movement witnessed 
new developments such as international definition, stability and a new 
constitution. In what follows therefore, we will shed some light 
on the non-aligned movements development during this period. 
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2.2 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE 1960s : PRIORITIES, STABILITY 
INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION AND NEW CONSTITUTION 
In the 1960s, the movement's attention was diverted for the first 
time from focusing on regional issues towards an emphasis on 
international issues, such as the movement's international definition 
and aims. At the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961, the non-aligned 
countries declared that, the non-aligned movements establishment was 
not against any countries or against any blocs, Western or Eastern or 
against any particular type of social system. It was a social movement 
looking for international peace and freedom; equality and so on. This 
is clear from Sukarno's words at the Belgrade Summit Conference in 
1961, when he said: 
"Non-alignment is not directed against anyone country or against 
anyone bloc or against any particular type of social system. It 
is our common conviction that a policy of non-alignment is the 
best way for each of us to make a positive contribution towards 
the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international 
tensions". 
Sukarno also added: 
II We mean that all nations must become independent. All nations 
must have the freedom to be free. We mean that no power shall 
interfere in the struggle of any other nation to find its own 
national concept, that no power shall attempt to force any other 
na t i on to change its ideology". 
Furthermore, during 1960s, there was general agreement that the 
basic tenet of non-alignment had crystalized: no military or political 
alliance with super-powers and an active role in the international 
system. 
1) Sukarno, A., Sppech at the Belgrade Conference 1961, The Conference 
of Heads of State or Governments of Non-aligned Countries, Belgrade, 
1961, pp.26-30. 
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The movement's role and activity in the United Nations General Assembly 
was made known in the following argument: 
"We are not neutral, we want it understood that we do not welcome this 
appelation of being called neutral or .•• neutralist whatever it means. 
We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialism and other 
countries ... our position is that we are unaligned and 
uncommitted, in relation to the Cold War, we do not belong to one camp 
or another".1 
It could be said that during the 1960s, the non-aligned movement 
was led and dominated by its founders, Nasser, Nehru and Tito and that 
the movement became more stable in that period, perhaps because of the 
absence of countries which were members of pacts with super-powers from 
the non-aligned conferences, such as Pakistan, China and the 
Philippines. Taking a quick glance over the agenda of the non-aligned 
movement conferences during the 1960s, we can see that most of 
Nasser's proposals passed into the non-aligned movement's communiques 
during that decade. For example, the responsibility of the non-aligned 
movement to work among themselves for peace and so on.* Figure 2.1 
shows that Nasser and Nehru dominated most of the non-aligned movement 
between them. Because the non-aligned movement was led by its founders 
during the 1960s, the member states evaluated the West and the 
Communists in the same terms. 
The non-aligned states perceived the actions of both groups also 
in similar terms. In addition, the non-aligned states' actions towards 
1) U.N. General Assembly Official Record, 1960 pp.444-446. 
* For more details See: Nasser's proposals at the Belgrade Conference 
1961. The Conference of Heads of State or Government, op.cit., pp.48-
51. 
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FIGURE 2.1 Shows that: Nasser and Nehru dominated most of the 
non-aligned movement in the 1960s 
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SOURCE: Jansen, G.H., Afro-Asian and Non-alignment, London, 1966 
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East and West did not differ significantly and did not display 
differing levels of co-operation. 
The actions of non-aligned states were congruent with their 
attitudes; overt behaviour and perceputal assessments were not 
incongruent with official policy. In addition, after the 1960 ls 
conferences and meetings of the non-aligned countries, two more 
important issues were more or less clear to the movement. On the one 
hand, the movement defined its identity as one based on a long cultural 
tradition redefined to cope with the challenges of modern life. On the 
other hand, they redefined their international role and function as one 
of mediation between conflicting parties in the world as well as 
reducing tension and instability at international level. 1 
This was a clear departure from the past conferences in the sense 
that the emphasis shifted from a regional, inward looking discussion to 
broadly based international issues that concerned the world at large. 
Since then, the movement has presented itself to the world as an 
international grouping that, while it has been so far on the receiving 
end, should have a bearing on world issues as well. 
Also, in the 1960s, the world witnessed many events, such as the 
attempts at disarmament, the building of the Berlin Wall and other 
events. Under the above circumstances, when the non-aligned summit 
conference opened at Belgrade in 1961, the question of security and 
disarmament was immediately relevant to the conference. 
1) Chouri. N. , liThe non-al i gnment of Afro-Asi an States, Pol icy, 
Perception and Behaviour". Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
Volume 11. March 1969. pp.3-5. 
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The Belgrade Summit Conference adopted a special 'statement on the 
danger of war and an appeal for peace and sent Sukarno and Keito to 
Moscow and Nehru and Nkrumah to Washington as special emissaries with 
letters appealing for further talks between Kennedy and Khrushchev. 1 
The non-aligned summit conference at Belgrade in 1961 discussed many 
important issues in addition to the question of security, such as anti-
colonialism; problems of unequal economic development; promotion of 
international economic and technical co-operation besides others. (For 
more details see the Agenda of the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961 
in Appendix No.1). 
As for the anti-colonial problem it could be said that from the 
beginning anti-colonialism was one of the criteria of non-alignment. 
Despite the fact that the letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev made a 
great impact, we can see from the agenda of the summit conference in 
1961, that the main declaration devoted the first eight of the twenty 
seven specific points with which it ended, to anti-colonial issues. 2 
The economic problem received very little attention in 1961, 
perhaps because at the time, the non-aligned countries were looking for 
world security, peaceful existence and disarmament. 
The Cairo conference communique in 1964, gave even more attention 
to security problems with eight separate sections on the codification 
of peaceful co-existence, on respect for soveriegnty, on settlement of 
1) The Collected Documents. op.cit., pp.1-2. 
2) Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.24-26. 
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disputes without force and disarmament as shown in the Agenda in 
Appendix No.L 
The economic problem received much more attention at the Cairo 
summit conference in 1964 than at the Belgrade summit conference in 
1961 as the agendas show. At the Lusaka summit conference in 1970, 
anti-colonialism, apartheid and imperialism were raised to being the 
main items on the agenda, besides the forces of racism. It can be seen 
from the 1961-1970 summit resolutions that it was the African countries 
that took the lead in most of these resolutions, because most of the 
African countries were in those years emerging from colonial rule. 
Also, the section on 'economic development and co-operation I in the 
1970 final document was second only to the section on colonialism in 
length. 1 
The proposals adopted were mainly a reiteration of previous 
demands on the U.N. and the developed countries for an increase in 
development decade targets, more and better aid. better terms of trade, 
a new U.N. industrial agency and so on. 2 At the third summit 
conference in Lusaka in 1970, the disarmament and the general security 
questions received relatively little attention perhaps because some 
dangerous events in the world had settled down such as the Cuba 
missiles crisis. 
However, this process of change in attitude as well as the level 
and scope of the movement's orientation to the issues was further 
elaborated on and enhanced in the period 1961-1964. i.e. from after the 
1) Ibid •• p.26. 
2) Ibid •• p.26. 
- 101 -
Belgrade conference up to and including the Cairo and Lusaka summit 
conferences. 
Furthermore, the 1960's summit conferences of the non-aligned 
countries, particularly the Lusaka summit conference adopted a non-
aligned constitution by which the non-aligned countries agreed to 
follow the following:-1 
Firstly, they decided to hold meetings on a regular basis at a 
variety of levels of representation. This now means that summit 
conferences are held every three years. They have been held for 
example in 1973, 1976 and in 1979 at Algiers, Colombo and Havana. The 
participating countries at the sixth summit conference at Havana in 
1979 decided that the seventh summit conference would be held at 
Baghdad in 1982, but because the war between Iraq and Iran was still 
going on, they agreed to change the place to India and the date to 
7-11 March, 1983. 
The second measure taken at the end of the 1970 summit conference 
was to appoint as official spokesman, the Chairman President of the 
movement. This role as spokesman or leader of the non-aligned 
countries was given for a three year period until the following summit 
conference, for example, the leader of the non-aligned countries during 
the period 1979-1982 was F. Castro of Cuba. 
Thirdly, they agreed to re-establish a permanent executive 
committee for the movement to maintain liaison and co-ordination with 
1) For more details see: The Documents of the Non-aligned Movement, 
op.cit., and Willetts, P., op.cit., pp.36-38. 
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Zambia to prepare for the summit conference. (For more details see 
later.) 
Finally, they agreed to develop an active group to work at the 
United Nations. It could be said that the non-aligned group started to 
operate after 1971 and became more active from 1973, but we may add, 
however, that these decisions were not always put into practice, 
particularly the activity in the United Nations.* For more details of 
the lusaka Summit Conference in 1970 Resolutions, See Appendix No.1. 
In addition to the 1960's summit conferences, there were other 
conferences and meetings in different places in the world. These 
meetings and conferences were held in the context of an international 
situation characterized by an intensification of the struggle of the 
peoples of the world for their political and economic independence and 
for an economic order based on universally accepted principles. 
The non-aligned movement was not a stationery organization, but 
rather a movement that responded to the development in the world's 
affairs. While the changes in the movement's thinking and orientation 
have changed during the 1960s to accommodate both internal and 
external changes, i.e. from within the movement and from the rest of 
the world, yet new changes that appeared during the 1970's warranted a 
fresh look on the part of the movement at the new issues. 
Hence, we continue our discussion in what follows, focusing on the 
response of the movement to the developments during the seventies. 
* For more details see: Willetts, P., op.cit, pp.34-40. 
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2.3 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE 19705 NEW LEADERS AND NEW 
DEVELOPMENT. 
After the Lusaka 1970 Summit Conference, the non-aligned movement 
had to face two important new situations. On the one hand, the 
movement lost some of its founders such as Nasser, Nehru and Sukarno 
and on the other hand the movement tried in the 1970s to project its 
views and functions to the international community through negotiation 
at the United Nations with the Northern countries in an attempt to 
change the international economic system, and the international 
information order, and other problems in the world, to promote peace. 
Firstly, in the 1970s the non-aligned movement faced new 
development. The movement lost more of its founders and for that 
reason perhaps, allowed new leaders such as Fidel Castro and others 
from the pro-communist camp to playa role in the movement. These in 
turn tried to steer the movement towards their own aims. In other 
words what happened gave some leaders the chance to pull the movement 
towards the communist bloc and away from the capitalist one. This was 
clear when Fidel Castro argued at the Algiers Summit Conference in 
1973: 
"I want to remind you that Cuba is a socialist country, Marxist-
Leninist, whose final goal is communism. We are proud of this! 
The theory of "Two imperial isms", one headed by the USA and the 
other allegedly headed by the Soviet Union has been echoed by 
leaders and spokesmen of non-aligned countries. Any attempt to 
put the non-aligned countries against the socialist camp is 
profoundly counter revolutionary and benefits only imperialist 
interests. Inventing a false enemy can have only one aim, to 
evade the real enemy. Any enstrangement from the socialist camp 
means weakening and exposing ourselves to the mercy of the still 
powerful forces of imperialism. It would bela stupid strategy, a 
case of severe political short sightedness". 
1) Leo Grande, William M., "Problems of Communism", January-February, 
1980, Edited by Smith, Paul A., JR, Volume XXIX 1980, p.42, U.S.A. 
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From Castro's argument, it is clear that the new international 
leaders such as Castro himself tried to steer the movement away from 
its original aims. This point gave the non-aligned nations in the 
1970's conferences no less a problem than how to define the future 
course of their movement. In the light of Castro's arguments to steer 
the non-aligned movement away from its principle of non-alignment 
between the super-powers, we may ask the question: How did the Cuban 
government come to the leadership of the non-aligned movement in 1979? 
Historically, Cuba had been among the original 21 countries 
invited in April 1961, by President Nasser and Tito to a conference 
that was to oppose the military pressures of the super-powers. 1 The 
Cuban government took part and sent representatives to the summit of 
the non-aligned movement during the 19605, but made no attempt to 
exercise leadership in that period, perhaps because of the attendance 
of the non-aligned movement's founders. The absence of the non-aligned 
movement's founders in 1970 gave Cuba a chance to take on a new role. 
This happened after the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973.* The summit 
set up a new co-ordinating Bureau** and Cuba was elected a member and 
the second ministerial conference of the Bureau was held in Havana in 
March 1975. Later in that year, the non-aligned movement's meeting in 
Peru recommended acceptance of a Cuban offer to host the sixth summit 
conference and a definite decision to go to Havana in 1979 was taken by 
the participating countries at the fifth summit conference at Colombo 
in 1976. 
1) Jankowitsch. 0 .• and Sauvant, K.P., The Third World without Super-
Powers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, New 
York. 1978. vol.I. pp.I2-28 and pp.33-34, and vol .11. pp.922-948. 
and vol.11. pp.759-760. 
* For the invitations sent out in April 1961, see volume 1, pp.33-34 
and for the delegation to the Summit, see volume 1, pp.12-28. 
** The first summit Castro attended was the Algiers Summit in 1973. 
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While the Colombo decision represented the high point of Cuba's 
position, 38 of the 85 countries opposed this decision, perhaps because 
of Cuba's policy and her attempt to steer the movement towards the 
communist bloc. 1 Therefore, because of the fact that the non-aligned 
movement encompassed nearly every shade of political opinion, it was 
divided on most issues, its members falling into three broad groups. 
The radicals generally leaned towards the Soviet Union or China, the 
conservatives, usually leaning towards the West especially the United 
States of America and the Independents sticking to the original purpose 
of the movement - non-alignment with any super-powers. 2 
The second development of the 1970s summit conferences, was the 
non-aligned countries' attempt to put their role into practice, by 
discussing at the conferences of the 1970s, in addition to the issues 
debated at the previous conferences, new issues such as demands to 
change the international information order, the international economic 
system, the establishment of the co-ordinating Bureau, and other 
matters. 
In 1972, the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries had a 
meeting at Georgetown and they formulated declarations and programmes 
of action. Two major economic declarations were adopted at Georgetown. 
Firstly, an action programme for economic co-operation among non-
aligned countries. Secondly, action for international co-operation for 
the economic development of developing countries. 
1) See Jankowftsch, 0., and Sauvant, K.P., op.cit., volume 11, pp.922-
48 and Willetts, P., op.cit., p.9. 
2) See: Newsweek, "Alignments of the Non-Aligned", September 17th, 
1979, p.14. 
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In other words there was a call for action on the problems of 
primary commodity producers in the areas of raw materials; 
manufacturing; development finance and co-operation between countries 
with different economic systems. 1 
The Algiers Summit Conference in 1973 saw the emergence of a new 
economic and political awareness. In effect the conference continued 
at the United Nations.* However, two quite different matters were 
raised in Algiers-political concepts formulated by members of the non-
aligned movement and economic proposals accepted by the United Nations 
General Assembly. In the political concepts, while the movement 
equated the Soviet Union and the United States of America as 
"imperialist super-powers", some new leaders saw the world as being 
divided into governments which supported imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism and racism and governments which were opposed to these 
tendencies. With that conception, Fidel Castro argued at the Algiers 
Summit Conference in 1973 that: 
"Different ways of dividing the world have been presented at this 
meeting. For us, the world is divided into capitalist and 
socialist countries, imperialist and socialist countries, 
reactionary and progressive countries, governments that support 
imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and governments 
that are against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and 
racism".l 
Moreover, in its economic proposals the Algiers summit conference 
in 1973 also carried over into the sixth and the seventh special 
sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, which passed 
Resolution No. 321-S-Ul, on the establishment of a new international 
economic order. 
1) Watson, Hilbournr, A., op.cit., p.136. * See later. 
2) Blanco, A., The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit.,p.18 
3) Watson, H.A., op.c;t., p.137. 
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It recognised the sovereignty of states, supported the right of 
countries to use their natural resources, freedom from foreign 
domination, and others. Secondly, Resolution No. 3202-S-Ull, concerned 
the programme of action on the establishment of a new international 
economic order. Other problems were identified and solutions proposed, 
the problems being commodity trade, food, transportation, insurance, 
monetary reform, industrialization, transfer of technology, regulation 
etc. 
Finally, at this conference the non-aligned countries seemed to 
believe in the importance of the United Nations, and that perhaps they 
had a part to play within the United Nations to solve certain problems, 
for example, to change the international economic order. However, for 
more details about the Algiers Summit Conference see the agenda of this 
conference in Appendix No.1. 
After the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973, a number of meetings 
and conferences were held to put the working principles agreed by the 
non-aligned countries into practice. Between February and June 1975, 
at least six such meetings were held in Dakar, Algiers, lome, Nairobi, 
New Dehlf and Georgetown. By the mid seventies the whole international 
situation had changed, particularly on the economic front, which called 
for a more positive participation from the movement in world affairs. 
The fifth summit conference of the movement was held in Sri lanka 
1n August 1976. The inflationary pressures and oil-price boom in the 
1970s brought the movement closer to demanding a role in the management 
of international economic affairs, since the member countries and the 
Third World countries in general were hardest hit. 
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For example, the oil price boom in the 1970s increased inflation 
from 0.1% in 1976 to 1.4% in 1980 and was expected to be 3.6% in 1980-
1984 and the average of inflation exported by the industrialized 
countries to developing countries increased from 1.0% in 1976 up to 
12.7% in 1980 and was expected to be 122.2% between 1980-1984.1 
Apart from political declarations on matters such as sovereignty, 
the right of self-determination and disarmament, the main outcome of 
the Sri Lanka conference was the emphasis placed on the new composition 
of its membership, the presence of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Kurt Waldheim, and the establishment of the co-ordinating 
Bureau. A further dimension was added to the conference in so far as 
the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations lent great 
importance to the movement, especially since he saw the movement as 
being part of a growing international trend (towards non-alignment)~ 
Waldheim's speech at the Sri Lanka Summit was one of the landmarks of 
the conference, since he reviewed the major areas of conflict in 
Southern Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus, referred to disarmament 
and the threat of war throughout the world and indicated the importance 
he attached to the non-aligned movement's views on these questions. 
In other words he argued that the non-aligned movement should be 
complimented for conducting its diplomacy within the framework of the 
United Nations. 2 
1) Alwayies, R., The Iraqi Role in the Non-Aligned Movement. France 
Ph.D., 1982, Table No.2, p.168. 
2) Singham. A.W., The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, op.cit., 
p.226. 
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In a declaration, the Sri Lanka Summit Conference rejected very 
strongly the claim that the world could be divided into two 
geographical divisions such as those expressed in the "North-South 
conflict" or the "East-West conflict". They stated that the problems 
of the world and its poverty were not because nations were born poor, 
but because human beings had created an unequal distributive system of 
the world's resources. The Heads of State or Governments created an 
economic co-ordinating committee. The following list of co-ordinators 
on its sub-committees is as follows:-* 
SUBJECTS 
1. Raw Materials 
2. Trade, Transport & Industry 
3. Financial and Monetary Co-operation 
4. Scientific & Technological Development 
5. Technical Co-operation & Consultancy 
6. Food and Agriculture 
7. Fisheries 
8. Telecommunications 
9. Insurance 
10. Health 
11. Employment & Human Resources Development 
12. Touri sm 
13. Transnational Corporations 
14. Sports 
15. International Co-operation for Economic Development 
* For the member countries at the above co-ordinating Bureau, see 
the collected documents of the non-aligned countries op.cit.p.222. 
The Sri Lanka Summit Conference also adopted recommendations for 
the establishment of the co-ordinating Bureau. The co-ordinating 
Bureau was to be composed of representatives of non-aligned countries-
up to 25 - chosen by the conference of Heads of State and Governments 
of non-aligned countries. 
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The co-ordinating Bureau was to meet at the level of ministers of 
foreign affairs or special government representatives once a year or as 
necessary, and on a continuing basis at the level of permanent 
representatives of non-aligned countries at the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York once a month as a rule. The conference 
decided that the Bureau would consist of 25 seats and that these seats 
would be allocated between the different regions in the following 
manner:-1 
AFRICA 12 
ASIA 8 
LATIN AMERICA 4 
EUROPE 1 
In addition the conference further decided that a co-ordinating 
Bureau elected during one summit conference would hold office till the 
next election at the following summit conference. The following 
countries were elected to membership of the new co-ordinating Bureau at 
Sri Lanka in 1976:2 
1. Al geri a 13. Liberia 
2. Angola 14. Niger 
3. Bangladesh/Afghanistan* 15. Nigeria 
4. Botswana 16. Peru 
5. Chad 17. P.L.O. 
6. Cuba 18. Sri Lanka 
7. Guinea 19. Sudan 
8. Guyana 20. Syria 
9. India 21. Tanzania 
10. Indonesia 22. Vietnam 
11. Iraq 23. Yugoslavia 
12. Jamaica 24. Zaire 
25. Zambia 
1) See: The Collected documents op.cit., p.497. 
2) Ibid., p.224. 
* It was agreed that Bangladesh would occupy the seat for the first 
half and Afghanistan for the second half of the three year term of 
offi ce. 
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In addition, the co-ordinating Bureau has operated at two levels. 
The permanent representatives in New York formed a U.N. caucus group, 
while the foreign Ministers started to meet once a year in a non-
aligned capital city for a short conference. The country holding the 
chairmanship of the movement as a whole has always been elected to the 
Bureau and taken the Chair in the Bureau. 
Since 1976, the Bureau has needed its own preparatory committee 
and ministerial meetings have been preceded by ambasadorial meetings of 
the Bureau members. Also, since 1976, the documentary output of the 
Bureau has sharply increased. The final declarations and resolutions 
together, for example, became on average three times as voluminous as 
before. 1 For more details about the Sri Lanka Summit Conference in 
1976 declaration, see Appendix No.1. 
In the 1970s summit conferences also, the non-aligned countries 
recommended the establishment of a non-aligned news agencies pool, to 
help compensate for perceived shortcomings in the existing system of 
international news supply for developing countries. Therefore, it 
seems to me that this problem is important enough to require an 
examination of the historical background of the international 
information system and the non-aligned countries 1 demand for a change 
in this system. 
The fact is that the world information system was dominated by the 
'Big Four ' Western news agencies: two American agencies, Associated 
1) See: Willetts: The Non-aligned Movement, op.cit., & ibid, The Non-
ali£ned in Havana, London 1981, p.39. Also see the collected documents 
of he non-aligned countries, op.cit. (the co-ordinating Bureau). 
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Press and United Press International; the British agency Reuters; and 
the French agency, Agence France Press. Its job was to collect and 
distribute news from and to most countries and territories in the 
world. 
When the non-aligned movement was established in the period 1955-
1961, most of the non-aligned countries had no television receivers, 
few radios etc. For example, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Jordan and 
others had no television receivers as Table 2.1 shows, while United 
Press International had 238 bureaus in 62 countries employing about 
10,000 people, serving more than 6,500 subscribers in more than 100 
countries, and circulating world-wide about 4.5 million words every 
day.1 
It is also therefore obvious, that the capitalist "consciousness 
industries', the news mUlti-nationals have become, especially since the 
end of World War II, one of the principal weapons of imperialism. For 
example, an American committee "found that at least 29 per cent of 
C.I.A'S covert actions over the years were for media and propaganda 
projects".2 This figure translates into secret C.I.A. expenditures 
in the billions of dollars aimed at making other countries conform to 
the covert American propaganda line. 
1) Mitra, Asok., "Rulership of Media Giants", in the Ceylon Daily News, 
Colombo, August 11, 1976, p.9. 
2) Marks, John., "Media in the Third World", Washington Post, August 
27, 1976. See also, Final Report of the select committee to study 
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, U.S. 
senate, Church Committee, Book 1, April 26, 1876; U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976, pp.179-203. 
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TABLE NO. 2.1: Daily Newspapers copies, Radio Receivers, Cinema seats, Television Receivers in some 
non-aligned countries during the 1950s. 
Countries Daily News- RadiQ Cinema Teleyision Number Number Papers Copies Recelvers Seats Recelvers of of Radio 
Dailies Transmitters Per 100 Per 100 Per 100 Per 100 
Al~eria 2.4 6.0 1.8 0.6 8 16 Ba utoland (U.K.) 
-
0.6 - - - -Burundi 
- - - - - -Chad 0.03 0.3 0.1 
-
1 2 Cameroon Republic 0.2 0.3 
- -
2 7 Ethiopia 0.2 0.5 
- -
10 6 Ghana 3.2 1.9 1.0 
-
4 7 Morocco 2.2 4.6 0.8 0.04 12 19 
Somalia 0.1 1.2 0.7 - 1 4 TO~Q 8epublic 0.4 0.4 0.1 - 1 3 Tu lSla 1.9 6.3 0.9 0.5 4 5 Zanzibar & Pemba 0.3 1.6 1.1 - 3 2 Afahanistan 0.5 0.2 0.07 - 12 4 In i a 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.01 465 59 Indonesia 1.1 1.3 0.6 - 94 62 Iraq 1.0 2.1 1.3 0.7 16 5 
Jordan 1.8 3.8 
- -
6 4 Costa Rica 9.4 6.6 6.3 0.6 6 48 Guatemala 2.3 5.4 1.9 0.9 6 82 Honduras 2.4 2.6 2.2 0.2 6 23 
Ar~~ntina 15.5 19.0 5.2 3.3 233 I~ Bo lVla 2.6 7.3 1.3 
-
6 
Ecuador 5.6 3.9 2.0 0.1 24 135 Paraguay 3.7 8.3 0.8 - 7 12 
------
I 
-
SOURCE: See Schramm, Wilbur, Mass Media and National Development, the Role of Information in the Developing 
Countries, California, 1964, pp.275-281, Selected Countries. 
Unless otherwise stated, figures given in the following Table are for 1961, except for the last 
column. Indicates a figure less than 0.1 (usually nil). 
For such reasons and benefits, the Western multi-national, in 
particular the U.S.A., information agencies dominated and try still 
to dominate world information. For example in this respect, John 
Foster Dulles declared that: 
"If I were to be granted one pOint in foreign p£licy and no other, 
I would make it the free flow of information". 
The non-aligned countries therefore, since the 1955 Bandung 
conference up to the Lusaka Summit in 1970, reiterated and reaffirmed 
the principle that: 
"All the nations have the right of unity, self-determination and 
independence by virtue of which right they can determine their 
political stat~s and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural aims". 
And also added that: 
"Culture helps to widen the mind and enrich life, that all human 
cultures have their special values and can contribute to the 
general progress that many cultures were suppressed3and cultural relations interrupted under colonial domination etc." 
But the non-aligned countries took different steps at the 1970s 
summit conferences towards the international information system. The 
Algiers summit conference in 1973, stressed "the need to reaffirm 
national cultural identity and eliminate the harmful consequences of 
the colonial era"4 Also the conference argued that: 
1) Quoted in Schiller, Herbert I., Communication and Cultural 
Domination; White Plains, New York. International Arts and Sciences 
Press, 1976, p.24. See also, Tran van Dinh, op.cit., p.30. 
2) See: The non-aligned movement documents op.cit., The Belgrade Summit 
1961, pp.3-9. 
3) Ibid., the documents of the Cairo Summit Conference in 1964, 
pp.17-30. 
4) Ibid., the documents of the Algiers Summit Conference in 1973, 
pp .89-119. 
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"The Secretary General of the United Nations established a special 
chair of non-alignment at the proposed United Nations University, 
so as to facilitate research on the historical evolution and the 
present1 and future role of non-alignment in the changing world order". 
In May 1975 and in 1976, the non-aligned countries l represent-
atives at Belgrade and later at Tunis agreed to discuss the following 
points: 
1. The promotion of mass information media between non-aligned 
countries.* 
2. The role to be played by the information organs in encouraging 
cultural interaction between non-aligned countries. 
3. The role to be played by the information organs in reinforcing 
economic and social co-operation between non-aligned countries. 
The first point has been partially met already since January 1975 
by the pool of news agencies of non-aligned countries in Belgrade. The 
pool has worked out 26 co-operative agreements with 26 official news 
agencies from non-aligned countries, and UNESCO were using Tanjug1s** 
service and by the autumn of 1976, Tanjug announced that 62 non-aligned 
countries were participating. 2 Also Yugoslavia said it was spending 
$13 million to improve Tanjug1s capabilities and had opened four 38,000 
watt transmitters near Belgrade and Tanjug sends pool information in 
five languages mostly in English and some in Russian. 3 
1) Singham, A.W., and Dinh, Tran van., op.cit., p.161 and 199. 
* The 1975 Lima Conference of Non-aligned Foreign Ministers proposed 
an intergovernmental meeting to discuss press-pool arrangements. This 
led to the New Delhi Conference in July 1976. 
2) Sussman, L.R., Mass News Media and the Third World Challenge, U.S.A. 
1977, p.29. 
** Tanjug: Yugoslavian News Agency established in Belgrade, October 
1944. See: UNESCO in commission for the study of communication 
problems, Mnograph, No.12, pp.1-10. 
3) Sussman, L.R., op.cit., p.29. 
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In addition the non-aligned countries in Tunisia resolved to 
authorise a limited budget for UNESC01S liaison with the press pool. 
The allocation of approximately $130,000 out of the UNESCO budget and 
another anticipated $370,000 in special grants from member states would 
mainly cover feasibility studies and other planning costs. 1 
However, after the Tunisian and the New Delhi non-aligned 
meetings, the non-aligned movement had other meetings and conferences 
which discussed and demanded the "decolonialization of information" and 
the creation of a new international order for information was as 
necessary it was said, as the new international economic order. For 
more details see the declarations made in the 1970s at the end of this 
thesis or the documents. 
At the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, the non-aligned countries 
discussed very carefully the attendance of Egypt after the Camp David 
Agreement between Egypt and the international settlements in Palestine, 
(Zionism). This agreement was made between a member country of the 
non-aligned movement on the one hand and the Zionist movement on the 
other hand. 
Egypt of course as we discussed earlier, was considered the leader 
of the Arab non-aligned countries on the one hand and on the other, 
Nasser the President of Egypt was a founder member of the non-aligned 
movement. 
1) An early draft of the Tunisian resolution 19C/Dr.19, September 7th, 
1976 called for UNESCO to co-ordinate research on the "Right to 
Communicate" with some examination of the "Independece of Information" 
Director General M1Bow declared that "Independence" could indeed be 
considered in such studies but he did not consider that "more 
prominence ll should be given to this aspect than to others included in 
the "Right to Communicate" concept. 
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After his election as president of Egypt in October 1970, after 
the death of Nasser, Al Sadat declared that IIhis policy will be as in 
the time of Nasser", "as a positive policy, with the principles of the 
non-aligned movement ll • 1 However, years later Al Sadat's policy 
witnessed step-by-step regression from non-alignment. He broke Egypt's 
relationship with the Soviet Union and became tied closely to the 
United States of America and he signed the Camp David Agreement with 
the Zionist movement in 1978. By this agreement, Al Sadat gave the 
Zionists a free hand permanently to colonize the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as she did in Palestirie before. 
The Egyptian action therefore, gave the non-aligned movement no 
choice but to condemn the Camp David Agreement of September 17th, 1978 
and the Egyptian-Zionist Treaty of March 26th, 1979 and to suspend 
Egypt's membership of the non-aligned movement. 2 It may be mentioned 
here that the non-aligned movement condemned the Camp David Agreements 
and suspended Egypt's membership of the movement because the non-
aligned movement had time and again equated "the racist regime in 
occupied Palestine ll with that of South Africa.* 
Within this context, the Heads of State or Governments at the 
Havana Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries considered the 
proposal that the government of Egypt be suspended as a member of the 
non-aligned movement for having violated its principles and 
resolutions. 
1) See: Agwain, M.S., liThe Arab World and Non-a1ignment ll , International 
Studies ll , Quarterly Journal of the School of International Studies, 
Volume 20, No.1-2, January-June 1981, p.376. 
2) Ibid., pp.376-77. 
* For more details: See the Palestine question, the non-aligned 
documents op.cit, pp.429-433. 
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The Conference decided to entrust the co-ordinating Bureau, acting 
as an ad hoc committee with the examination of the damage caused to the 
Arab countries, particularly the Palestinian people by the conduct of 
the Egyptian government in signing the Camp David Agreements and the 
Egyptian-Zionist separate peace treaty. The ad hoc committee would 
report on this matter to the Ministerial Conference to be held in New 
Delhi, which would take a decision regarding the status of Egypt in the 
movement. 1 
The non-aligned countries at the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, 
discussed very carefully the question of the representation of 
Kampuchea. The conference recognized the existence within the movement 
of three positions with respect to this problem. Firstly, that of 
those who upheld the view that this representation devolved on the 
Peoples· Republic of Kampuchea. Secondly, that of those who hold that 
this representation devolved on the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea 
and thirdly, that of those who proposed that the seat should not be 
occupied by either of the parties. 2 However, the conference decided 
to refer the question of the representation of Kampuchea to the co-
ordinating Bureau, which would act as an ad hoc committee to continue 
analyzing this question and to submit a report to a subsequent 
Ministerial Conference. 
Clearly, while the conference reaffirmed the need for strength-
ening the basic principles on which the movement was based, it 
addressed itself, perhaps for the first time, to more specific problems 
on which action could be actively mobilized. 
1) The Collected Documents, op.cit. p.431. 
2) Ibid., p.452. 
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The conference identified the importance of European security and 
its impact on the Mediterranean member countries of the movement and 
the positive contribution the latter had made to the former. However, 
the decision of the Sixth Conference in that context in considering the 
Mediterranian a zone of peace and co-operation was ratified and 
confirmed, hence forging stronger links between the movement and 
European nations. This was further enhanced by the conferences' 
resolutions concerning Cyprus, and Maltais elimination of foreign bases 
from its territory. 
Furthermore, it was for the first time suggested and in fact 
actively supported that the movement had an important role to play in 
securing a modification of the international economic system in what 
came to be known as the New International Economic Order. On the other 
hand the movement which had begun as a small regional grouping had 
become a major international force in world politics and its increased 
membership included a new group of socialist countries such as, the 
Republic of Vietnam, Angola led by Agostinho Neto, Laos and the 
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. 1 The presence of these 
countries at the 1970s Summit Conferences made a new qualitative 
difference in the proceedings of the conferences and made the non-
aligned countries question the principles and the definition of non-
alignment. 
The Havana Summit Conference in 1979 decided that the membership 
of the co-ordinating Bureau should be increased to 36 seats to permit 
the following regional distribution: 2 
1) For more details See the collected documents of the non-aligned 
countries. op.cit, p.435. 
2) For more details about the Functions, The Chairman, Convening of 
Meetings, Composition and Size of the Bureau, See Ibid., pp.497-498. 
and p.453. 
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Africa 
Asia 
Latin America 
Europe 
17 seats 
12 seats 
5 seats 
1 seats 
The conference decided that the next conference of foreign 
Ministers of the non-aligned countries would be held in New Delhi, 
India in 1981 and the next conference of Heads of State or Governments 
of the non-aligned countries would be held in Baghdad, Iraq in 1982. 
For more details about the non-aligned Summit Conference held at Havana 
in 1979, see Appendix No.1. 
After the 1970s summit conferences, a number of meetings and one 
summit conference were held to discuss the problems facing the non-
aligned movement during the 1970s and to solve such problems. Between 
the Havana summit conference in September 1979 and March 1983, three 
meetings were held in Havana, New Delhi and Kuwait. 
During the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen which 
may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement and its 
continuity. One such issue is the Iraqi - Iranian War. This war 
between two member countries has certainly brought to the fore two 
issues. First, that some of the movement1s member countries aligned 
themselves directly or indirectly with one country against the other; 
and secondly, such a war put the credibility and authority of the 
movement to solve its internal problems at stake. 
It is therefore rather important to discuss such developments, 
even though the period is a relatively short one, because the outcome 
may affect the future of the movement. 
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2.4 THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE EARLY 1980s 
The fact is that, during the past three decades, so many develop-
ing countries, particularly those which joined the non-aligned movement 
have changed or transformed their own governments and socio-economic 
systems according to their own needs. Some changed kingdoms into 
republics such as Iraq and Libya and others have changed their systems 
from military dictatorship to democracy or from democracy into 
dictatorship or semi-dictatorship. Indeed such internal changes or 
transformations have resulted in some kind of problems in relationships 
among members of the movement. Such as the crisis of leadership, a 
crisis of identity and a crisis of objectively of the non-aligned 
movement. 1 
On the other hand and at the same time, the cold war antagonists, 
who have been watching the progress of the non-aligned movement with a 
certain degree of discomfort, have been making attempts to draw some 
non-aligned countries into their respective orbits. 2 It seems to me 
that these things among others have made the non-aligned movement 
complex and varied in the early 1980s. 
In the light of the above, one could mention here that the non-
aligned movement has had to face further new developments in the early 
1980s. On the other hand, the movement has faced internal conflicts 
among its member countries such as the war between Iraq and Iran. The 
movement has also faced external problems, such as the struggle or 
demand for the establishment of a new international economic order. 
1) Tadic, B., "The POllCY and the movement of non-alignment 1n the 
eighties", Journal of Institute of International Politics and Economics 
Review of International Affairs, Belgrade 1982, p.417. 
2) "Far Eastern Economic Review", March 10, 1983, pp.26-27. 
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The conflicts between the non-aligned countries are considered 
some of the most serious problems facing the non-aligned movement in 
contemporary conditions, simply because these conflicts threaten the 
unity of the non-aligned movement and impair the prestige enjoyed by it 
in the world, and because they amount to a departure from the 
principles of non-alignment, endanger the realization of common 
interests of the non-aligned countries and open the door to direct or 
indirect interference in the non-aligned movement by the super-powers 
and bloc systems of states. Therefore, maximum efforts need to be 
exerted as a matter of urgency with a view to settling these conflicts 
by political means as rapidly as possible. To do so, the non-aligned 
movement also needs to search for methods of prevention i.e., timely 
solving of problems conducive to conflict, so as to avoid them. 1 
Unfortunately, during the past ten years or so, the non-aligned 
movement has witnessed many conflicts between some non-aligned 
countries such as the armed conflicts between Mali and Upper Volta; 
Angola and Zaire; Ethiopia and Somalia etc. 2 Furtheremore, at the 
present time we are witnessing the conflict between Iraq and Iran. It 
could be said that if these inclinations to conflict cannot be 
minimised, the movement would be weakened. However, it seems to 
me that the war between Iraq and Iran is important enough to shed some 
light on these conflicts, simply because this has happened between two 
oil rich countries on the one hand and on the other because Iraq had 
been elected as a host country to the Seventh Summit Conference of the 
non-aligned countries in 1982. As the war is still going, the summit 
1) Tadic, B., "The policy and the movement of the non-aligned movement, 
op.cit., p.417. 
2) Dabo, Banga1y., "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflicts 
between the non-aligned", Review of International Affairs, Belgrade 
1980, op.cit., pp.373-374. 
- 123 -
conference was held at New Delhi in March 1983 instead. 
The Iraqi-Iranian conflict is considered as old as is the history 
of its region. After occupying Arabistan since 1925, Iran modified the 
name of this territory, calling it Khuzestan in an attempt to deprive it 
of everything that made it Arab. Moreover, the Iranian authorities 
prevented the Arab language from being taught there. However, "events 
have shown that most of the tribes living in these regions refused to 
collaborate with the Persian authorities".l 
The occupation of Arabistan since 1925 has been a step allowing 
Iran to take control of a part of the Shatt-a1-Arab water way. Also to 
weaken Baghdad, the Shah of Iran, the U.S.A. and the Zionist movement 
supported the Kurdish movement, fighting against the central power of 
Iraq.2 
After the construction of refineries in Abadan. close to the east 
coast of the Shatt-a1-Arab, Iran extended its claims to the islands in 
the Gulf, immediately after Great Britain's declaration regarding its 
retreat from the zone, eastward of the Suez Cana1. 3 In 1971, the 
Shah occupied the three islands in the strait of Hormuz, belonging to 
the United Arab Emirates, believing that he was to become the policeman 
of the Gu1f. 4 Iraq was the only Arab country to protest against this 
annexation but this objection was not followed up by other Arab 
countries. 5 
1) Saleh, Akkad., "Colonialism and Oil in the Arab Gulf", International 
Political Review, No.8, Cairo, April 8, 1967, p.234 (in Arabic). 
2) Le Point, C.F., No. 419, September 29th, 1980. 
3) Firz1i, N •• The Iraq-Iran War, Paris 1981, p.103. 
4) Le Monde, September 29th. 1980. 
5) Firz1i, N., op.cit. p.103. 
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The tension in the relations between the two countries continued 
until a climax was reached towards the beginning of 1975, after which 
both sides were brought to the negotiations table upon the initiative 
of the later Algerian President, Houari Boumedienne, which led to the 
Declaration of Algiers on March 6th, 1975. 1 
Nevertheless, the Algiers agreement was not to be respected by the 
Iranian side any more than the preceding ones. It is incontestable 
that relations between Iraq and Iran have deteriorated since the return 
of Khomeiny to Tehran and even before, as a study of each country's 
declarations will confirm. 2 For the Arab countries it was clear that 
since the return of Khomeiny to Iran, neighbourly relations with that 
state also started to deteriorate, which led the two countries towards 
war in early September 1980. It could have been expected that the 
Iranian Revolution, which had upheld the cause of the Palestinians, 
would proclaim that the Shah had illegally conquered Arab lands in the 
Gulf. It ought to have decided to restore these lands to their Arab and 
Muslim inhabitants since it had announced its revolutionary nature to 
all Muslims. It was also expected that Iran would apply the agreements 
signed with Iraq by which it promised to maintain courteous relations 
and not to threaten the security of neighbouring countries. These 
hopes proved to be in vain. 
The fact is that, the new Iranian leaders have taken it upon 
themselves to undermine the security of the other Arab and Muslim 
countries. They have declared that the territories forcibly annexed by 
1) Firzli, N., op.cit., p.105. (For more details about the Algerian 
agreement see Ibid., p.l11. 
2) Ibid., p.IOS. 
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the Shah would remain Iranian. 
They even went so far as to claim Iraq and even the Arab Gulf 
countries as Persian territories. Furthermore, they have adhered to a 
policy of interference in the internal affairs of the Arab regimes, 
especially that of Iraq. For example, the Iranian forces had committed 
244 border violations or acts of aggression against Iraq by air, sea 
and land in the period from February 23, 1979 to July 26, 1980.1 
Among these acts should be included bombing of Iraqi border posts, the 
capture of soldiers belonging to border units etc. The Iraqi forces 
answered these aggressions by trying to limit them. Meanwhile, Iraq 
sent 240 official notes to the Embassy of the Iranian Republic, in 
baghdad, giving an account of the aggressions, their date, form and 
consequences.2 Moreover, Iraq sent official notes to most of the 
regional and international organizations such as the Arab League, the 
United Nations, the non-aligned movement, the conference of Islamic 
Nations etc. 
Even though these organizations were informed of the events having 
taken place on the Iraq-Iran border, Tehran did not take the notes of 
protest into consideration, thus violating international laws and rules 
as well as the conventions concluded between the two countries. 3 The 
Iranians were still doing so until the Iraq army was moved in September 
1980 to the border and following a violent struggle, forced the 
Iranians to retreat from Iraqi land called Zein Al-Qaws. 
1) Official memorandum about the Iraq-Iran border conflict. See: Firzli, 
op.cit., pp.105-115. 
2) C.F. Iraq-Iran conflict, "Course on French Linguistics of Professor 
Georges Matore' at the University of Paris IV - Sorbone, Appendix IX, 
p.217. 
3) Ibid., Appendix X, p.219. 
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Later Iraq demanded by way of an official note that Iran return 
the Iraqi territories it occupied in violation of the agreements 
concluded between the two countries, in particular the 1975 Algiers 
agreement. That note was left unanswered and Iran multiplied its acts 
of aggression against Iraq.1 This situation led to the war between 
Iraq and Iran in September 1980. 
International circles attentively observed the evolution of the 
war and its effects upon the world situation. On September 22nd, the 
then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, sent out 
an appeal to both countries inviting them to cease fire and to open 
negotiations. This request was transmitted to the representatives of 
the two countries in the United Nations. Iraq responded favourably to 
this invitation, but put three conditions upon the stopping of the 
combat: 2 
A. Respect of Iraqi sovereignty over the frontier zone separating it 
from Iran. 
B. Respect and recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the Shat Al-Arab 
C. Iran's retreat from the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tumbs. 
The Iranians failed to reply to Kurt Waldheim's appeal. 
An appeal from Europe and the Security Council on September 23rd, 
was also made to stop the war, and the efforts of the Islamic 
conference and the initiative of the non-aligned countries etc. 3 
The fact is that the initiative of the non-aligned countries was no 
more successful than the two preceding ones. 
1) Firzli, N., op.cit. p.I09. 
2) Al-Nahar, September 23, 1980 (In Arabic). 
3) Le Monde September 25, 1980. 
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Following the visit of the Cuban Foreign Affairs Minister to Iraq 
on September 26th 1980, an official spokesman announced "Iraq has 
accepted Cuba's 'goodwill mission ' , the aim of which is to put an end 
to this conflict". 1 The visit of the Cuban Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to Iran ended in failure. The Iranian Leader M. Rajai 
explained: "Castro has misunderstood the revolution of our people if he 
is asking us to sit at the negotiation table with Iraq".2 
We have seen the reasons which led to the war between Iraq and 
Iran, one could mention here that, this war led to the following 
points. First, both sides, Iraq and Iran lost and are still losing 
hundreds of people in addition to millions of pounds buying weapons and 
damaging their economics. Second, Iraq elected at the Havana Summit 
Conference in 1979 to be a host country for the Seventh Summit 
Conference of the non-aligned countries in 1982, spent millions of 
pounds to make every thing ready for the Summit conference, but when 
the Iraqi leaders saw some non-aligned member countries which favoured 
Iran did not want to come to Baghdad, and because the Iraqi government 
was concerned about the solidarity of the non-aligned countries, the 
Iraqi government suggested and agreed to change the host venue from 
Baghdad, Iraq to New Delhi, India in March 1983. Finally, to the non-
aligned countries, this war between two oil rich member countries, in 
the non-aligned movement meant that the movement has lost and is still 
losing some assistance from these countries on the one hand and this 
conflict between member countries of the non-aligned movement weakened 
the movement on the other hand. 
1) Al-Nahar, September 28, 1980. 
2) Al-Nahar, October 3, 1980. 
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To put an end to this war between Iraq and Iran, the Vice 
President of Iraq, Taha Moheiddin Maarouf proposed at the Seventh 
Summit Conference at New Delhi in March 1983 that the non-aligned 
summit should set up an arbitration committee whose decision would be 
binding on Baghdad and Tehran. He said: 
"Iraq pledges itself in advance to abide by the results of 
arbitration. The committee should be established by agreement 
between Iraq and Iran with the help of the Prime Minster of India 
Mrs. Indira Ghandhi, Chairman of the non-aligned countries. Its 
task, he added, would be to determine which side started the war 
in September 1980, and which was responsible for continuing it, 
as well as arbitrating all issues related to t~e conflict and 
formulating a comprehensive and final settlement". 
The Iranian delegate at the non-aligned summit conference at New 
Delhi, refused the Iraqi proposal arguing that liThe damage caused by 
Iraqi troops in Iran up to three months ago exceeded $200 billion. We 
demand at least one-fourth of this sum as a cash deposit, so that we 
have an assurance the Iraqis are really serious" about ending the 
war.2 
Unfortunately, the New Delhi Summit Conference also failed to put 
an end to the Iraq-Iran war. 
What is really at issue is not a discussion of the causes of the 
war itself, but rather the impact that such a war between two member 
countries has on the movement. It is clear that the Iraqi rights are 
unquestionable. However, the movement was unable to make one solid 
stand to end the conflict. Such an outcome is a serious failure on the 
part of the non-aligned movement. 
1) International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1983, p.4. 
2) Ibid., p.4. 
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Resolving conflicts among member countries by way of peaceful 
means forms the very basis of justification for the movement's 
existence. It is therefore very important for the movement to make a 
move to solve this conflict, otherwise its very existence may be 
questioned. Moreover, if the war drags on, then it would be only 
natural to see some countries aligning themselves with one country 
against another, and such a development may also put the continuity of 
the movement at stake. It also may prevent it from making any further 
progress on other issues, because most of the time the issues are 
interconnected. Finally, such a conflict if not stopped or solved once 
and for all by the movement, may lessen its credibility in the world, a 
damaging effect which would need a very long period of time to be 
checked. 
While the Iraqi-Iranian conflict was not the only one, it was the 
most important issue that has faced the movement in the last few years. 
What is really needed at this stage is for the movement to maintain 
solidarity among its member countries over the major issues and at the 
same time re-establish countries. Simply what is needed is for the 
movement to put its house in order t because then and only then it will 
be able to provide a united front on dealing with the most important 
issues on the world stage. Without doing this, the next conference 
will need great effort on everybody's part for it to convince and 
produce any tangible results. This period in between would then be 
considered a breathing space for all concerned to reconsider their 
positions in the interest of keeping the movement going for the good of 
all member countries as well as for world peace.* 
* For more details about the non-aligned summit conference held at New 
Delhi in 1983, see Appendix No.1. 
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However, over the last three decades or so, the subjects addressed 
by the movement have appealed to most of the Third World countries, 
because they concerned each and every country separately and all 
countries collectively. Moreover, the movement has become an inter-
national forum for developing countries, since the movement's member-
ship has increased several times over. This is the subject of the 
following section. 
2.5 THE EVOLUTION OF THE MOVEMENT'S MEMBERSHIP 
After the Bandung conference there emerged a set of principles for 
any country which wanted to join the non-aligned movement. Some of 
these principles are as follows:-1 
Firstly, the member country of the non-aligned movement should not 
be a member of any of the military pacts of the super-powers. 
This principle has a considerable importance and represents one of 
the fundamental principles of the movement in its international 
relations, because one of the reasons behind the creation of the non-
aligned movement was to avoid any kind of participation in the cold war 
between the big powers and hence avoid the destructive consequences 
such as those experienced in Korea and Vietnam during recent decades. 
Therefore, any country that participated in one of the military pacts 
would have deviated from the principles of non-alignment. 
The members may sign defence agreements among themselves such as 
1) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., pp.71-72. 
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the defence agreement between the members of the Arab League, but not 
with any of the super-powers. Mutual defence agreements would not 
affect the signatories' status within the movement. 
Secondly, a member country of the non-aligned movement should not 
have a mutual agreement with any of the super-powers which might affect 
the policy of the former country. 
It could be said that the aim of this point is to protect the 
developing countries from the domination of the great powers. However, 
there are countries which try to find justification for these 
agreements under the cover of aid and friendship, which they argue do 
not affect the policy of the developing country, providing there is a 
nationalist leadership which understands the interests of their 
country, for example, agreements between the Soviet Union and countries 
in the Third World such as, India, Iraq in the 1970s and Syria in 
1980. 
Thirdly, the member countries of the non-aligned movement should 
not permit the existence of military bases on their territories. 
Permitting the establishment of military bases by the super-powers 
is considered to be against the principles of non-alignment. Therefore, 
no member country should allow such bases. There have been some 
deviations from this principle under various justifications and titles, 
such as, military facilities. These bases are aimed at minimising the 
involvement of the super-powers, for example, military facilities to 
the Americans in the Arab countries, such as Oman and Egypt in the 
1980s to counter the Soviet presence in the region. Such facilities 
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perhaps bring conflict in the Middle East and divert the country from 
non-alignment. 
However, if the military bases are forced upon the country by one 
of the super-powers, this does not affect its position within the 
movement and with the rest of its members who should help it to get rid 
of the foreign military bases. 
Finally, the member country of the non-aligned movement should 
support the National Liberation Movements. 
A brief look into the history of the Third World countries shows 
that most of them have been under colonial rule. Support and aid from 
the non-aligned movement's members for their National Liberation 
Movements would help them gain their independence and give them the 
opportunity to participate and playa role in the world community. The 
question of support to the National Liberation Movements had a great 
effect in distinguishing the non-aligned countries from the supporters 
of alliances. 1 
As far as membership of the non-aligned movement is concerned, the 
number of member countries increased from 25 at the first summit 
conference in Belgrade in 1961 to 47 at the second summit conference 
held in Cairo in 1964 and further to 53 members at the third summit 
conference held at Lusaka in 1970. Since then, the membership has 
increased considerably from 75 members at the fifth summit conference 
at Colombo. By the sixth summit conference in Havana in 1979, the 
total number of non-aligned countries had risen to 92, and at the New 
1) Al-Alwan, 5., op.cit. p.73. 
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Delhi summit conference held in 1983, the total number of non-aligned 
countries increased to 102 members. 1 
This increase was debated by delegates at the Colombo, Havana and 
New Delhi Summit Conferences. These conferences debated the widening 
of membership that is, the basis on which membership of the movement 
could be obtained. This was because the number of member countries 
had increased dramatically since the foundation of the movement, and 
because any country wishing to obtain membership of the movement had 
been accepted regardless of whether or not the member country applied 
and respected the movement's principles. In addition, debates over 
this issue led to a division among the participants, between what we 
can call fundamentalist or strict members and those who might be 
considered as moderate. Others argued in favour of the acceptance of 
new members even if they were allied to other political pacts on the 
grounds that once they joined the movement, they could be persuaded to 
leave these political pacts, for example, Romania, Portugal, the 
Philippines etc., over whose membership there were heated debates. 2 
The other group which opposed the easy acceptance of new members 
without being strict about the movement's principles, argued that the 
acceptance of the membership of new countries might lead to conflicts 
within the movement and this division would affect the movement's 
status and strength. This in turn would lead to some member's trying 
to direct the movement towards one or other of the super-powers, 
because of their membership of military pacts and their disregard for 
the non-aligned movement's principles. 
I} For more details about the number of non-aligned countries 
increases see: Appendix No.2. 
2) Al-Alwan, S., op.cit., pp.95-96. 
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In addition to the full-members, there were other countries' 
provisional governments, liberation movements and organizations, which 
attended the summit conferences of the non-aligned movement as 
observers and guests.* 
Perhaps it could be said that the participation of the liberation 
movements and the international organizations played a considerable 
role in their struggle against colonialism as they were allowed to 
speak on behalf of their people, which to a certain extent gave them a 
kind of legitimacy for their existence. 
In addition to the above discussions, the agendas in Appendix No.2 
show more details about the member countries attending the non-aligned 
summit conferences. 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We saw in this chapter that the mobilizing themes of Third World 
solidarity have evolved since 1955. Anti-colonialism was the central 
bond in the early years, to be supplemented by the aspiration to 
genuine autonomy from the great-powers. Therefore, we divided the 
evolution of non-alignment in the period 1955-1982 as follows: (1) The 
Afro-Asian Conference, 1955 (2) The Non-aligned Movement in the 1960s 
(3) The Non-aligned Movement in the 1970s (4) The Movement in the early 
1980s and finally (5) The expansion of the Movement's membership. 
The Afro-Asian countries represented at Bandung in 1955, were 
deeply divided in their foreign policy orientations. 
* For more details about the number of these organisations, see: 
Appendix No.2. 
- 135 -
Several were formal members of the western alliance system, such 
as Pakistan, Iraq, Philippines and Thailand, while China and North 
Vietnam had a comparable relationship to the communist bloc. The 
other group such as India, Egypt, Indonesia took a middle course 
between these states, i.e. pro-Western and pro-Eastern, and advocated 
a genuine non-aligned policy. 
However, despite this diversity the Bandung Communique pOinted 
to the two main principles that have remained the foundation of Third 
World solidarity - decolonization and economic development. One can 
say here that the Bandung Conference was, then, an augury of a future 
protest against the subordinate status of the developing countries 
in the international system. In the following years, various leaders 
of the non-aligned movement sought to materialize the spirit of Bandung 
in more concrete terms. 
In the 1960s, the non-aligned movement's concerns were as 
fol10ws:-
(a) The movement's attention was diverted for the first time 
from focusing on regional issues towards an emphasis on international 
issues. 
(b) The non-aligned movement's establishment was not against 
any particular type of social system or bloc. Therefore, the non-
aligned countries perceived and evaluated the action of both groups, 
i.e. the West and the Communist in the same terms. 
(c) In this period the movement was still led by its founders, 
therefore it was a very stable movement, and there was general 
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agreement that the basic tenet of non-alignment had crystalized: no 
military or political alliance with super-powers. 
(d) In the 1960s also, two more important issues were more or 
less clear to the movement, (1) The movement defined its identity 
as one based on a long cultural tradition redefined to cope with the 
challenges of modern life, (2) They redefined their international 
role and function as one of mediation between conflicting parties 
in the world as well as reducing tension and instability at 
international level. 
(e) The non-aligned countries adopted a non-aligned constitution 
by which they agreed to follow the following: (1) They decided to 
hold meetings on a regular basis at a variety of levels of 
representation. This now means that summit conferences are held every 
three years, (2) The second measure taken by the non-aligned countries 
was to appoint as official spokesman, the chairman-president of the 
movement, (3) They agreed to re-establish a permanent executive 
committee for the movement, (4) They agreed to develop an active group 
to work at the United Nations. 
However, as we argued earlier, the non-aligned movement was not 
a stationary organization, but rather a movement that responded to 
developments in the world's affairs. Hence, we continue summarizing 
the movement's developments during the 1970s. 
In the 1970s, the non-aligned movement faced many important 
developments among which were: 
(a) The loss of some of its founders such as Nasser, Nehru and 
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Sukarno and for that reason perhaps, new leaders such as Castro and 
others were able to playa role in the movement. Such leaders tried 
and are still trying to steer the movement out of its original 
principles as we have argued. 
(b) The movement established the co-ordinating Bureau. 
(c) The non-aligned countries in 1979 suspended Egypt's membership 
of the non-aligned movement, because Egypt signed the Camp David 
Agreement in September 17th, 1978 and March 26th, 1979. This event 
is very important because, Egypt was considered the leader of the 
Arab non-aligned countries on the one hand, and on the other, Nasser 
the former president of Egypt, was a founder member of the non-aligned 
movement. 
(d) The non-aligned countries discussed at the conferences of 
the 1970s, in addition to the issues debated at the previous 
conferences, new issues such as demands to change the international 
information order, the international economic system, and other 
matters. 
During the early part of the 1980s, new issues have arisen which 
may have a drastic influence on the stability of the movement and its 
continuity. One such issue is that the movement has faced internal 
conflicts among its members such as the Iraq-Iran war. The conflicts 
between the non-aligned countries are considered some of the most 
serious problems facing the non-aligned movement in contemporary 
conditions, simply because these conflicts threaten the unity of the 
Movement. and because they amount to a departure from the principles of 
non-alignment. endanger the realisation of the common interests of 
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the non-aligned countries and open the door to direct or indirect 
interference in the non-aligned movement by the super-powers and bloc 
systems of states. 
The fact is that, the Non-aligned Movement was unable to make 
one solid stand to end the conflict. Therefore, maximum efforts needs 
to be exerted as a matter of urgency with a view to settling these 
conflicts by political means as rapidly as possible. Resolving 
conflicts among member countries by way of peaceful means forms the 
very basis of justification for the movement's existence. It is 
therefore very important for the movement to make a move to solve 
this conflict, otherwise its very existence may be questioned. 
Finally, after the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1955, as 
we saw earlier, there emerged a set of principles for any country 
which wanted to join the non-aligned movement. Some of these 
principles are as follows:-
(a) The member country of the non-aligned movement should not 
be a member of any of the military pacts of the super-powers. 
(b) A member country of the non-aligned movement should not have a 
mutual agreement with any of the super-powers which might affect the 
policy of the former country. 
(c) The member countries of the non-aligned movement should not 
permit the existence of military bases on their territories. 
(d) The member country of the non-aligned movement should support 
the National Liberation Movements. 
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As far as membership of the non-aligned movement is concerned, 
the number of member countries increased from 25 at the first summit 
conference in Belgrade in 1961 to 102 members at the New Delhi Summit 
Conference held in 1983. This increase was debated by delegates at 
the Colombo, Havana and New Delhi Summit Conferences. These 
conferences debated the widening of membership, that is, the basis 
on which membership of the movement could be obtained. 
It seems to me that the easy acceptance of new members without 
being strict about the movement's principles, led and might further 
lead to conflicts within the movement and this division would affect 
the movement's status and strength. This in turn would lead to some 
members I trying to direct the movement towards one or other of the 
super-powers, because of their membership of military pacts and their 
disregard for the non-aligned movement's principles. 
This chapter has therefore sought to show that since approximately 
1970 the Non-aligned Movement has tended to move away from the ideal 
of genuine non-alignment as defined in this thesis and as advocated 
by the Movement's founders. 
Furthermore, our analysis in the present chapter has shown that 
the movement has concentrated in its many conferences on two main 
issues. On the one hand, the movement contributed, perhaps 
significantly, 1n its various political declarations towards increasing 
the world's awareness of the suffering of peoples seeking independence. 
Its support for the many national liberation movements world-wide, has 
lent credibility to the recognition of the just causes of such 
organizations and their admission to the non-aligned movement gave 
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liberation organizations the stage to explain their causes to the 
world. 
On the economic front, the movement followed a path of bringing 
to the surface the main economic problems, of the movement's member 
countries as well as those of the Third World countries at large. 
There have been debates within the movement as to the cause and 
effect of the existence of such problems not only for developing 
countries, but also their impact on the world economy at large. 
As we said before, many declarations in the various Conferences 
of the movement were issued concerning each and every major economic 
matter. This will be subject to analysis in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
CHAPTER THREE 
The Non-Aligned Movement and the International Economic System 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the first two chapters I discussed the international 
circumstances within which the ideal and goal of non-alignment and 
the Movement itself were initiated and the divergence of the Movement 
from the original ideal during its evolution over the past three 
decades. 
I also argued in the Introduction that in order to be able to 
achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, the Movement's member 
countries had to liberate themselves from the superpowers' domination 
and exploitation by achieving independent economic and socio-political 
development. In the light of this argument the present chapter 
focusses attention on international economic problems which hinder the 
economic development of Third World countries and on the role which 
that the Non-aligned Movement can play in promoting independent 
economic development. It is obvious that the Movement could therefore 
grow in importance as a major grouping in reshaping the international 
economic system. 
Therefore, section one gives a chronological assessment of the 
development of international monetary management which, in the view 
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of the vast majority of developing countries, is the source of 
complaint. This is followed up in section two by an analysis of the 
resultant adverse effects on developing countries with particular 
. attention given to the most prominent issues, leaving aside the less 
important ones. Such issues include trade; aid; transfer of resources; 
energy and transfer of technology. 
In section three the role of the Non-aligned Movement is carefully 
scrutinized with emphasis placed on the potential as well as the more 
current positive action that the movement can actively take. This 
is followed in two consecutive steps:-
(1) an outward looking approach on what members of the movement 
have done and can do concerning world economic issues as partners 
particularly through the United Nations' various organs, and 
(2) an inward looking approach in which the interrelationships 
among the movement's member countries could be developed on the basis 
of their mutual interests. Some concluding remarks are then given. 
Ever since the second world war, the economic problems of 
developing countries, and in particular for our purposes, those of 
the members of the Non-aligned Movement have been compounded by two 
main issues. These are (1) the fact that they have been neither 
directly nor indirectly involved in the management of the international 
economy and (2) the oil price boom since 1973 coupled with 
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international inflationary pressures have affected their economic 
position drastically. However, the resultant impacts of the two issues 
are different from each other so far as concerns the source of the 
level of impact as well as the time dimension involved. 
The international economic system has always been managed by 
developed countries which have economic, political and military power. 
The fact is that the developing countries, including of course the 
Non-aligned Movement have suffered from the adverse effects of this 
control because the whole system has been geared to serve the interests 
of the industrialized world, a matter which the poorer countries have 
had no power to affect or change, for a very long time, even in a 
very limited way. 
However, the changing political and economic situation in the 
world in the last decade has introduced new factors in the light of 
which the developing countries have felt, for the first time, that 
reshaping the international economic system in such a way as to lessen 
their disadvantages seemed less remote than they had always assumed. 
This potential change has prompted them to try to put their weight 
behind these possibilities of change. On the other hand, the world 
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oil price boom which is incidently one of those new factors on the 
world stage, while paradoxically badly hitting developing countries 
the most, yet provided some of them with some sort of a bargaining 
power in order to change the adverse effects of the whole international 
system. Within this prospect it is perhaps important to note that 
both the oil producing and the poor developing countries are members 
of the Non-aligned Movement, a fact which the Movement's leaders felt 
needed to be explored in order to lessen the oil price effect within 
the Movement among its own members on the one hand, and a card to 
be played in the whole matter of producing a fairer economic system 
less biased against the Third World countries on the other hand. 
3.2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MANAGEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT 
DEBATE 
The origins of the current international economic system, or 
rather the management of the present system, go back to the late 
Second World War period. In 1944 it was recognised that a new economic 
system would be needed to cope with the world economy during the 
aftermath of the war. Then, with the European economy in a shambles, 
the famous Bretton Woods agreement was reached. The two most important 
points to be mentioned concerning that agreement are the roles and the 
instruments. Firstly, the agreement set a fixed exchange rate, 
according to which all countries agreed to establish a parity of their 
currencies in terms of gold and to maintain exchange rates within 1% 
plus or minus of parity. The rules further sought to encourage an open 
system by committing member countries to the convertibility of their 
respective currencies into other currencies and to free trade. 
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Secondly, for the first time both the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) were required to perform a central bank function for the 
international system. 1 
As became very clear during the following three decades the system 
itself seemed to have built-in self-destructive points. Due to the 
fact that most of the two institutions' finances came mainly from the 
U.S., as well as some other European countries, coupled with the 
weighted voting according to their shares, effectively these 
institutions were directly manipulated by these countries. If this is 
looked at in perspective - that is, the main function of the IMF was to 
give credit to member countries in times of balance of payments 
deficits on the current account on the one hand, and the IBRD was to 
give long and medium term loans for development projects - then it 
would seem fairly clear that those developing countries in difficulties 
were susceptible to the direct impact of the dominating countries on 
the two institutions. As will be made clear, despite the changes and 
evolution of the system, this was one of the basic complaints, 
particularly of the Third world countries. 
Originally, in 1944, it was felt that this system needed no more 
than five years to adjust to international conditions during which time 
the world economy would recover. However, by 1947, it was clear that 
Bretton Woods Institutions were not enough to cope with the inter-
national economic problems arising out of the war, particularly in 
1) Gardner, Richard., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and 
Prospects of Our International Economic Order, New York, McGraw Hill, 
1969, pp.xxii-xxv. 
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saving the European countries' economies from virtual collapse. Hence, 
with its economic power and immense resources the United States stepped 
in unilaterally to manage the system by providing the much needed 
resources, in what came later to be known as the dollar standard. The 
willingness of the Americans to carry out the job was perhaps enhanced 
by the need, as they saw it, to prevent the Soviet Union from taking 
advantage of the world's economic and political circumstances. 1 More 
importantly, the willingness as well as the capability of the Americans 
unilaterally to take over was more than welcomed by the Europeans and 
the Japanese, both of whom were in desperate need of resources-
injection to revive their industrial bases. 
After that time and up to 1960, the international system was 
managed unilaterally. As is the case in any national economy, the 
international system needed a convertible, powerful and stable currency 
characteristics which neither gold nor the pound was able to provide 
due to weaknesses of the British economy at the time as well as the 
international gold market. 
Here the American dollar filled the gap. Since the American 
balance of payments was in a state of immense surplus, it was necessary 
for the Americans to run a deficit to allow a flow of resources to 
Europe and the rest of the world economy. This was eventually done 
through huge economic grants to Europe as well as a vast increase in 
America's military expenditures. During the period 1946-1953, the 
1) See for example, Acheson, D.G., Present at the Creation or my 
Years in the State Dept., New York; Norton, 1969, See also Garwood, 
E.C., Will Clayton: A short Biography, Austin, University of Texas at 
Houstin Press, 1958· 
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United States transferred to the rest of the world through grants and 
loans, $33 billion of goods and services, exclusive of military items. 
By 1959, the Japanese and European economies were in full recovery and 
they were building continuously high reserves equal to those of the 
Americans. Whereas American gold reserves had fallen, from $24.4 
billion at the end of 1948 to $19.8 billion at the end of 1959, dollar 
reserves overseas had increased from $7.3 billion to $19.4 billion 
within the same period. 1 
During this period the dollar was weakening, reflecting the 
weaknesses of the American economy after a long period of outflow of 
resources. This came to a peak during 1960 when the U.S. experienced 
the first run on the dollar. 2 This "dollar crisis" signalled the 
first need for a change in the management of the international economic 
system particularly due to the fact that the international economic 
forces had been changing very rapidly. 
From 1959 therefore, it was clear that the forces of change were 
powerful enough to produce proposals for reform directed at correcting 
three alleged weaknesses in the international system. 
These are related to the adjustment mechanism to deal with 
payments disequilibria; liquidity in the international economic system; 
and confidence in the international currencies. 3 
1) Spero, Joan, E., The Politics of International Economic Relations, 
London, Allen & Unwin 1977, p.38. 
2) Solomon, Robert, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976, An 
Insider's View, New York; Harper & Row Publlshers, 1977, pp.19-20. 
3) Ibid., p.38. 
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These necessary changes in the effectiveness of the international 
economic system were also complicated during the sixties by detente 
between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. during which the lessening of the 
Soviet threat argument, particularly over Europe, led to a decline in 
European security needs which had been met by the Americans and, by 
implication, brought the submerged economic tensions to the surface. 1 
In addition, the world political and military tensions during this 
period, i.e. the Vietnam conflict etc., along with the weaknesses in 
the American economy led to the growth in international monetary 
interdependence. This monetary interdependence which was created by 
the industralized world returning to convertability led to a relaxation 
in the instruments of management of the world economy. The recovery of 
Europe and Japan with strong economic power meant that the U.S. was no 
longer the sole dominant economic power it had been for almost two 
decades. 2 
However, while there had been expressions of concern about such 
problems immediately after 1959, it was only in 1963 that official 
multilateral negotiations actually got underway and continued for 
several years. This took the form of a declaration by the Group of Ten 
that they would undertake a thorough examination of the functioning of 
the international monetary system. 
At the same time the IMF started its own investigation. 3 Between 
then and up to 1967, this period witnessed the emergence of national 
1) See Spero, Joan, E., op.cit., pp.37-49. 
2) Ibid., p.48. 
3) Argy, Victor. The Postwar International Money Crisis. An Analysis. 
London. Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp.4S-S3. 
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interests, but the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) managed to put 
through two specific proposals for credit creation in order to solve 
the problem of world liquidity. One was to extend automatic rights 
within the Fund, and the other was a more radical proposal, i.e., 
members would acquire claims (resources) on the International Reserve 
Fund (IRF), an affiliate of the IMF, expressed in IRF units of gold 
weight. 1 The main outcome of this was the creation of Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs). 
Despite such reforms it was clear by the early seventies that the 
system was under heavy pressure. The United States of America was no 
longer willing to lead the international system. Although the U.S.A. 
did not wish to see a fundamental change in the system, it was 
disappointed with the weak response from its European and Japanese 
partners to its initiatives. The upshot was that on August 15, 1971, 
President Nixon without consultation with anyone else, announced his 
new economic policy of non-convertability of the dollar into gold as 
well as a 10% surcharge imposed on dutiable imports. These measures 
marked the end of the Bretton Woods period and the beginning of a new 
era in the international system. 2 
It is clear from the above that the problems of the international 
system were magnified by the early seventies and the end of the Bretton 
Woods agreement threw the system into chaos. Perhaps the two most 
1) For details See, Cohen, S.D., International Monetary Reform, 1964-
1969 : The Political Dimension. New York, Praeger 1970, 110-11; See 
also De Varies, M.G., The IMF 1966-1971, The System Under Stress, 
Volume 1, Narrative, Washlngton, D.C., IMF, 1976. 
2) Spero, Joan, E., op.cit., p.51. 
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important features of the seventies were the Smithsonian agreement, 
which did not last more than a year, and the oil-price boom later in 
1973. Despite the short life of the said agreement, it was however, 
the first clear approach to multilateral ism in international monetary 
management. The oil-price increases brought new unknown powers into 
the system i.e. the oil producing countries who started accumulating 
huge surpluses. As Table 3.1 below shows, foreign exchange reserves 
oil exporting countries started an upward increase almost matching that 
of the industra1ised countries which remained stable. 
TABLE 3.1 Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1973-75. ($ Billion) 
End of Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Oil-Exporting 
Countries 
12.7 
43.7 
51.1 
Industrial 
Countries* 
66.2 
68.0 
70.2 
Other 
Countries 
43.8 
43.9 
40.0 
* Group of Ten plus, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Norway. 
SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics, June, 1976, p.24. 
Moreover, the world witnessed the inflationary pressures of 1972-
1974 and together with the oil shock, may explain the troubles of the 
international system since then. The aftermath of the developments 
which took place in 1973 i.e. the oil-price boom, was a period in which 
the voice of Third World countries was heard for the first time 
concerning the problems and the injustice that the monetary system 
inflicted on such countries. 
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More importantly, it was the first time that a linkage between the 
prices of raw materials of developing countries and manufactured products 
and technology of the industrialised world had come to the surface, and 
the developing countries called for international negotiations for the 
creation of a "New International Economic Order". It was recognised by 
developing countries that being outside inter-national monetary 
management for such a long time, was an important factor which eventually 
produced the biases of the system against them in favour of the 
industrialised world. 
The world recession which was cutting deep into the international 
economy put pressure on the industrialized countries to open 
negotiations, with the developing world, be it through the OPEC 
Organisation, those of the U.N., or other international fora. The 
important thing to be mentioned here is that such global negotiations 
were this time concentrating on all the major aspects of the 
international economy, be it trade, aid, flow of resources etc. 
These issues however, are further elaborated on in section two of 
the present chapter in order to see how they affected developing 
countries, and in section three in the discussion of the role of the 
non-aligned movement in participating in the process of lessening the 
biased effect or the resulting impact in these major areas. This was 
surely one of the main areas of emphasis of the movement in world 
affairs particularly during the seventies. 
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3.3 THE NEED TO CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: MAIN AREAS 
OF COMPLAINT 
As was argued in the previous section, through the post-war period 
developing countries played no role in the management of the inter-
national economic system. It is therefore not surprising perhaps to 
argue that this has resulted in gearing the system away from the needs 
of such countries to favour those countries who have the power and 
control. This bias in the system created a huge set of problems 
particularly affecting almost all Third World countries and very 
severely hit and shattered a number of them. It is perhaps ironic that 
developing countries recognised the impact of the ariSing problems as 
early as the 1950s, yet were in no position to redress their effect 
until the early seventies when the world at large felt the impact of 
the oil-price boom. It was only when the Western World had felt the 
impact of the world recession, that it showed the slightest recognition 
of the developing countries plight. Accordingly new initiatives for 
the improvement of the system have been examined, despite the 
relatively long period of time this has taken, and undoubtedly it will 
take an equally long time to materialize. 
In the light of the above, the present section focuses attention 
on a number of problems which collectively should be dealt with as a 
priority, taking into consideration the fact that these are the most 
important issues but not all the issues. Such issues include trade; 
transfer of resources; aid; energy and transfer of technology. These 
will be examined briefly in turn, making way for the discussion in 
section three of the role of the non-aligned movement in addressing 
these problems and alleviating their impact on developing countries.! 
1) The arguments presented ln thls sectlon hlghlight the main issues, 
rather than the details of each issue. 
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3.3.1 INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY TRADE 
One of the main complaints against the current international 
economic system lies in the area of trade. The majority of developing 
countries found themselves taking a relatively minor share of overall 
world trade as well as experiencing ever-deteriorating terms of trade. 
Despite the efforts made over the past three decades or so, the 
developing countries' share in world trade has remained virtually 
stagnant and even dropped significantly during the 1960s. As Table 1 
demonstrates, the share of the industrialized countries in world trade 
has increased steadily from 63.5% in the early 1950s to about 68% by 
1979, whereas the share of developing countries decreased during the 
same period from about 29% to only 22% by 1979. Given the fact that 
most developing countries have small open economies dependent in most 
cases on one or two export-oriented commodities, their share in world 
exports is of particular importance. 
* TABLE 3.2 Share of Selected Regions in World Trade (per cent). 
1950 1955 1965 1970 1975 1979 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
World Developed 
Market Economies 63.0 65.5 69.1 72.0 67.1 68.4 
Developing Market 
Economies 28.7 24.8 16.4 17.3 22.3 22.2 
OPEC 5.3 5.3 4.5 4.3 9.3 9.3 
LDCs 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 
Centrally Planned 
Economies 7.8 9.7 15.5 10.7 10.6 9.4 
SOURCE: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade. Statistics, 1979. Table 
A.P.1067. 
* Averages of the shares of each region in imports and exports of the World. 
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This is perhaps mainly because such products playa vital role as 
foreign exchange earners. Therefore, changing world economic 
conditions result in an equal deterioration in their domestic 
economies, be it on account of changing world demand or fluctuations in 
world prices. Such fluctuations more often than not result in 
instability in domestic revenues and cause undesired internal frictions 
and disrupt economic and social development. Table 3.3 shows that 
between 1950 and 1978, despite the fact that the share of the major oil 
exporting countries ' share in world exports has increased, the overall 
share of 'deve10ping ' countries in world exports decreased from 30.8% 
in 1950 to about 23% by the end of 1978. This decrease has eventually 
taken its toll on those developing countries, other than the oi1-
producing countries, with a meagre share of about 11% of total world 
exports by 1978. 
TABLE 3.3 Share of 'Deve10pin I Countries in World Ex orts, 1950-1978 
ercentages • 
Year All I Deve1 opi ng I Major Petroleum Other 'Deve10ping ' 
Countries (a) Exporters Only (b) Countries 
1950 30.8 6.2 24.6 
1955 25.5 7.1 18.8 
1965 19.6 6.4 13.2 
1970 17.8 6.0 11.8 
1975 24.2 13.7 10.5 
1977 25.7 13.9 11.8 
1978 22.9 11.6 11.3 
SOURCE: UNCTAD, Handbook of Internatnona1 Trade and Development 
Statistics 1979 New York, U.N., 1979. 
Represented Sauvant, M.K.P., op.cit, p.238. 
NOTES: (a) Excluding ' soc ia1ist ' countries in Asia whose share, since 
1965, has been under 1%. 
(b) Including those countries for which petroleum and petroleum 
products accounted for more than 50% of their total exports 
in 1974. 
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In addition to the decline in the share of 'developing' countries 
in world trade, the terms of trade have been deteriorating as well, 
especially for these developing countries. Taking 1970 as a base year, 
the terms of trade index decreased from 96% to 91% for developed market 
economies during the period 1960-1978. Despite the fact that the index 
for all developing countries has increased considerably, such an 
increase seems artificial for the simple reason that it was only oil 
producing and exporting countries which benefited and the rest of the 
developing world's relative prices for exports declined while those for 
their imports increased, hence leaving them at a poorer level still. 
(Table 3.4 below). 
TABLE 3.4 Terms of Trade of Developed and Developing Countries 
(Selected Years, 1970 = 100) 
I 
Year Developed Market All 
Economies 
1960 96 100 
1963 97 94 
1966 98 97 
1970 100 100 
1973 99 105 
1976 89 170 
1978 91 151 
Major Petroleum Other Developing 
Exporters Countries 
113 95 
109 89 
101 95 
100 100 
123 96 
362 88 
324 86 
SOURCE: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development 
Statistics 1979, New York, U.N. 1979.lbid.P 239 
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Moreover, the recent economic contraction in the world economy has 
led to acute unemployment problems particularly in the industrialised 
western countries which gave way to the emergence of protectionist 
policies. 
These changes taken together have led raw material producers to 
demand the establishment of producers' associations or product cartels. 
The success story of OPEC in the area of petroleum products has 
certainly activated the ideas of controlling world demand on the part 
of such producers in order to protect their foreign exchange earnings 
through increases in raw material prices. The measures employed so far 
have taken many different forms: decreed prices; production cutbacks; 
selective embargoes; increased royalty payments; negotiated prices, 
etc. 1 
However, the success or otherwise of such moves depends to a large 
extent on world economic conditions concerning the demand for 
commodities; the possible alternatives to each product; the demand 
elasticities, i.e., the response of demand on the world market to 
changes in prices; and above all the agreement among exporting 
countries on a given policy designed to serve their collective 
interests as well as the domestic economic problems of those countries. 
Since the main idea behind trade associations sprang from 
emulating OPEC'S success, one may question the applicability of such a 
1) Sauvant, K.P., Changing Priorities on the International Agenda, New 
York, Pergamon Press, 1981, p.122. 
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proposition in view of the above mentioned obstacles. The main serious 
question which might be asked is whether the same conditions available 
to OPEC are also available to other commodity producers. More 
important perhaps is the fact that, particularly in the area of mineral 
products, the developed countries have a large share in production as 
well as the possibility of substitution and contraction in consumption. 
This much said, it is perhaps very important to acknowledge the fact 
that there is a wide range of interdependence among developed and 
developing economies. This is precisely why developing country 
commodity cartels' can generate successful leverage on developed 
countries. 
Before embarking on any such scheme, developing countries seeking 
stabilized commodity prices supported international trade agreements. 
This is exemplified by UNCTAD'S integrated programme for commodities 
that proposes a network of such agreements for all raw materials 
exported by developing countries. 1 This approach assumes commodity 
prices are to be stabilized, price fluctuation to be eliminated and 
prices to be increased in the long run. 2 But such negotiations have 
so far produced little of value to Third World economies. Therefore, 
the use of cartels may be the best available leverage for change, 
however, much they may be disapproved of in orthodox economic theory. 
Since the ultimate aim of developing countries is that of securing 
a steady flow of stable revenues in order to ensure the implementation 
1) Sauvant, M.K.P., Changing Priorities on the International Agenda, 
New York, Pergamon Press, 1981, p.161. 
2) Ibid., p.161. 
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of their development plans, and if reforming the international system 
through such agreements is feasible, then there is no reason to believe 
that forming producers associations is the best alternative, but 
unfortunately without cartels the developing countries may find it 
difficult to exert the necessary pressure for reform on the developed 
countries. 
It is perhaps more important to increase the productive capacities 
of developing countries, particularly in the area of manufactured goods 
in order to diversify their economies and alleviate the susceptibility 
of such small open economies to the vagaries of world market. In 
actual fact, whether forming cartels in the product markets is the 
answer for the needed structural changes is still an open question.* 
Some even go further and refer to the current problems facing 
OPEC's price structure as an example of the eventual failures of such a 
method. While current OPEC problems reflect, in essence, the short-run 
world economic conditions, particularly world recession as well as the 
world oil glut, it is nevertheless not clear whether this is a 
temporary or a permanent problem. Again the elasticity of world demand 
may prove to be the vital link in the success or otherwise either for 
OPEC or any other potential producers. 
The recognition and eradication of dependency in the world markets 
and the need for stabilization in developing countries must be 
considered the over-riding objectives sought after. This might be 
* for more details See Mikesell, R., "More Third World Cartels Ahead?" 
Challenge, November-December, 1974, pp.24-31 • 
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properly addressed through improvements in the current institutional 
framework that governs world trade. Specifically this means that GATT 
and UNCTAD as mechanisms in world trade may need re-construction if the 
world trade situation is to be prevented from further deterioration. 
In this area, it will need to be made clear that the non-aligned 
movement has a vital role to play, both within its member countries and 
in negotiating a better deal for developing countries through the U.N. 
and its affiliated agencies. 
3.3.2 THE INFLOWS OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Perhaps one of the main constraints on economic and social 
development in developing countries is the availability of capital. 
Due to their own characteristics, developing economies in general, tend 
to have considerable consumption needs so that little is left for 
savings and capital formation. Moreover, in addition to the lack of 
adequate savings, the lack of foreign exchange makes it a lot more 
difficult for developing countries to attain a reasonable rate of 
economic growth. 
It is in the light of the above constraints on economic growth in 
developing countries, that the need for foreign resources arises. 
Early in the 1950s, developed countries realized the need of the 
Third World countries for economic assistance for several, and 
sometimes independent motives. 
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Economic aid is usually given for humanitarian, economic or 
political motives. Whatever the main motive of aid, the fact remains 
that the need for the lessening of the gap between the poor and rich 
countries of the world is in the interest of world development and 
stability, in addition to the fact that mutual interdependance among 
the two groups is something which is undeniable. Poor countries want 
to improve the quality of life of their people, develop their economies 
which after all, represents an important market for the products of 
rich countries. The latter on the other hand, would like to continue 
receiving raw materials, as was discussed in the previous section, as 
well as ensuring political and economic 'stability', let alone the 
humaritarian aspect of it all. 
UNCTAD proposed that developed countries should allocate at least 
one percent of their gross national product to assistance purposes. 
Despite the pleas of Third World countries, the Pearson Report on 
international development by the end of the 1960s, complained that "in 
the last years of this decade, the volume of foreign official aid has 
been stagnant. At no time during this period has it kept pace with the 
growth of national product in the wealthy nations.! 
Despite the call of the said report for action on the part of 
developed countries to increase the real flow of resources to 
developing countries, available data indicate that official transfers 
declined during the mid seventies. 
1) Pearson, Lester, B., Report of the Commission on International 
Development. Partners in Development, 1969, p.4. 
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Throughout the period 1969-1975 for example, the share of total 
official development assistance from the OECD countries which was 
devoted for concessiona1 aid declined from 0.42 percent to 0.30 percent 
of GNP between 1967 and 1973. On the other hand, the share of the U.S. 
in total official development assistance fell steadily from 58% to 32% 
during the same two years.1 
The sources of aid are of particular importance. This is because 
the transfer of resources does not come only from government sources, 
but also from the private sector in different forms i.e. either in cash 
or in kind. It is important to note that while official aid has been 
declining since the mid 1970s, private transfer increased relative to 
the total transfer of resources as Figure 3.1 below indicates. While 
the need for private transfer of resources is always present and in 
fact welcomed in developing countries, these resources should be 
considered complementary rather than a substitute for official 
transfers. At worst they may involve, ~r lead to, sheer exploitation. 
FIGURE 3.1 
A Comparison of the Volume of Private and official Aid Flows between 
1961-1977 • 
Millions of U.S. $ 
170,000 
1 
160,000 
1 
150,000 
140,000 
1 
130,000 
--1 
A"d -- ~- 120,000 Qfjlci!L-!. ____ .-_~-- - -- 1 r--- ------ -----.-r- -----vrivate- Aid 110,000 
1 1 196~O------~lrn9~6~5------~1~97~or-------n19~7~5-------TI19ri77 
SOURCE: Mountjoy, Alan B., "International Aid, Donations and 
Receipts." Third World Quarterly, January 1981, vol. 3 
No.1, p.12S. 
1) For some detailed data see, DECO, Development Co-operation, 1974, 
Review, Nov. 1974, p.14. 
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The problem does not only lie in the total volume of aid, but is 
also multiplied by aid tying. The experience of many developing 
countries indicates that the tying of aid either to the importation of 
specific products from the donor country or to programmes specified by 
the donor country, reduces the benefits that recipient countries could 
achieve, had foreign aid resources not been tied, as well as increasing 
the cost of aid. According to Bhagwati, liThe limited general evidence 
available indicates that the direct costs alone of aid-tying are 
equivalent to a significant proportion of the value of tied aid and 
almost certainly accounts on the average for as much as one-fifth of 
the value of aid."1 More recently developments in the world economy 
seem destined to lead even smaller amounts of aid on the one hand and a 
new dimension of political and economic pressures on the other hand. 
This has not only been applied to bilateral relations between donor 
and recipient countries, but also through international agencies 
particularly IBRD and its affiliate IDA (International Development 
Association). Several ex-officials of the IBRD have criticized the 
control of top management of this important international institution, 
because this eventually manifests itself in the policies adopted. As a 
scholar and Canadian diplomat who served for several years as a bank 
senior official noted; liThe World Bank Group is now a very unequal 
partnership between the rich and the low-income countries. In 1973, 
nationals of rich countries held 68 of the top 80 positions in the 
management staff of the bank and its affi1 iate IDA." 2 
1) Bhagwati, J.N., The Tying of Aid, Study prepared for UNcTAD, Nov, 
1964, pp.1-3. 
2) Yost, Charles, W., Chief U.S. delegate to the U.N. 1968-71, "Growing 
Sentiment for iso1ationism" Washington Post, November 7, 1971, p.6. 
Reid, Escott, "McNamara's World Bank", "Foreign Affairs, July 1973, 
pp.794-810 and also Reid" The World Bank Group: An unequal partnership 
Co-operation Canada, Nov-Dec, 1973, pp.15-21. Also see: Mikdashi, Z., 
The International Politics of Natural Resources, 1976, London. 
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In that respect, this control reflects the political control of 
the design and implementation of the institution's policies. This is 
particularly relevant to the United States as well as other western 
countries. A former administrator of USAID observed for example that 
"We must have agreement with the recipient on the appropriate policy 
package which will move the system away from enclaved development and 
towards a more broadly based participation of its people in productive 
and innovative activity."l Specifically, this argument calls for the 
donor country to divert its aid package from helping public sector 
development in developing countries to follow market economies 
regardless of their own circumstances, social needs or ideology. Here 
economic ideology comes into it more strongly than ever. As was 
indicated above, this is not only applicable to bilateral relations but 
to international agencies as well. The more recent economic problems 
in the Western World have brought this argument to the fore. 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its 
arm IDA, moved down towards not only accepting but applying the 
American argument, because of the leverage the United States has on 
their financial resources. Such institutions provide much needed soft 
loans to developing countries, the absence of which will certainly 
aggravate the economic and social development of Third World countries 
and may also result in destabilizing a great many of them. The 
McNamara era seems to have been shelved now and replaced by a more 
dogmatic ideological one based on monetarism which will do more harm 
than good to developing countries. Surplus countries, in particular 
OPEC, may have an important role to play in transferring more resources 
to developing countries through which the non-aligned movement may 
prove to be a key factor as will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
1) Ranis, Gustav., "Why Foreign Aid?" Ventures, Fall, 1968, p.2S. 
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However, one must not forget for a moment that the need for a more 
direct transfer of resources from OPEC countries to other Third World 
countries must be complementary to, rather than a substitute for, any 
genuine aid from the U.S.A. and other Western Countries. But insofar 
as much so-called "aid" from the developed world has an underlying 
exploitative purpose, OPEC aid needs to substitute genuine aid which 
enables other Third World countries to move towards the economic 
independence necessary to underpin a truly non-aligned foreign policy. 
Whatever the contribution of the OPEC countries this must not obviate 
the need for more rather than less real resource transfer from 
developed to developing countries and this may not be used as an excuse 
to cancel the responsibility of the developed world for the achievement 
of a more equal international economy. The international transfer of 
real resources must also be viewed in a wider perspective in the quest 
for a new international economic order. Moreover, it is important to 
note that in spite of the fact that there has been this inflow of 
foreign aid to developing countries, their outstanding loans have been 
growing over time as well. 
Once the period of grace for such loans expires, then this leads 
to an outflow of much needed resources. As Figure 3.2 indicates, 
between 1960 and 1977 the total debt of developing countries increased 
considerably from about $17.9 billion to a staggering $244 billion. Of 
course this dramatic increase in the overall volume of external debt 
was accompanied by an equal increase in debt service payments to the 
developed countries which increased from a low of $2.6 billion in 1960 
to as high as $36.6 billion in 1977. Such an increase in the outflow 
of resources in terms of interest and principal repayments has caused a 
lot of problems for a large number of developing countries whose 
economies did not grow fast enough during the last two decades to 
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FIGURE 3.2 
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT (DISBURSED) AND DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (a), 1960-1977 
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SOURCE: OECD, Development Co-operation: 1978 Review, Sauvant, M.K.P., 
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(b) Provisional. 
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ensure that such payments would cause few problems. Perhaps an 
outstanding example to that effect is the case of Poland and the 
instability it created which not only affected the country itself, but 
other countries and world financial institutions as well. 
3.3.3 ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
The energy problems facing the industrialized world, serious as 
they may be, pale in comparison with those facing developing countries. 
In the well-off countries of Europe and in Australia, New Zealand and 
Japan the energy consumption per capita exceeds the equivalent of 5 
tonnes of coal per year, and in North America it is more than double 
this. In most developing countries energy consumption is barely the 
equivalent of a quarter tonne of coal per capita annually.1 While on 
the other hand, primary energy consumption in the developing countries 
during the early seventies was approximately 15% of the world total 
outside communist areas. 2 Once the stage of economic and social 
development proceeded to a new level, undoubtedly this share would 
increase. 
While energy consumption was not a problem after World War II up 
until the early seventies, an era which was characterized by cheap 
energy sources, the picture has changed drastically since the oil-price 
increases of 1973. Given the fact that energy is, naturally, the prime 
mover of economic growth and development, then obviously the quest of 
1) Smil V., & Knowland, William, "Energy in the Developing World", in 
Smil, V. & Knowland, W., eds. Energy in the Developing World, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1980. 
2) For data on production and consumption shares see: World Energy 
Statistics, New York, UN Publications, annually; see also OECD, 
Statistics of Energy, OECD, Paris, annually. 
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developing countries for the achievement of any acceptable level of 
development will be accompanied by ever-rising energy costs. 
In view of the above, it is acknowledged that the availability of 
financial resources as well as highly developed technology would allow 
the developed world to develop energy alternatives to oil, either 
conventional energy sources such as coal and natural gas, or in the 
form of solar and nuclear energy resources. If this is coupled with 
the potentiality of reducing their consumption needs, as was the most 
recent experience in Western Europe and the U.S.A., then one would be 
inclined to think that no matter how hard the energy situation is for 
the industrialized world nowadays, it is potentially and practically 
feasible for such countries to ease the problem off. The fact remains, 
however, that the growth in the consumption of energy for developing 
countries during the past two decades and the high dependence on 
imported sources of energy make them prone to the vagaries of the 
international market situation because essentially, they are in most 
cases price takers and have no leverage whatsoever on the price and 
sources of supply of their imported oil. This situation has created 
acute problems of economic instability in a number of developing 
countries; halted the advance towards development for others and 
generally brought about balance of payment problems. 
Table one provides data on net energy petroleum product imports 
for a number of developing countries divided into four groups of 
countries according to the level of their imports. It is acknowledged 
that OPEC countries, particularly those Arab countries with substantial 
surpluses recognised the need of developing countries and provide 
significant sums in grants and concessiona1 loans. This is evident 
from data provided in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which show that three of the 
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TABLE 3.5 
NET ENERGY PETROLEUM PRODUCT IMPORTS, 1974 (MILLION TONNES FUEL OIL 
EQUIVALENT) 
I I I 
Country Imports I Country I Imports I Country Imports 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
GROUP A I I I 
I I I 
Brazil 28.63 I Panama I 0.91 I Laos 0.13 
India 14.72 Jordan I 0.68 I Malawi 0.12 
Philippines 8.18 Surinam I 0.69 I Togo 0.10 
Yugoslavia 7.74 Tanzania 0.69 Oem. Kampuchea 0.09 
Thail and 7.97 Bangladesh 0.56 Mauritania I 0.09 
South Korea 10.81 Cyprus 0.61 Niger I 0.09 
Sub-Total I 78.05 El Salvador 0.61 Benin I 0.08 
I Nicaragua 0.61 Hai ti I 0.08 
GROUP B I Ethiopia 0.54 Mali I 0.08 
I Costa Rica 0.54 Somalia I 0.08 
Singapore I 3.05 Sub-Total 9.04 Nepal I 0.07 
Chile I 3.78 Central Africa I 
Pakistan I 2.88 GROUP E Empire I 0.06 
Jamaica I 2.60 Upper Volta I 0.05 
Morocco I 2.36 Liberia 0.46 Chad I 0.04 
Argentina I 2.81 Honduras 0.41 Burundi I 0.03 
Sub-Total I 17.48 Senegal 0.49 Cape Verde I 0.02 
I I Guyana I 0.48 Equatorial I 
GROUP C I I Papua New I Guinea 0.02 
I I Guinea I 0.43 Gambia 0.02 
Lebanon I 1.91 I Afghanistan I 0.39 Grenada 0.02 
Uruguay I 1.70 I p.Democratic I Rwanda 0.02 
Kenya I 1.41 I Yemen 0.40 Samoa 0.01 
Sudan I 1.45 I Uganda 0.34 Comoros 0.01 
Srik Lanka I 1.20 Cameroon 0.27 Guinea Bissau 0.01 
Peru I 1.69 Guinea 0.27 Sao Tome 0.01 
Dominican I Paraguay 0.28 Principe 
Republic I 1.31 Madagascar 0.33 Seychell es 0.01 
Ivory Coast I 1.16 Burma 0.24 Sub-Total 7.67 
Bahamas I 1.05 Malta 0.25 
Sub-Total I 12.89 Sierra Leone 0.22 
I Mozambique 0.44 
GROUP D I Barbados 0.17 TOTAL 125.13 
I Fiji 0.18 
Zambia I 0.80 Mauritius 0.15 
Guatemala I 0.93 Yemen Arab 
Ghana I 0.87 Republic 0.13 
I 
SOURCE: Energy Pol icy, Volume 6, Number 4, December 1978, p.259. 
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TABLE NO. 3.6 
ACTUAL CONCESSIONAL LOANS AND GRANTS PROVIDED BY OPEC COUNTRIES FOR 
THE YEARS, 1970, 1973-1977. (FIGURES PAID IN MILLIONS $) 
Country 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Algeria 1.0 25.4 46.9 40.7 53.6 46.7 
Iran 3.6 1.9 408.3 593.1 752.5 202.1 
Iraq 2.0 11.1 422.9 218.1 231.7 53.4 
Kuwait 130.0 345.2 621.5 975.3 614.3 1441.8 
Libya 63.0 214.6 147.0 261.1 93.6 109.4 
Nigeria 4.7 15.3 13.9 82.9 63.6 
Qatar 93.7 185.2 338.9 195.0 117.6 
Saudi-Arabia 155.0 304.9 1029.4 1997.4 2407.1 2373.0 
U.A.E. 288.6 510.6 1046.1 1060.1 2261.8 
Venezuela 2.5 17.7 58.8 31.0 95.9 71.5 
TOTAL 357.1 1307.8 3445.6 5515.9 5586.8 5740.9 
TABLE 3.7 
FIGURES AS % OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
Country 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977* 
Algeria 0.01 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.24 
Iran 0.02 0.01 0.88 1.10 1.13 0.24 
Iraq 0.04 0.21 3.99 1.66 1.46 1.28 
Kuwait 1.30 5.76 5.70 6.52 4.34 10.18 
Libya 1.14 3.32 1.23 2.13 0.61 0.63 
Nigeri a 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.27 0.19 
Qatar 15.62 9.26 15.62 7.95 4.71 
Saudi-Arabia 1.69 3.75 4.56 6.01 5.84 4.82 
U.A.E. 12.03 6.66 11.79 10.94 10.97 
Venezuela 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.31 0.20 
TOTAL 0.43 1.41 2.01 2.71 2.29 2.10 
* 1977 Figures preliminary. 
SOURCE: OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, November 11, 1978, quoted from OECD, 
Observer, Brussels, 1978 
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OPEC countries, namely, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, 
provide the bulk of OPEC grants and concessiona1 loans. 
For example Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia each provided about 10% of 
their GNP in 1977. Moreover, since the 1973 oil price increases, most 
Arab oil producing countries have created their own financial 
institutions to provide more concessiona1 loans to developing countries 
other than the direct government bilateral agreements. The figures 
pledged by such institutions for the period 1973-1977 for which data is 
available are provided in Table 3.8 below: 
TABLE 3.8 Major OAPEC Financial Institutions' Pledges of Concessiona1 
[oans for the Period 1973-1977 (In U.S. $ Millions) 
1 1 
INSTITUTION 1973 1974 1975 1976 11977 1 
1 
____________________ ~----~----T_----r_----;_----I 
1 
1 
138.11 
The Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Economic Development. 
The Arab Fund. 
The Arab Bank for African 
Economic Development. 
The Islamic Development 
Bank. 
The Kuwait Fund for Economic 
and Social Development. 
The OPEC. 
The Saudi Fund for Economic 
Development. 
TOTAL 
59.5 
59.5 
55.1 
127.3 
143.4 
325.8 
46.2 169.4 
200.8 336.3 
79.5 
343.1 324.5 
42.7 
282.7 458.3 
872.8 1,410.7 
I 
362.61 
1 
I 
76.01 
1 
1 
120.31 
1 
1 
411.81 
1 
243.01 
1 
1 
841.11 
1 
2,192.91 
1 
--------------------~----~----~----~----~----I 
SOURCE: OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, Nov.ll, 1978, Quoted from OECD, 
Observer, Brussels, 1978 
However, this is not to suggest that the geographical distribution 
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of grants and concessional loans provided by these institutions or 
directly by governments benefited all developing countries. The largest 
share of these grants and loans went to non-OPEC Arab countries. 
This was perhaps for two main reasons. Firstly, the current 
volatile political and military upheavals in the Middle East, which 
need to be contained, even if it is only for the sake of oil producing 
countries themselves, and secondly, for the fact that donor OAPEC 
countries have the full knowledge of both the economic and political 
situation in neighbouring Arab countries. But this biased geographical 
distribution has been changing in recent years, however small and 
gradual it may be. For example while one third of the countries 
receiving OPEC funds in 1973 were Arab countries, this percentage 
dropped to one quarter by 1976 and less later on. This is also 
reflected for example in the change in the basic enabling statutes of 
the Kuwait Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund, both of which were originally 
geared to the countries of the Arab League. 1 
One of the improvements needed in the workings of these financial 
institutions is not only the geographical distribution of their funds, 
but perhaps the avoidance of overlapping activities in developing 
countries. This problem may perhaps be avoided by a possible 
specialization among these institutions either in the form of sectoral 
specialization, that is one or more specializing in granting loans for 
the industrial sector, others for agriculture and so on. Or even it is 
feasible to direct each Funds' resources to a particular region or 
group of developing countries. Such an approach needs a great deal of 
1) OPEC, Weekly Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1978. 
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close co-ordination of activities and even more the political will on 
the part of the governments concerned. 
So far as the developing countries themselves are concerned it 
might be of prime importance that current consumption be more effic-
iently used. Price subsidies which are a widely used policy in most 
developing countries because oil is a politically sensitive issue, may 
have to be gradually abandoned if efficiency in reducing or conserving 
energy is to be achieved. 
Finally, what is perhaps needed on the part of the non-aligned 
movement in alleviating the adverse effects of the energy problem of 
its member countries is dealt with in some detail in the rest of this 
chapter. 
3.3.4 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
The combination of the problems of developing countries coupled 
with their open economies and their adverse effects have led them to 
view industrial development as the backbone of any future development. 
However, despite the efforts made during the last two decades or so, 
while the developing countries accounted for two thirds of the world 
population their share in world manufacturing value accounted for less 
than 10% by 1975. Equally important is the regional distribution of 
the origin of this output. As Table 3.9 indicates, over 50% of the 
developing countries' share came from Latin American countries which 
are basically dominated by one or two large producers, namely Brazil 
and Argentina. South East Asia also accounted for over 30% and the 
rest by Africa and West Asia. 
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TABLE 3.9 Share of Developing Regions in World Manufacturing 
Value Added, 1960-1975. (Percent) 
Year All Developing Africa Latin South & West Asia 
Countries (a) America East Asia (b) 
1960 6.9 0.7 4.1 1.9 0.3 
1966 6.8 0.7 3.9 1.9 0.4 
1972 7.7 0.7 4.4 2.1 0.4 
1975 8.6 0.8 4.8 2.5 0.5 
Represented in Sauvant, M.K.P., op.cit, p.282. 
SOURCE: United nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
World Industry since 1960: Progress and Prospects. Special 
Issue of the Industrial Development Survey for the Third World 
General Conference of UNIDO. New York: U.N., 1979. 
NOTES: (a) 85 Developing Market Economies. 
(b) Cyprus, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Turkey. 
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During the period 1960-1972, the developing countries' total 
output grew at a respectable average annual growth rate of 7% compared 
to 6% for the developed market economies and 9% for the communist 
countries. 1 
Nevertheless these relatively high rates of growth of capital and 
know-how were achieved through the multinational corporations (MNCs) 
and their subsidiaries in developing countries. Such capital transfer 
could be transferred directly rather than through (MNCs) and this needs 
to be done if benefits to developing countries are to be maximised. 
Over the past two or three decades, few economic issues have 
generated more rhetoric than the role in and relations of MNCs with 
developing countries. For some, like former U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger lithe multinational corporation represents one of the 
most effective engines of development"; for others such as Ronald 
Muller, the MNC is "one of the most powerful impediments to Third World 
development". 2 Between these two extreme views lie a host of opinions 
differing according to the impact of MNCs in each particular case. 
Despite the conditions favourable to foreign investment in 
developing countries originally designed to attract such investments, 
most MNCs' activities are located in the developed world. 
1) See United Nations, Restructuring of World Industry: New Dimensions 
for Trade Co-operation, New York, U.N. 1978, p.3. 
2) Address by Aenry Kissinger on "Global Consensus and Economic 
Development", delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to 
the U.N., Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 
September I, 1975; Ronald Muller, liThe Multi-national Corporation and 
the Exercise of Power: latin America", In Abdul A. Said and Luize R. 
Simmons, eds. The New Sovereigns: Multi-national Corporations as World 
Powers, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975, p.55. 
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As is apparent in Table 3.10 below, the global distribution of 
direct foreign investment (DFI) seems to be heavily concentrated in 
developed market economies. 
TABLE 3.10 Stock of Direct Investment Abroad of Developed Market 
~conomies, By Host Country, 1957-1975. 
I I I 
I 1967 I 1971 I 1975 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
Host Country & Country Group I I I 
Total Value of Stock (Billions of $) I $105 $156 $259 
Distribution of Stock (Percentage) 
Developed Market Economies 69% a 72% a 74% 
Canada 18 17 15 
United States 9 9 11 
United Kingdom 8 9 9 
Germany (Federal Republic) 3 5 6 
Other 30 32 33 
Developing Countries 31 28 26 
OPEC Countries (1) 9 7 6 
Tax Havens (2) 2 3 3 
Other 20 17 17 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 
SOURCE: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Transnational 
Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination, E/C 10/38 
March 20, 1978, p.237. 
(1) Algiera, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
(2) Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands, Antilles 
and Panama. 
a. Details do not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 
In 1967 for example, about 69% of OF! was located in developed 
market economies, from which about 40% was concentrated in four 
countries namely, Canada, the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and 30% of the total went 
to developing countries, 9% of which was invested in OPEC countries. 
This situation even worsened from the point of view of developing 
countries, since the share of developed market economies increased to 
74% by 1975 leaving 26% in developing countries. 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
According to United Nations data in 1973, about three-quarters of 
the affiliates of MNCs had their head quarters in the developed nations 
in 1967.1 Despite the fact that by world standards the volume of 
investments, the size of the MNCs' affiliates, and the scale of their 
activities are relatively small, foreign direct investment is 
frequently an important factor in the economic life of a developing 
country. What is considered a small operation by New York or London 
standards can be crucial for a small developing economy. 
The tensions between MNCs and host countries in the developing 
world are not a new phenomenon. There has always been a dispute 
concerning the impact MNCs have on domestic economies despite the fact 
that developing countries' leaders, in most cases look for new direct 
foreign investments. There has been exploitation on the part of MNCs, 
the degree of which is not easy to quantify and perhaps as a result of 
lack of legislation, the capacity of developing countries' administra-
tors to negotiate the need for investment for development, or a 
combination of these factors. The need nowadays is more for se1f-
reliance as well as control of our flow of capital, not to mention the 
need for a better distribution of the fruits of development to all 
segments of society rather than to the elite. 
Despite the fact that the developing countries' legislation as 
well as their capacity to bargain have developed in more recent years, 
they are still a long way from reaching an acceptable level of benefits 
to be drawn from direct foreign investment. 
1) United Nations, Multi-national corporations in World Development, 
Document St /ECA /190, 1973, p.147. 
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On the other hand, over the years MNCs have failed to clear the 
suspicions of developing countries which are looking for a better deal 
consistent with concessions they provide, be it in the form of tax 
havens, physical facilities, raw materials, cheap labour or other 
advantages. 
3.3.5 INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 
It was only relatively recently that the importance of the 
transfer of technology emerged as an issue seen as relevant to 
development. Originally, exchange earnings, capital inflow or domestic 
savings were commanding the main emphasis. Technological development 
and diffusion in the industrialized world largely remained an "Intra-
Norther" experience. The technologies and know-how diffused were those 
which reflected the market mechanism, the price structure and the 
physical environment in which they operated. None of these factors was 
necessarily appropriate to developing countries. Whatever technologies 
were diffused to developing countries by private firms or institutions 
with interests in these countries remained relatively of minor 
importance. 
Accordingly this has led those most concerned with developing 
nations' interests to assess (a) the size and nature of the efforts to 
transfer appropriate technologies; (b) Whether and where the 
technological "system" of the developed countries is harmful or 
beneficial to developing countries. 1 
1) Bhagwati, J.N., (ed), The New International Economic Order, the 
North-South Debate, Cambridge, the MIT Bicentenniel Studies, 1977. 
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In actual fact the current diffusion of technology to developing 
countries is not so much "transferred" as sold. This has led to many 
questions, ranging from "what is the appropriate technology that is 
needed and relatively easily absorbed in developing countries?" to 
"what price in the current imperfect world technology market should 
developing countries pay?". 
Recent studies of costs and restrictive practices in the transfer 
of technology field have noted: the burden of financial payments, the 
widespread use of restrictive practices embodied in the agreements on 
the transfer of technology, the inappropriate character of some of 
these technologies, the host country's lack of control of technological 
development, and hence the costs of the absence of an effective 
indigenous scientific-technological capacity through which innovations 
can be absorbed, disseminated and reproduced. 1 
Among the United Nations organisation's network, UNCTAD undertook 
a pioneering work in bringing together a wide range of material bearing 
on these issues,2 focusing on transfer of technology, especially on 
ways and means to improve the terms and conditions on which developing 
countries acquire technology. In order to facilitate the transfer of 
technology to developing countries, a programme in the form of a code 
of conduct for the transfer of technology was devised by the United 
Nations, and a wide range of regional conferences was held during 1978 
and 1979 to discuss the major issues. 
1) For detailed discussion of these issues see, Stewart, Frances, 
Technology and Underdevelopment, Boulder, Colo, Westview Press, 1977. 
2) See Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and UNCTAD, Technology 
Transfer, a Bibliography of Material available in the ECE/UNCTAo 
Reference Unit, Geneva, 1975. 
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The main objective of this code of conduct was to restructure the 
legal and juridical environment governing the transfer of technology.1 
Despite the progress made under the pressure of UNCTAD for its proposed 
code of conduct, there have been rival drafts prepared by the group of 
77 and by the developed countries. These drafts contain substantial 
areas of agreement, hence the question now is not whether there is to 
be a code of conduct, but rather when, and what it will contain. 
The main points, however, still at issue between developing and 
developed countries, are both definitional as well as procedural such 
as: 
(a) What constitutes a "restrictive business practice", 
(b) Whether the code should be legally binding, 
(c) Whether it should contain special preferences for developing 
countries. 
(d) Who is the legal reference in disputes, is it international court, 
host country or what? 
(e) What sort of guarantees should be offered by the supplying firms to 
host countries and so on. 
Without resolving such issues, it is doubtful whether a code of 
conduct so limited in application would be more than a token gesture by 
the multinational corporations and developed countries who have the 
technology. 
1) See UNCTAD, Restructuring the Legal and Juridical Environment; 
Issues under Negotiation, Report by UNCTAO Secretarlat, TO 1237, 
January 29, 1979 and April 12, 1979. 
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The mobilization of resources from within the non-aligned movement 
and transferring such resources on reasonable terms from the haves to 
the have nots may provide the missing link in the chain of economic and 
social development in Third World countries. It is in the light of 
this perspective and the emergence of the movement on the international 
scene as a force to be recokened with, particularly during the 1970s, 
that this issue is analysed. I am of the view that the non-aligned 
movement's action must be directed on two fronts, and more vigorously 
if it is to be effective. In the first place, the movement's voice at 
the international level must be reinforced, particularly through the 
United Nations and its agencies, with particular importance given to 
such institutions as the IBRD, UNCTAD, GATT, etc., if a better deal for 
the member countries and Third World in general is to be achieved. 
On the other hand, there needs to be an inward looking approach 
directed towards greater co-operation on a wide scale in order to 
ensure a reasonable degree of self-reliance even if it may be of a 
medium to long-term nature. This redirection of efforts from a totally 
outward looking approach, i.e. one which concentrates on the movement's 
relation with the North, to one with a two-tier strategy taking into 
consideration the importance of interdependence among the movement's 
member countries, may in the long run, prove to be the linch-pin of the 
movement's success in achieving its declared objectives. 
As I outlined in Chapter Two, the movement for over two decades 
concentrated on political issues as its top priority and therefore was 
seen as no more than a political club for its member countries. This 
attitude within the movement dominated its activities until the early 
seventies as is clear from its resolutions and conference agendas. 
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Since as was said earlier, there has been a number of drafts with 
a wide range of accepted principles it is in the interests of all 
concerned to compromise on the issues still outstanding. The non-
aligned movement still has a great role to play in bringing about a 
final agreement on the code of conduct for the transfer of technology 
with particular emphasis on two major issues, that is (1) it should be 
enforceable to be effective; and (2) it should not result in either 
increasing the cost of technology or the volume of transfer to 
developing countries but rather the reverse. 
3.4. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: ITS INITIATING ROLE AND FUTURE 
POTENTIAL FOR CO-OPERATION 
In the previous two sections attention has been given to the 
management of the international monetary system as well as the main 
problems facing Third World countries in general and the movement's 
member countries in particular. 
In the present section our attention is devoted to the role that 
the movement may play on the international scene in the wake of the 
intense discussion on the New International Economic Order. 
We have argued in the previous section that a substantial increase 
in raw material prices which ensures stable revenue flows for 
developing countries, reinforced by a reduction of debt and debt 
service obligations and an increase in foreign aid inflows along with 
more favourable terms for transfer of more appropriate technology, 
constitute the best means for improving the chances of Third World 
recovery. 
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The first signs of change were apparent during the early sixties, 
but by 1970 this change was more noticeable. The emergence of economic 
issues as important factors in international relations was deeply 
reflected in the shifting of the emphasis in the movement from 
addressing itself totally to the political questions into becoming an 
economic pressure group for its member countries and the Third World at 
large. 
As determined at the Algiers Summit, the Bureau at the ministerial 
level was entrusted with supervising a group of co-ordinating countries 
for the Action Program on Economic Co-operation among non-aligned 
countries (see Chapter Two). The co-ordinating countries emerged later 
as those who carry out a substantial part of non-aligned movement 
activities as well 
implementation.1 
as being the driving force for their 
More importantly, as a signal of a more active movement towards 
the implementation of its resolutions, the co-ordinating countries, can 
call on the results of expert groups that have sprung up in the 
aftermath of the 1973 Algiers Summit. These groups of experts have 
included those on science and technology, information on research in 
the field of economic co-operation, private foreign investment etc. As 
these groups' activities indicate, most of them have concentrated on 
development issues, and their work is particularly important because it 
shapes the detailed policies of the non-aligned movement. 
I} For a detailed account of the role of co-ordinating countries see 
for example, Jankowftsch, 0., & Sauvant, M.K.P., (eds), The Third World 
without super~owers: The collected Documents of the Non-Ali~ned 
Countries. Do bs Ferry, New York, Oceana, 1978. see also, t e Collected 
Documents of the non-aligned countries, op.cit, pp.119-124. 
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The result of these changes has not only been the increasing of 
the movement's appeal for more countries to join, but also the 
production of increasingly subject oriented, comprehensive and detailed 
proposals. 
These changes were gaining impetus by 1975 during the Dakar 
Conference which accelerated the trend. The "Declaration of Non-
alignment and Economic progress", which was adopted at the 1970 Lusaka 
Summit gave for the first time a detailed and concrete meaning to se1f-
reliance and co-operation among developing countries. Most important 
of all perhaps, this changing balance in the activities of the movement 
infused a new, much needed vitality into the movement, reflected by 
both increased numbers of member countries, and more regular 
participation. The non-aligned movement had transformed itself from an 
informal gathering of like-minded leaders, to a highly structural and 
organized movement with the aim of promoting economic development. 
While the main areas of complaint were more or less clear by then, 
more future activities of the movement in its new formation and 
attitude were concentrated on how to approach such problems both at the 
inter-member country level and in the movements' relations with the 
rest of the world. 
One of the major forces working for differentiation among the non-
aligned movements' member countries is the nature of their external 
economic relations - the differences between surplus and deficit. Such 
differences have a deep impact not only on the socio-economic 
structures prevailing in these countries, but also on co-operation and 
coherence within the movement. 
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These differences are not likely to disappear, but can be reduced, 
if only slightly, if the political will to do so exists and if 
countries are committed to the movement's basic principles, they may be 
narrowed even if only by a small margin. 
While it is important to consolidate the gains achieved at the 
international level, even if it has been so far presenting the Third 
World's case more powerfully, equally important is the fact that 
similar steps must be taken from within the movement if a fruitful co-
operation with a long-lasting effect of mutual benefit is to be 
achieved. 
Mutual co-operation could only materialize in that respect on any 
significant scale if two fundamental conditions are met to begin with. 
First, a move towards co-operation should take into account the varied, 
even divergent, interests of member countries, and secondly, each 
country should be free to choose the socio-economic system that suits 
its interests. This will ensure the adherance of all concerned to the 
basic principles of the movement as well as achieving the desired 
results with the least interference from one country in another's 
affairs. 
One of the main areas of co-operation in which the movement has 
particular responsibility is the channelling of surplus resources from 
surplus countries to deficit countries in the movement which is dealt 
with in some detail. It is no more than stating a fact to say that the 
main form of such transfer of resources will come from OPEC countries 
to the rest of the movement's member countries. There has been a great 
number and various sources of estimates of OPEC surpluses. 
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For example, the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin estimated them 
at $37.2, $33.3 and $11.9 billion for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978 
respectively, while the OECD Economic Outlook has estimated them at 
$37.0, $31.5 and $11.0 billion for the same years.! Despite the drop 
that occurred during 1978, all projections indicate the acceleration of 
these surpluses in the future, despite the necessary qualifications 
which need to be made given the current crisis facing OPEC. While the 
volume of the surpluses is important, the deployment of these surpluses 
is of equal importance. As Table 3.11 indicates, the share of the 
developing countries and the communist bloc together, did not add up to 
more than one fifth of the total OPEC surpluses during the period 1974-
1978. 
TABLE 3.11 The Disposition of OPEC Investment, 1974-1978 
Country Billion $ Per Cent 
U.S.A. 44.92 22.8 
U.K. 7.30 3.7 
Other Industrial Countries 33.75 18.2 
Euromarket 55.10 28.0 
Developing Countries and 43.30 22.0 
Communist Bloc 
International Financial 10.35 5.3 
Institutions 
SOURCE: Sobhan, op.cit., p.723. 
1) See for example Sobhan, R., "Institutional Mechanisms for 
Channelling OPEC Surpluses within the Third World", Third World 
Quarterly, Vol.2, No.4, 1980. 
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However, over 50% of the surpluses were deployed in the United 
States and the Euromarket. It may be argued that developing countries 
absorptive capacity of financial resources into productive investments 
is still limited in nature, however unless there is a gradual transfer 
of funds such a capacity will not be enhanced. The irony lies in the 
fact that while the OPEC surpluses are invested in the Euromarket, 
other developing countries· debts to this market have been increasing, 
and the outlook for such countries is bleak. According to one 
analyst1, the combined current account deficit for LOCs may mushroom 
from its already dangerous level of more than $60 billion to over $200 
billion in 1986. There are ample reasons to believe that a basis for 
sound investments in developing countries does exist and must be 
explored. 
Here a system of general criteria for investment needs to be 
established among OPEC member countries - and among the richer non-
aligned countries generally - in order to ensure the flow resources 
from the surplus countries to the deficit ones without their needs to 
pass through a third party in the developed world. Decision of this 
kind would be necessarily political ones and not ones determined by 
market forces. The question of stability and conditions for sound 
investment that ensure the repayability of such funds may arise. 
Without oversimplifying such an issue, however important, one may argue 
that if necessary conditions exist for the increase in Eurodollar loans 
for developing countries that has occurred it surely must equally exist 
for direct transfers of resources for OPEC countries to the rest of the 
movement·s member countries. 
1) Parkin, Adam, liThe LDC Debt Burden may be impossibly heavy by 1986 11 , 
Euromoney, march 1980, p.118. 
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OPEC has already been willing to give generous though not un-
limited assistance to developing non-oil producing countries. However, 
two issues remain to be elaborated on in this respect. Firstly, for 
obvious reasons the distribution of loans from OPEC specialized 
financial institutions is still geared disproportionately to favour 
non-oil producing Arab countries. For example, as Table 3.12 demon-
strates, one of the leading institutions in this field i.e., the Kuwait 
Fund for Economic Development gave about 69.4 per cent of its loans to 
Arab countries between 1962 and 1977, with about 20 per cent to Asian 
countries and less than 10 per cent to African countries. While it is 
important to keep up the volume of loans granted to the Arab countries, 
it is perhaps desirable to increase the shares of the rest of the 
developing countries of such concessional loans. Moreover, what is 
needed is perhaps a more systematic approach to aid-giving in general 
on the part of the OPEC countries. 
Given the fact that non-oil producing developing countries have 
been the hardest hit by the oil-price increases, a comprehensive 
package can be fashioned combining at least partial compensation for 
future oil price increases; support for oil and gas exploration and 
development; and finally guarantees of secure, relatively low-cost 
supplies. l 
So far there have been several proposals for the acceleration of 
resource transfer from OPEC to other law-income countries. 
1) Rahmani, Btjan Mossaver, "OPEC and no OPEC oil in South Relation", 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol 34, No.1, 1980, pp.41-58. 
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TABLE 3.12 
LOANS BY THE KUWAIT FUND, JANUARY 1, 1962 TO JUNE 30, 1977 
(IN MILLIONS OF KUWAIT DINARS) 
I I I I I 
Region 1 Agricu1-1 Trans.Comml E1 ectrif I Industryl 
I ture 1 1 ication I I 
I I I I I 
I , , , , 
Arab Countries 71.09 98.53 I 52.84 I 19.84 / 
African Countries 13.31 10.60 13.47 4.50 
Asian Countries 12.20 8.80 52.70 16.35 
European Countries 1.13 
TOTAL 96.60 119.06 119.01 100.68 
PER CENT 22.2 27.4 27.4 23.1 
I 
Total I % 
1 
I , 
302.30/ 69.4 
I 
14.881 9.6 
1 
90.051 20.7 
1 
1.131 0.3 
1 
I 
435.351100.0 
1 
100.001 
SOURCE: Jorge Lozoya and Hector Cuadra, Africa, The Middle East and the New 
International Economic Order, New York, 1980. Appendix Table 12, 
p.141. 
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In fact OPEC itself has realised such a need as is documented in 
the report of a group of its experts early in 1980.1 The said report 
made a number of recommendations the most important of which in this 
context is the fo11owing:-
1. The OPEC Special Fund should be transformed into a development 
agency with a substantially increased initial authorized capital. The 
agency would undertake to: finance developing countries' balance of 
payments deficits; finance under favourable terms, economic development 
projects recognized by the recipient countries as priority projects; 
finance projects that ensure integration among developing countries; 
and projects designed to up-grade the raw materials in these countries. 
2. The non-oil producing developing countries should be given 
assurances about the security of their oil supplies at official prices 
as a matter of priority. 
3. OPEC should assist non-oil producing developing countries in 
meeting the costs of their oil bills through a service of loans and 
grants. Developing countries oil bills have been increasing 
considerably, particularly since the 1973 oil-price increase. This is 
evident from data presented in Table 3.13. 
1) OPEC, "Report of the Group of Exports Sub-committee; to and approved 
by the Fourth Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on long-term 
Strategy:, London February 22, 1980 • 
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TABLE 3.13 
PETROLEUM IMPORT BILL FOR OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1973-1980 
(BILLION $) 
Low Income 
Middle Income 
TOTAL 
1973 
0.06 
6.1 
6.7 
1975 
1.8 
20.3 
22.1 
1977 
2.0 
26.1 
28.1 
1979 
2.7 
40.4 
43.1 
SOURCE: The Times (London), March 16, 1980, p.16 • 
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1980 
3.3 
54.5 
57.8 
As Table 3.13 shows, the total oil-bill of non-oil producing 
developing countries increased considerably from only $6.7 billion in 
1973 to reach a peak of $57.8 billion by 1980, with a percentage 
increase of over 30% between 1979 and 1980 alone, while such proposals 
lie at the heart of the matter, and if realized may well alleviate a 
lot of developing countries' problems, the need remains for their 
formalization and the putting of such proposals into active 
implementation. 
Nothwithstanding the fact that OPEC has been responsive to the 
needs of recycling its surpluses through international agencies parti-
cularly the lBRD, lMF and the regional development banks, as it has 
been argued in the previous section, the distribution of these 
institutions' funds has been questioned. While this must not be taken 
to mean less support should be given to international institutions, 
indeed more support needs to be directed towards them, it needs to be 
made sure that a better utilization of their funds by developing 
countries can be achieved. 
While supporting their activities, however, the need remains for 
direct investment in neeqy developing countries i.e., more direct 
transfer of resources has to be attempted. One of the major channels 
through which such resources could be directed by surplus countries is 
through subscription to developing countries' issues of development 
bonds, available data suggests that the share of developing countries 
of world external bond issues is still meagre at best. As Table 3.14 
indicates, the share of developing countries of world external bonds 
was as low as 3.5 per cent in 1975. 
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TABLE 3.14 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BONDS ISSUED BY DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, 1972-1978. (MILLIONS OF $) 
Item 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Total Foreign Bonds 339 751 722 548 908 1600 1058 
Total International Bonds 493 442 96 243 986 2412 2939 
Total External Bond Issues 832 1193 818 791 1894 4013 4998 
Oil-Exporting Countries 85 125 63 68 177 794 1715 
Non-Oil Exporting Countries 747 1068 755 723 1717 3219 3283 
Higher-Income 667 891 714 682 1230 2975 2801 
Middle-Income 50 108 41 33 486 244 1 482 
1 
Lower-Income 30 69 9 - 1 -
1 
Developing Country Share 1 
of World External Bond 1 
Issues (Percentage) 7.3 11.9 6.7 3.5 5.5 11.1 113.6 
1 
1 
SOURCE: World Economic Survey, 1978, Current Trends in the World Economy, 
U.N., New York, 1980, p.58 • 
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Despite the fact that since then, this share had increased to 
about 14% by the end of 1978, it is clearly still a very small share 
and needs to be increased to a more reasonable level. While it is 
recognized that economic as well as political conditions and stability 
in these countries dictate the matter, yet it is conceivable that 
adverse political or economic conditions could be eased in order to 
ensure better development opportunities and larger absorptive financial 
capacities in these countries. 
It could be argued, however, that if the non-aligned movement is 
to be able to implement its principles in this respect, then it could 
help in creating a new financial facility utilizing its unique position 
as a group that includes both surplus and deficit countries. Such a 
facility may aim at medium - term financing which may not be in 
conflict with OPEC's short-term financing objectives through its own 
financial institutions or the long-term financing through the 
international bank. Such a facility, it is believed, would serve the 
objectives of both the OPEC countries in releasing additional funds to 
least developing countries and at the same time, meeting the needs of 
the latter for new funds which otherwise are not available. 
Such a proposal may take into consideration the objectives set out 
by the group of experts' reports cited earlier as well as laying down 
conditions that may ensure the safety and repayability of such 
resources through guarantees from within the movement. Project 
financing may be the best way in this respect,by means of which sound 
projects with long-term economic impact on the recipient developing 
countries may be considered on their merits as investment propositions 
for an acceptable level of rates of return for both lender and the 
developing country itself. 
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The experience of other world facilities and programmes in this 
field could be best utilized by avoiding their acknowledged mistakes as 
well as the use of their judging and following up of such projects. 
What is meant by sound projects is those projects which would prove 
valuable for the developing countries concerned and at the same time 
have a good outcome on the internationally agreed economic criteria. 
This is because it makes it more acceptable for international 
fi nand ng. 
While the inflow of real resources lies at the heart of the matter 
since unless such resources are made available, developing countries 
can do little in the way of improving the conditions of life for their 
peoples, there are other important issues to be tackled simultaneously 
if it is at all possible. On top of these is the trade problem. 
I have argued earlier in this chapter that the developing 
countries' pattern of trade as well as the terms of trade with the 
industrialized world have not been favourable for a long-term 
development strategy, and the idea of "trade not aid" of the 1960s did 
not materialize. In addition to the positive efforts needed in 
correcting this imbalance at the international level, there is wide 
scope for improvement from within the movement's member countries and 
the developing world in general. 
Developing countries viewed the solution to their major problem as 
moving into industralisation, or more specifically into import 
substituting industries as well as export orientated ones. 
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However, the industrialised world·s markets are not readily 
available for such products for a wide range of reasons, be it, the 
unemployment problems in those countries, the level of technology in 
developing countries· productivity, transportation and the like. This 
makes the development of their own markets, however small they may be, 
one of the pre-requisites for future development. 
One of the areas of reform from within could be approached through 
a scheme similar to the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) 
which during the last few years has constituted the central concern of 
UNCTAD and of the Third World in general. This programme endeavours to 
tackle the major problems. Its central element is the common fund 
which will be used to finance buffer stocks, designed to intervene in 
the market so as to ensure remunerative and just prices to producers 
while being equitable to consumers.1 
On the same lines the development of international trade among the 
non-aligned movement·s member countries could prove to be of prime 
importance for the mutual development of all participating countries. 
Such an approach would not only satisfy the consumer needs of most 
countries, but also provide the necessary markets for producer 
countries which otherwise may not be easily available. It combines a 
number of small markets to provide a potentially lucrative source of 
industrial expansion, as well as the base for a minimum degree of 
economic intergration which may be designed to benefit all 
1) Tomassini, L., "Industrialization, Trade and the International 
Division of Labour", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No.1, 
1980, pp.137-153. 
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participating countries as well as by passing both the tariff and non-
tariff barriers of developed markets. 
Given the fact that the non-aligned movement's priority has been 
changing over the years from that of a political platform into that of 
an economic pressure group serving the interests of its member 
countries, as well as the Third World at large, this orientation 
towards enhancing the trade links between its member countries could 
also serve the achievement of its principal objectives. 
Moreover, one way of supporting the previous proposals of mutual 
interdependance either in resource mobilization or trade dependance is 
to ensure that payments among the movements' member countries from one 
country to another be made direct rather than passing through third 
party intermediation. This might require the enhancement of the role 
of existing financial institutions. As was indicated earlier, OPEC 
countries have created their own financial institutions and regional 
development funds. 
Therefore, instead of creating new institutions to handle the 
expansion anticipated in capital markets, the existing institutions' 
functions could be enlarged in such a way that it will make it easier 
for them to work as clearing houses for the rest of developing 
countries transactions. This should be considered against a background 
of grants and loans which would be made by OPEC financial institutions 
or by other multinational ones yet to be created to finance the balance 
of payments deficits of developing countries as well as to finance 
newly created industrial and agricultural projects. 
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This is not to suggest, however, that such steps are meant to be 
isolationist in nature, that is, seeking to isolate the non-aligned 
movement collectively from the international economy, but rather a way 
through which to formalize and integrate the economic activities in 
these countries in a harmonized manner. The appreciable growth of 
experience by many developing countries in recent years which has 
accompanied the intensification of their links with the world economy 
could best be utilized and such links could be enhanced with a more 
equitable distribution of mutual benefits. 
However, initial efforts by the movement's member countries to 
insulate their political systems from foreign interference could be 
complemented by economic interdependance which serves to lessen 
political, economic and social instability, provided the members 
conform to the movement's original ideals. 
It is well to keep in mind, however, that unless technology 
devised and used within member countries is made freely available for 
the benefit of other countries, the achievement of other objectives 
could be severely hampered. As mentioned earlier, the level of 
technological development and absorption in developing countries is not 
sufficiently developed to meet the requirements of the high technology 
of the industrialized world. However, since some of the efforts in a 
number of these countries have been successful enough in devising 
technologies which could easily be absorbed by others at lesser costs 
either in capital or human resources, then it is only reasonable to 
expect that such technologies be made available to the rest of the 
movement's member countries. 
There has been a number of success stories in a number of Latin 
American countries such as Brazil and Argentina in areas like 
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manufacturing technology, armaments, and the industrial base in general 
which could be highly beneficial to other developing countries. 
Ironically, in many cases nationalism has increased as a result of 
these efforts to promote economic development and unity of 
interests. 1 This is a problem which will have to be vigorously 
faced, and it is by no means an easy one, yet if it could be shown that 
mutual co-operation could work for the good of all member countries 
then, and only then, national interests could be ensured at the same 
time. 
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the first two sections of this chapter attention has been given 
to the developed countries' management of the international monetary 
system as well as the main problems facing Third World countries in 
general and the Non-aligned Movement's member countries in particular, 
and we argued that this has resulted in gearing the system away from the 
needs of such countries to favour those countries who have the power and 
control. This bias in the system created a huge set of problems 
particularly affecting almost all Third World countries and very severely 
hit and damaged a number of them. 
Also, it was argued eralier in the theoretical introduction that if 
the non-aligned countries wished to be genuinely non-aligned, they needed 
to achieve socio-economic and political development, or in other words 
to be genuinely non-aligned, they needed to achieve economic as well as 
1) See for example, Anderson, Charles, Politics and Economic Change in 
Latin America, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967. See also Mazrui, Ali., 
"Tansania versus East Africa", Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies, Vol.3, November, 1965, pp.209-222. 
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political independence. Therefore, in section three our attention was 
devoted to the role that the movement may play on the international 
scene in the wake of their intense discussion of a possible New 
International Economic Order. 
We have argued in section three that a substantial increase in raw 
material prices which ensure stable revenue flows for developing 
countries, reinforced by a reduction of debt and debt service 
obligations and an increase in foreign aid inflows along with more 
favourable terms for transfer of more appropriate technology, 
constitute the best means for improving the chances of Third World 
recovery. 
While the main areas of complaint were made more or less clear in 
the first two sections, more action is needed in future by the Movement 
in promoting its aims and tackling the problems both at the inter-
member country level and in the movements' relations with the rest of 
the world. 
One of the major forces working for differentiation among the Non-
aligned Movements' member countries is the nature of their external 
economic relations - notably the differences between surplus and 
deficit. Such differences have a deep impact not only on the socio-
economic structures prevailing in these countries, but also on co-
operation and coherence within the movement. 
These differences are not likely to disappear, but can be reduced, 
if only slightly if the political will to do so exists and if countries 
are committed to the movement's basic principles, they may be narrowed 
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significantly. 
While it is important to consolidate the gains achieved at the 
international level, even if it has been so far only in presenting 
the Third World's case more powerfully, equally important is the fact 
that similar steps must be taken from within the movement if a fruitful 
co-operation with a long-lasting effect of mutual benefit is to be 
achieved. 
Mutual co-operation could only materialize in that respect on 
any significant scale if two fundamental conditions are met to begin 
with. First, a move towards co-operation needs to take into account 
the varied, even divergent, interests of member countries, and 
secondly, each country has to be free to choose the socio-economic 
system that suits its interests. This will ensure the adherence of 
all concerned to the basic principles of the movement as well as 
achieving the desired results with the least interference from one 
country in another's affairs. 
One of the main areas of co-operation in which the movement has 
particular responsibility is the channelling of surplus resources 
from surplus countries to dificit countries in the movement, which 
is dealt with earlier in some detail. It is no more than stating 
a fact to say that the main form of such transfer of resources will 
come from OPEC countries to the rest of the movement's member 
countries. 
Also, a system of general criteria for investment needs to be 
established among OPEC member countries - in order to ensure the flow 
of resources from the surplus countries to the deficit ones without 
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their needing to pass through a third party in the developed world. 
Decisions of this kind would be necessarily political ones and not 
ones determined by market forces. 
So far there have been several proposals for the acceleration 
of resources transfer from OPEC to other low-income countries. As 
we saw earlier some reports made a number of recommendations the most 
important of which in this'context is the following:-
1. The OPEC Special Fund should be transformed into a development 
agency with a substantially increased initial authorized capital. 
The agency would undertake to: finance developing countries' balance 
of payments deficits; finance under favourable terms, economic 
development projects recognized by the recipient countries as priority 
projects; finance projects that ensure integration among developing 
countries; and projects designed to up-grade the raw materials in 
these countries. 
2. The non-oil producing developing countries should be given 
assurances about the security of their oil supplies at official prices 
as a matter of priority. 
3. OPEC should assist non-oil producing developing countries 
in meeting the costs of their oil bills through a service of loans 
and grants. Developing countries oil bills have been increasing 
considerably, particularly since the 1973 oil-price increase. This 
is evident from data presented in the previous section. 
While the inflow of real resources lies at the heart of the 
matter, since unless such resources are made available, developing 
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countries can do little in the way of improving the conditions of 
life for their peoples, there are other important issues to be tackled 
simultaneously if it is at all possible. Such issues include trade; 
transfer of material resources; aid; energy and transfer of technology. 
I have argued earlier in this chapter that the developing 
countries' pattern of trade as well as the terms of trade with the 
industralized world 
development strategy, 
did not materialize. 
have not been favourable for a long-term 
and the idea of "trade not aid" of the 1960s 
In addition to the positive efforts needed in 
correcting this imbalance at the international level, there is wide 
scope for improvement from within the movement's member countries 
and the developing world in general. 
The development of international trade among the Non-aligned 
Movement's member countries could prove to be of prime importance 
for the mutual development of all participating countries (as discussed 
earlier in this chapter). Also, the recognition and eradication of 
dependency in the world markets and the need for stabilization in 
developing countries must be considered the over-riding objectives 
sought after. This might be properly addressed through improvements 
in the current institutional framework that governs world trade. 
Specifically this means that GATT and UNCTAD as mechanisms in world 
trade may need re-construction if the world trade situation is to 
be prevented from further deterioration. In this area, it will need 
to be made clear that the Non-aligned Movement has a vital role to 
pl ay, 
deal 
both within its member countries and in negotiating a better 
for developing countries through the U.N. and its affiliated 
agenci es. 
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As I outlined in Chapter Two, the movement for over two decades 
concentrated on political issues as its top priority and therefore 
was seen as no more than a political club for its member countries. 
This attitude within the movement dominated its activities until the 
early seventies as is clear from its resolutions and conference 
agendas. 
Since, as was said earlier, there has been a number of drafts 
with a wide range of accepted principles it is in the interests of 
all concerned to compromise on the issues still outstanding. The 
non-aligned movement still has a great role to play in solving economic 
problems, the transfer of technologies, energy and other problems 
by co-operating much more among themselves and negotiating with the 
industrialized countries on a unified basis as was argued earlier 
in this chapter. 
If the Non-aligned Movement is to enter a new era of co-operation 
and is to implement its intended policies, which so far have been 
put only in the form of resolutions, then the issues discussed above, 
inter alia, could be considered guide lines for a package deal. While 
some countries may be negatively affected in one area, the benefits 
they may achieve in other areas could possibly offset such adverse 
effects. More importantly, while it is important for the movement 
to play its initial role in the world forum, representing Third World 
interests, it is pehaps equally important that moves and positive 
action on areas of co-operation within the member countries have to 
be initiated. It is not enough for the movement to indulge itself 
only in the political arena. 
The changing priorities of the Non-aligned Movement from being 
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a political gathering to an important group of mutually dependent 
countries in the economic field, necessitate a firm commitment to 
closer economic co-operation. Unless "internal" relations within 
the movement, be they of a political, economic or other nature, are 
seriously addressed, it is doubtful whether its international appeal 
can last long in an already, volatile world situation, particularly 
if one takes into consideration the recent moves on the part of some 
member countries to change the face of the movement in leaning towards 
one bloc or another. 
The movement on the other hand, has been and still is considered a 
champion of liberation movements for those who are looking for 
political independence. The activities and initiatives of the movement 
in securing a better deal for those already politically independent, 
should not obscure the fact that reactivating the non-alignment 
initiatives on behalf of the Third World people still seeking 
sovereignty is of equally vital importance. The changing emphasis 
of the movement's orientation towards discussing world economic 
strategies could lead it to ignore the political needs of peoples 
that have still not attained political independence. 
It is in the light of the above that attention is given in the 
following chapter to the discussion of the past achievements of the 
movement in supporting the liberation movements in the Third World 
countries, as well as pinpointing areas of political instability in 
which the movement can lend its support for a better future. This 
would certainly be reflected not only on the movements in question, 
but on the credibility of the non-aligned movement as a whole and 
world peace in general, one of the main concerns and sources of 
inspiration to the movement in its relatively short history. 
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CHAPTER fOUR 
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Non-Aligned Movement and the National Liberation Movement 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
We saw in the previous chapter that the international economic 
system has always been managed by developed countries which have 
economic, political and military power. Also, in the previous chapter 
the role of the non-aligned movement in attempting to create a new 
international economic order to tackle the problems of developing 
countries was discussed. 
A few decades ago direct military interference in order to 
subjugate developing countries and small countries was the principal 
means used by the super-powers to control others. Given the fact that 
the world's great powers are still always competing to dominate other 
parts of the world not only in the economic system but also by other 
means, it is only natural that new ways to achieve these objectives 
have been adopted in the new circumstances of Third World political 
independence. 
It is in the light of the above that the present chapter treats 
as a continuous process the struggle of national liberation movements 
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for political independence and the subsequent struggles of newly 
independent nations to avoid other forms of dependence that can result 
from the use by the super-powers of new methods for continuing their 
dominance. 
The role of the Non-aligned Movement in relation to both these 
phases of the struggle for independence is discussed with some 
analysis, firstly with particular emphasis on lessons gained from two 
national liberation movements, namely the Algerian and the Palestinian 
movements, and secondly by an analysis of three important aspects which 
together form a way of lessening the effect of political independence 
of emerging nations and discussing the possible reactions of the Non-
aligned Movement to face such problems. These include armaments 
dependency; food supplies and financial pressures, and the emigration 
of qualified people to the developed world. 
The bulk of these problems combined, deepen the problems of 
developing countries, and are means through which independent decision 
making in small developing countries can be threatened in times of 
hardship, and therefore the political independence given to certain 
countries after a military struggle may be curtailed even after such 
military action has ended. 
The idea behind discussing these important issues within this chapter 
is that they have a direct influence on the emergence of National 
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Liberation Movements because they are, most of the time, cited as the 
main reasons behind such movements. Also, as we argued in the 
discussion of theoretical connections of non-alignment and development 
in the introduction, to be genuinely non-aligned the Third World 
countries must pursue both political and economic independence by 
national leaders and national movements, because a country will not 
be able to achieve any appreciable level of socio-economic development 
if it is still subject to external influences, nor can it be genuinely 
non-aligned. 
Finally, while the initial direction of influence went from the Non-
aligned Movement to the National Liberation Movements in the form of 
international support for independence struggles, in the latter stages, 
once these movements achieved their objectives, they joined the Non-
aligned Movement as independent states and began to feed back support. 
This section is concluded by some remarks on the chapter and 
lessons for the future. 
4.2 THE BASIC CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE NATIONAL 
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
It is a well known fact that the emergence of the national 
liberation movements, hereinafter referred to as NLMs is not 
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unconnected with the situation in the world at large. During the early 
years of this century, the world was dominated directly by the main 
powers particularly Great Britain, when it was at its most powerful, 
and France. 
After the First World War, Great Britain dominated a large propor-
tion of the Third World countries for many purposes, most obvious of 
which were the extraction of raw materials to supply its imperialistic 
economy at the time and to extend its power both politically and 
militarily to the widest area possible in the world. The result of 
this policy was that at the end of the Second World War, there were a 
large number of colonies. Semi-colonies and. dependent territories 
formed about 72% of the territory of the earth, and over 69% of the 
world's popu1ation. 1 For example, as Table 4.1 shows, when the United 
Nations was created in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was 
made up of 51 countries of which only 31 were developing countries from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, but this later changed so that it 
included at the end of 1976, more than 100 developing countries. (see 
table 4.1 at the end of this chapter). 
1) See: Magubane, Ben., liThe Non-aligned Movement and the National 
Liberation Movements", In the non-aligned Movement in World Politics, 
New York, 1978, pp.20B-209. 
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One can appreciate that things have changed since the Second World 
War, in as much as there has been a change in the composition of Third 
World countries, and there has been a similar change in world power. 
The main change has been the diminishing role of Great Britain and 
other European nations in world affairs and at the same time, the 
emergence of the United States of America facing the Soviet Union as 
the leader of what is usually called the "Free World" against 
communism. 
During this period, a number of policies emerged, each of which 
involved an attempt by a nation or group of nations to shape the world 
according to its own desires and needs. Firstly, there was the 
communist policy adopted by the Chinese communist party and Soviet 
communism, a policy which presented itself as the champion of poor 
countries in their struggle to free themselves from capitalist 
domination. It advocated to that end a policy of people's war against 
imperialism taking its lessons from the Chinese experience. This was 
not merely a national war, but also a revolutionary struggle seeking to 
achieve a transformation of class structure in China itself and in the 
worlds' emerging nations. It was in essence presented as a socialist 
revolution with a definite effort to create a new international order 
that openly identified with the communist bloc and its leader namely, 
the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, another policy was advocated by a number of 
newly independant countries in Asia and Africa led by India. These 
countries which were among those that had suffered from colonialism and 
domination, advocated a policy of political independence without 
necessarily having a content of social transformation. Such countries 
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provided the basis for the creation of the non-aligned movement. 
The group of non-aligned countries argued that the task of a 
nation entering an imperially dominated world was to select what was 
good from socialism and capitalism. 1 Despite the new developments on 
the worlds stage in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Western 
capitalist countries were in no mood to leave the old territories (old 
colonies) or other areas in the world to communist domination. It was 
therefore rather obvious, as it is obvious nowadays, that the struggle 
between Western capitalism and Eastern communism to dominate the world 
would have to take a new shape and use different ways and means. 
4.2.1 LESSONS FROM THE ALGERIAN AND THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENTS AND 
THE REACTION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
4.2.1a ALGERIA 
From 1830 until 1962, Algeria was occupied by France. When the 
French colonial rule in Algeria came to an end, a new state was born 
and its foreign policy became oriented towards the non-aligned 
movement. It is therefore pertinent that we should briefly examine the 
pre-independence period in which Algeria's non-aligned status began to 
take shape. 
As a matter of fact, the French always considered Algeria 
constitutionally a part of France. Hence France sent over a million 
French settlers to Algeria as a new motherland, hoping that the latter 
would become genuinely French. 2 In addition, France sent troops and 
1) See: Oinh Tran Van., Singham, A.w., From Bandung to Colombo, New 
York, 1976, pp.208-209. 
2) Ogunsanno, Dr. Alabo, liThe Foreign Policy of Algeria", The Foreign 
Policies of African States, London, 1977, p.24. 
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police forces to rule Algeria. 
The Algerian people started resistance to the colons (i.e. 
colonists) to get their independance in the earlier days of the 
colonization under the leadership of Emir Abde1kader and other 
political movements. On February 10th, 1943 Abbas Ferhat and fifty 
other Algerians asked the French Government to let Algeria become an 
independent country. The French Government refused these demands and 
arrested Abbas. 1 
In 1954, which was a time of eclipse for Abbas Ferhat, there began 
a time of preparation and underground organization for a small group of 
Algerian people, mostly in their twenties. These young Algerians some 
of whom had served in the French Army during the Second World War, and 
who had acquired some measure of cosmopolitanism and a knowledge 
of other revolutionary techniques, created and organized the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), under the leadership of Ahmad Ben-Bella. 2 
The FLN was set up in Cairo in November 1954, it aimed to wrest 
independence for Algeria from the French. They defined their 
aims as national independence through: 
(1) The restoration of the Algerian State, Sovereign, Democratic and 
Social, within the framework of the prinCiples of Islam; and 
(2) The preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction 
of race or religion. 
France also opposed the above aims and the FLN opened a guerrilla 
1) Mansell, G., Tragedy in Algeria, London 1961, p.3. 
2) See Laqueur, W., A Dictionary of Politics, London 1971, pp.8-11. 
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campaign early in 1955 and waged war until France conceded independence 
under the Evian Agreements in March 1962. 
The FLNs armed forces were recruited both from secret supporters 
in Algeria itself and from Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, 
which gained their independence from France in 1956. Also the leaders 
of the FLN needed all the external support they could muster in the 
areas of political, diplomatic, financial material and military 
equipment. The immediate support for them and their movement came from 
the Arab states particularly from President Nasser of Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait and others. * Other support came from ASian, African and East 
European countries. Such support took two forms. On the one hand, 
when the FLN appointed a provisional government in exile in September 
1958, all the Arab countries and the people's Republic of China 
immediately recognised it and the Chinese government and the Egyptian 
government gave some aid to the Algerian revolution. ** On the 
other hand, the non-aligned countries invited the FLN represent-
atives to the non-aligned movement conferences. *** 
It could be said, that such support from the non-aligned countries 
and other Eastern countries to the Algerian Revolution assisted the 
Algerian Revolution to gain its independance and to join the non-
aligned movement. Indeed, the Algerian Government held the leadership 
of the non-aligned movement in the period from 1973-1976. This situa-
tion may lead us to ask about the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's 
role. 
* The support came to the FLN from the Arab States which came by 
official and unofficial support. 
** China gave the FLN $12 million, while Egypt's aid was $10 million. 
*** More details, see, the non-aligned movements' agendas. 
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4.2.1.b THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
From the beginning of the sixteenth century until 1918, the Arab 
World including Palestine was occupied and dominated by the Ottoman 
Empire. 
During that period, the Arabs established some secret societies 
asking for an independent Arab World, such as al-Fata which was founded 
in Paris in 1911. * During the Arabs' revolt against the Ottoman 
Empire, Great Britain supported the Arabs, but we may ask at this 
juncture: Did Great Britain support the Arabs to help them become 
independent? 
According to Briton Busch, Great Britain did not want to give all 
the Arabs a single independent state, because she thought that a strong 
Arab State might be more dangerous to Western interests in the Middle 
East than a strong Ottoman State. 1 Great Britain therefore divided 
the Arab World under the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France on May 16th, 
1916. On the other hand, she created the question of Palestine under 
the famous Balfour Declaration in 1917. Indeed the outcome of the 
above agreement was that the Arab World was divided up between Great 
Britain and France. Also by the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain 
"looked with favour on the setting up of a homeland for the Jews in 
Palestine." ** Therefore, the question should be asked: What were the 
British motives and what were the considerations which induced the 
British Government to issue the Balfour Declaration? It may be said 
that, the government of Great Britain were moved by many considerations 
* See Busch, Briton Cooper, Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-1921, 
London 1971, p.92. 
1) Ibid, p.92. 
** It seems to me that Great Britain had no right to issue the Balfour 
Declaration, simply because Palestine was not a part of Britain. 
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among which were: firstly, political considerations and secondly, 
imperialistic motives. 
The political strategic reason was that Great Britain hoped to win 
over the powerful Zionist elements in Germany and Austria and to 
mitigate the hostility of Jews in allied countries towards Russia 
and give those Jews who had been active in overthrowing the Tsarist 
regime an incentive to keep Russia in the War and also to persuade the 
Jews to use their financial and political influence to bring the U.S.A. 
into the War on the side of the anti-German entente. 
The imperialistic motive was that it had been first propounded by 
Kitchener, of securing Palestine or a portion of it as a bulwark for 
the British position in Egypt, and an overland link with the East. 1 
It was perhaps these motives that were the important ones and whatever 
role other considerations, whether financial, religious or humanitarian 
may have played, there is no doubt that they sufficed by themselves to 
bring about the Balfour Declaration. 
The Arabs refused to accept (the Balfour Declaration) and started 
negotiations with the British Government to gain their own independence 
while on the other hand to occupy Palestine, the Zionist movement 
followed two policies: political activity in European countries, 
especially in Great Britain, to get support for their movement; and 
also encourage the migration of hundreds of thousands of persons from 
many parts of the world to Palestine. By the end of the 1935, the 
number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine in one year reached about 
150,000 persons. 2 
1) Intonious, Arab Awakening, london, 1969, p.261. 
2) Fraser, T.G., The Middle East, 1914-1979, London 1980, pp.4-13. 
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The years 1936-1939 were a period of Arab organisation and the use 
of violence in Palestine as a means of pressurising the mandate 
authorities to accede to the objective of keeping Palestine an Arab 
country. This objective included demands for the following: 1 
(1) An end to Jewish immigration. 
(2) Prohibition of the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. 
(3) The establishment of a national government responsible to a 
representative council. 
The Zionist immigration to Palestine and the struggle between 
Great Britain and Zionism on the one hand and the Arabs' revolt on the 
other hand was still continuing when the British Government referred 
the Palestine problem to the United Nations. The United Nations was at 
that time a new organisation and it was still a quite compact body of 
some fifty-five members, within which the United States of America and 
the Soviet Union were both committed to support for a Zionist State in 
Palestine, and in fact these two super-powers wielded as they still do, 
a powerful influence in the United Nations. 
After the 1948 War between the Arab Governments and the 
international Zionist Settlements in Palestine, a younger generation of 
Palestinian leaders appeared whose dispersion had led them to identify 
with various ideological currents in the area, such as Nasserism, 
Baathism, Communism and Conservatism. All of them aimed to liberate 
Palestine from the international Zionist Settlements. They established 
1) Abbas, A.M., Palestine, 1933-1939, in Challenge and Response in 
Internal Conflict, eds., Condit, O.M., and Cooper Jr., B.A., Washington 
D.C., the Amerlcan University, Centre for Research in Social System, 
March 1967, p.68. 
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in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) at the Arab 
summit conference in Cairo, which considered the PLO as the official 
voice of the Palestine people, and shortly thereafter it proceeded to 
organise a military component, the Palestine Liberation Arm (PLA). 
In addition, Ahmad Al-Shuqairy the Head of the PLO at that time 
addressed to the Arab governments three demands: 1 
(1) Freedom for the PLO to function as a Supra-national entity, 
among the refugees in every state. 
(2) Freedom to draft the refugees into a Palestine Liberation Army. 
(3) The right to levy taxes upon them. 
Also the Palestine National Council (PNC) adopted a Palestine 
National Charter in July 1968 which in a series of articles, formally 
codified the ultimate aim of the movement as the total liberation of 
Palestine from Zionist control. 2 
Having seen the establishment of the PLO and the PNC and their 
aims, I am led to ask the question: Did the PLO and the PNC put their 
aims into practice? In other words, did the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation liberate Palestine, as the FLN had liberated Algeria? 
The fact is that the world knows the answer, the Palestinians 
could not put their aims into practice for many reasons among which 
were and are still the following: 
1) Cooley, J., Green March, Black September: The Story of the 
Palestinian Arabs, London, Frank Cass, 1973, pp.90-91. 
2) QiNelll, B.E., Armed Struggle in Palestine, A Political Military 
Analysis, London 1978, pp.6-7. 
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Firstly, the PLO could not achieve its aims because the Zionist 
settlers in Palestine had great fighting experience. The settlers came 
from the whole world, particularly from the U.S.A., U.K., France, the 
Soviet Union and other countries with great experience of fighting from 
their original home armies. 
Secondly, the great powers supported the Zionists against the 
Palestinian people starting with the 1948 recognition and giving full 
support, technology, new weapons etc., while the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation had little experience of fighting and old weapons were 
received from the Arab States or the Soviet Union. 
However, the non-aligned movement had played different roles 
towards the PLO. During the period 1969-1975, they invited the PLO to 
attend the non-aligned movement meetings and summit conferences as 
observers, while the Lima Ministerial conference of the non-aligned 
countries on August 25-30, 1975, recognized the PLO as a member of the 
movement (see agenda 4.1 next page). Also the non-aligned movement 
adopted many resolutions towards the Palestinian question. For more 
details, see the documents of the non-aligned movement op cit). 
The discussions of the national liberation movements lead us to 
the following results:-
(1) Most of the Third World countries gained their own independence 
and joined the non-aligned movement. 
(2) The super-powers lost their old forms of colonialism and followed 
new ways to dominate or to lead the Third World countries, new 
ways such as military dependence. In what follows therefore, we 
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AGENDA No: 4.1 
Attendance by PLO at Non-aligned Meetings and Summits as an 
Observer or Guest. 
1. Consultative Meeting of special government representatives of non-
aligned countries - Belgrade, July 8-12, 1969. 
2. Preparatory Meeting of non-aligned countries - Dar Es-Sa1am, 
April, 13-17, 1970. 
3. Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned 
countries - Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970. 
4. Conference of Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries -
Georgetown, August 8-12, 1972. 
5. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-
aligned countries - Algiers, September 5-9, 1073. 
6. Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries, 
Algiers - March 19-21, 1974. 
7. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned 
countries - Havana, March 17-19, 1975. 
Attendance by PLO as a member 
1. Ministerial Conference of non-aligned countries - Lima, August 25-
30, 1975. 
2. Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries -
Algiers, May 30, June 2, 1976. 
3. The fifth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - Colombo 
August 16-19, 1976. 
4. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned 
countries - New Delhi, April 7-11, 1977. 
5. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of non-aligned 
countries - Havana, May 15-20, 1978. 
6. Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned 
countries - Belgrade, July 25-30, 1978. 
7. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of 
the non-aligned countries - Maputo, January 26, February 2, 1979. 
8. Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned 
countries - Colombo, 4-9 June 1979. 
9. The Sixth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - Havana, 
September 3-9, 1979. 
10. Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned 
countries - New Delhi, 9-13 February, 1981. 
11. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of 
non-aligned countries - Algiers 16-18 April 1981. 
12. Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of 
Delegation of the non-aligned countries - New York, September 25-28, 
1981. 
13 Extraordinary Meeting of the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-
aligned countries - Kuwait, April 5-8 1982. 
14. The Seventh Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries - March 
7-11, 1983. 
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will shed some light in the new imperialism: the new ways and 
means. 
4.3 The NEW IMPERIALISM THE NEW WAYS AND MEANS 
Given the fact that the world's great powers are always competing 
to dominate other parts of the world, it is only natural that new ways 
and means to achieve these objectives have been adopted in the new 
circumstances of Third World political independence. A few decades ago 
direct military interference in order to subjugate developing countries 
and small countries was the principal means to control others. 
Developments on the world stage, in the form of relationships between 
the super-powers; economic and cultural advancement in poor areas of 
the world; or international political conditions made it necessary for 
the super-powers to change their ways and means of dominating others. 
Most recently, developing countries have realized that there is a 
wide range of instruments through which their political and economic 
independance can be threatened and their societies can be subjugated to 
a series of pressures, by means of which their ability in decision 
making can be severely restricted or hindered. Their dependance on 
advanced countries in strategic areas such as food, military equipment 
and the like, may not be compatible with the fulfilment of the 
interests of their people and the national sovereignty of their 
nations. 
Despite the fact that the number of developing countries has been 
increasing over time, their full independence both economically and 
politically is most of the time questionable. In what follows we will 
discuss three important areas, namely food security, military supplies 
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dependance, and financial pressures, areas through which independent 
decision making in small developing countries can be threatened in 
times of hardship, and therefore the political independance given to 
certain countries after a military struggle may be controlled even 
after such military action is done away with. 
It is not intended to say here that these are the only areas of 
importance in this respect, but rather to emphasize these priority 
aspects and therefore we consider them in some detail. The idea behind 
discussing these important issues within this chapter was that they 
have a direct influence on the emergence of National Liberation 
Movements because they are, most of the time, cited as the main reasons 
behind such movements. At the same time they form part of the major 
issues on the non-aligned movement's agenda in its relationship with 
the rest of the world. It is therefore important to discuss the 
interrelationship among the two movements through an open discussion of 
these three major areas, the effect of which will certainly go deep 
into both the NLMs as well as the NAM. 
4.3.1 NATIONAL SECURITY OF EMERGING NATIONS AND THE DIRECTIONS OF 
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEPENDENCY 
It is well understood that once a national liberation movement 
succeeds in gaining independence in the political sense, it does not 
mean that the dominating power be it regional or international will 
completely leave this newly established country. There are ways and 
means of staying in without necessarily using military power. In the 
old days, one of the ways of dominating emerging nations was to give 
the people some kind of political independence, but at the same time 
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creating puppet regimes so that they were totally dependant on the 
world power which created them. 
With developments in education and knowledge, these emerging 
nations have developed in such a way that direct involvement by outside 
powers is no longer acceptable. Therefore, more discreet ways have 
been developed either deliberately or otherwise. 
Most recently it has been recognised by developing countries that 
even if they have gained political independence, they are still 
dependent on outside powers in a wide range of important areas. Up to 
the early 1970s, national security for a particular country was usually 
defined by its military power available to defend its existence. 
However, the objective circumstances that have emerged lately have led 
to the emergence of new changes in the definition and meaning of this 
security from the purely military aspect so that it includes other 
aspects, such as, economic, political and social ones. 
National security gained its present day importance within the 
current world circumstances, which are gradually leading to the 
continous international ising of economic life, through introducing the 
concept of mutual dependance among various countries of the world. In 
the past, developing countries used to be subjected directly to the old 
imperialist system, yet with the gradual phasing out of this system, it 
has been replaced by new forms of dependency from which small emerging 
nations can find it difficult to escape. 
4.3.1a FOREIGN MILITARY CHALLENGES AND MILITARY DEPENDENCE 
In what follows our analysis will be concentrated in these areas 
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of concern in the Arab World. This will be done for a number of inter-
related reasons, the most important of which are: firstly most of the 
Arab countries are relatively newly independent in the sense that 
almost all of them emerged as independent countries after World War II. 
Secondly, they have two of the most well known liberation movements one 
of which dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, namely the Algerian FLN 
which gained independence for Algeria in 1962, the other being the 
Palestinian Liberation Movement which is still struggling to achieve 
its goals. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, Arab countries are members of the 
non-aligned movement, and one of them, namely Egypt, was a founder 
member of the movement. Finally, the circumstances in which the Arab 
World finds itself today are similar to those of other developing 
countries. Having this in mind, one cannot look into Arab military 
supply dependencies without taking account of military challenges from 
the occupying Zionist forces on the one hand and the international 
eagerness to control Arab resources, particularly oil, on the other 
hand. 
At the start of this century, the Arab World was, as indeed it 
still is, faced with pressures from colonialist countries. The area 
was subject to European colonial occupation from the Atlantic Ocean in 
the West to the Gulf in the East. France entered Algiers in 1830 and 
then occupied the rest of North African Arab countries along with 
Spain, while Britain and France gained control of the Arab Middle East 
countries. Since then there have been continuous military challenges 
despite the fact that they have taken different forms, differing 
according to the particular historical period. Nowadays the Zionist 
movement has served as the direct instrument of Western colonial 
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strategy to dominate the Middle East area, hence creating the need for 
the Arab World to arm itself to face the quantity and quality of arms 
guaranteed to the Zionist State by Western powers, particularly the 
United States of America. 
The net outcome of this is necessarily the draining of Arab 
resources under continuous military threat, and therefore helping 
Western military industries out of their current problems as well as 
affecting the international military situation in general. It is 
therefore obvious that this military dependency by the Arab world in 
particular, and the rest of the developing countries in general, has 
military, strategic economic, and financial effects. 
It seems that the second aspect is usually ignored in the analysis 
of Arab armaments dependency, yet it is considered by Western military 
analysis a very important aspect, related directly to the overall 
economic situation in the countries exporting military equipment, and 
it gains much more importance during periods of economic recession such 
as that which is hitting such industries very hard nowadays.1 
These conditions of hardship which have hit these industries have 
led certain exporting countries to create specialised agencies to 
supervise military trade. For example, the United States of America 
1) It is worth noting in this respect that the American military 
industry was directly affected and in a very negative manner after the 
ending of the Vietnam war, particularly the aviation industry. Also, 
this sector was negatively affected during the period 1969-1975 because 
of the decrease in military spending which led the American government 
to subsidise six large corporations to avoid the risk of liquidating 
such companies. For further information See: Hoaghland J.H., "The USA 
and European Aerospace industries and military exports to the less 
developed countries", In Arms Transfers and the Third World: The 
Military Build Up in Less Developed Countrles, ed. by Ra'anan V., et.al 
Boulder, Colorado: westview, 1978, p.2lS. 
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gave this responsibility to the Defence Ministry (the Pentagon) or one 
of its departments to cater for special contracts for the Middle East. 
This department made large profits from trade in military equipment 
with the Middle East of the order of $15 billion during the period 
1977-1978 alone. 1 
It is necessary, in order to analyze the Armament Dependency 
relationship, to look into the volume of military expenditures. 
Available figures indicate that the Arab countries spent some 
$25,685 million on armaments in 1979, although the exact figures are 
very difficult to calculate because of the secrecy problem as well as 
their being spread over a medium period of time. Nevertheless such 
figures make it clear that very large amounts of capital have been 
spent by the Arab World on armaments. If we take Saudi Arabia for 
example, we would find that its declared military spending has been 
increasing very rapidly from $6.8 billion in 1979 to over $20 billion 
in 1980 or about $2,518 per capita, as Table 4.2 shows. 
The nature of the Arab/Zionist movement confrontation along with 
the strategic importance of the Arab world, either from a geo-political 
point of view or its oil and financial resources, in addition to the 
international confrontation between the two super-powers to dominate 
the area, make armaments dependency much more important than a purely 
economic relationship despite the importance of the economic aspects. 
It is a strategic relationship which tends to strengthen and widen this 
military dependency, which in the end plays an important role in 
1) Arab Development Institute, "On the Strategy of Arab Armament 
Dependancy", Majalt Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Vol.1, 1980, • (In Arabic). 
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TABLE 4.2 
A comparison between Military Expenditures and Military Power in a 
number of Arab Countries, 1975-1980. 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Libya 
Morocco 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Kuwait 
1 1 -- -I - -- - - I -- - I 
\ Military Budget \ Per Capita \ ~ of Gov. 1 % of 1 No. of Armed 
\ Million ($) \ ($) \ Expenditures \ GNP \ Forces 
\ \ 1 \ \ 
\ \ \ \ \ 
\ 1975 1979 1980 \ 1975 1979 1980 \ 1975 1979 1980 \1975 1979 \ 1975 1979 1980 
\ \ \ \ \ 
\ \ \ I \ 
liT I 1 I 
\ 285 605 705 17 32 36 4.7 6.3 5.3 \ 2.2 1.9 63.0 \ 88.8 1101.0 
\ I \ \ 
\ 6.103 2.168 163 54 42.0 - \50.4 13.2 322.5 \ 395.0 1367.0 
1 \ \ 
1 1.064 2.328 107 183 43.7 30.1 - I 7.9 10.9 135.0 1 222.0 1242.2 
1 I I 
I 155 380 57 125 22.0 22.2 12.2 80.2 1 67.2 1 67.2 
I I 
1 203 83 13.7 1.7 32.0 \ 42.0 1 53.0 
I \ 
1 224 917 676 13 47 34 4.5 16.8 20.7 2.8 6.0 61.0 1 98.0 \116.0 
\ 1 
\ 6771 14.184 20.704 1.193 1.404 2.518 20.0 129.9 \28.1 18.1 15.0 47.0 I 44.- I 47.0 
I 1 \ \ 
\ 120 \ - \ 7.0 15.1 I - I - 48.6 \ 62.9 I 68.0 
\ \ I \ \ \ 
\ 706 I 2.036 4.040 \ 96 243 409 25.3 135.6 \54.9 15.1\ 22.1 177.1 1 277.5 
\ 1 \ I I I I 
\ - 1 2.060 1 - I I - - 1 - I 
1 1 1 \ 1 \ I 
\ I 1 I I I I 
\ 
1247.5 
1 
I 10.-
I 
I 
NOTE:- (-) indicates data is not available 
SOURCES: The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1980-1981, London 1980. 
changing the mutual Arab international unequal relationship into one of 
dominance and dependence. This dependency does not only have an 
economic side, but also has other aspects forming in the end an 
introduction to pressure to redirect developing countries' policies. 
This takes several forms, for example: 
(1) Banning highly advanced military equipment and attaching a wide 
range of strings to their use, which eventually limits their 
effectiveness. 
(2) There are specific conditions laid down as to the possibility of 
transfer or re-export or of lending such equipment; conditions which in 
their scope totally limit the options available to developing countries 
(3) Since the international market for military equipment is of a 
monopolistic nature, this limits the margin of choice facing developing 
countries, and in the end leads to the imposing of certain limits on 
the quality, quantity and effectiveness of military imports. 
(4) Technological advancement has its impact in transferring the real 
costs to the "consumer" countries which leads to the inflating of the 
military budgets of developing countries in an unprecedented way. 
The net outcome of this dependency has its impact on the societies 
of small developing countries not only through their devoting high 
percentages of their national income to armaments, but also through the 
limiting of their range of manoeuvre at the international and regional 
levels. Wherever we look nowadays, we find local and regional 
conflicts around the Third World, the beneficiaries of which are no 
doubt clear from the analysis. 
4.3.1.b FOOD SECURITY: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRODUCING SECTOR 
AND THE HIGH DEPENDENCY ON IMPORTED FOOD 
While the direct and indirect military involvements over time have 
brought to the surface the dimensions of the armaments problem and 
armaments dependency as one of the main problems facing newly 
independent countries and most developing countries, yet the problem of 
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Food Security is a new phenomenon. It is only relatively recent that 
decision makers in the Third World countries have given it some 
consideration. 
In the Arab World, the recent economic developments brought this 
problem to the fore and it has been given high priority as representing 
one of the major areas which need to be tackled. This is because this 
problem not only relates to the daily problems of the people, but more 
importantly is strongly connected to a number of other issues raised by 
the development process. It is also connected to a wide range of 
political and security aspects which are raised by the dependency of 
the Arab word as well as most other developing countries on food 
imports from foreign sources in order to fill the gap of consumer needs 
in these countries. It is because of these dimensions that this 
problem takes on its importance, an importance which is becoming from 
day to day equivalent to that of armaments dependency. 
Despite its obvious importance, one may ask oneself, why discuss 
this issue in relation to the non-alignment movement? The simple 
answer to this question lies in the important role that the non-aligned 
movement plays nowadays on the world stage in representing the 
developing countries' interests in world politics. Moreover, there is 
a very important potential role that the movement can play among its 
member countries in the form of co-ordinated policies in order to face 
up to the effects of such "a problem. It is also relevant in that it 
makes countries more dependent and therefore less able to be genuinely 
non-aligned. We can now proceed in discussing the problem itself. 
. There is no doubt that the food problem is escalating to the 
extent that doubts have been cast on the capabilities of developing 
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countries to face it. In the case of the Arab World, which forms a 
significant part of the non-aligned movement, as well as in that of the 
developing countries facing this problem, some writers have noted that 
"The Arab world, with a total population now of 142 million, would not 
be able to meet its food requirements within the coming ten years, 
unless real efforts are strongly put to achieving that effect, efforts 
which so far do not appear on the horizon".l 
This presents one side of the problem, that is the population 
explosion expected in the near future. This is a war, if we consider 
the spread of hunger allover the world. 
The hungry people in the world are increasing by 450 million a 
year, or about 11% of the total population of the whole world, in 
addition to the existence of nations of which almost the total popula-
tion suffers from hunger and malnutrition and distribution of food 
namely, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Honduras, etc. 
To come back to the Arab countries, they, like every other 
developing country, face population increases. In 1975, their popula-
tion was estimated at 138 million, with an average rate of growth of 
about 2.7% for the period 1970-1975. This rate of growth may reach 
3.1% in 1985 as Table No.4.3 shows. This would make the Arab world 
population about 186 million by 1985 and 268 million by the year 200, 
therefore it would double in the 25 years 1975 - 2000. 
Population size is accompanied by irregular population distribu-
tion and structure. Some countries suffer from lack of national 
1) "Considering the Food Sources in the Future Spread Over the Arab 
World", Middle East Journal, February, 1976. 
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TABLE NO. 4.3 
The Development of the Arab Population from 1970-1985 in Millions. 
Projected 
Country 1970 1975 1985 1970-1975 1985 
% 
IRAQ 9.74 11.41 15.63 3.3 3.2 
ALGERIA 14.14 15.75 22.68 3.2 3.2 
SAUDI ARABIA 6.05 7.29 11.69 3.7 3.7 
LIBYA 1.94 2.68 4.37 6.7 5.0 
KUWAIT 0.74 1.00 1.40 6.1 3.0 
OMAN 0.66 0.77 1.03 3.0 1.5 
QATAR 0.11 0.18 0.30 8.4 5.2 
BAHRAIN 0.22 0.30 0.46 6.4 4.5 
U.A. EMIRATES 0.27 0.56 0.96 15.6 5.6 
MOROCCO 14.00 16.70 22.90 2.4 2.4 
EGYPT 33.08 37.10 47.36 2.32 2.4 
SUDAN 14.00 15.60 19.40 2.2 2.2 
TUNISIA 4.99 5.58 7.01 2.36 2.11 
SOMALIA 2.74 3.09 3.96 2.5 2.5 
MAURITANIA 1.16 1.30 1.73 2.9 2.9 
LEBANON 2.13 2.40 3.24 2.9 2.9 
SYRIA 6.30 7.36 10.20 3.3 3.35 
NORTH YEMEN 4.60 5.24 6.64 2.4 2.4 
SOUTH YEMEN 1.44 1.69 2.29 2.1 3.1 
JORDAN 1.67 1.90 2.60 3.1 2.1 
TOTAL 120.82 137.98 186.40 2.69 3.1 
SOURCE: Dr. M. 8asBoos and Moreise Freniyah, "Western Europe and the 
Arab World", Rome, 1980. (Translated from Arabic). 
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resources per capita, others face inappropriate relations of population 
to land size and resources and on the other hand revenues which can be 
directed to serve the individual. 
It should be added that the social demographic changes which 
accompanied economic development were represented by initial internal 
migration from rural to urban centres. Rural population decreased 
about 65.3% of the overall population in 1970 to 59% in 1975, and it is 
expected to decrease to 45% in 1985.1 
Secondly, there is also migration within the Arab states 
especially towards the oil-rich countries. There is another kind of 
migration from heavily populated countries to developing Arab 
countries, e.g. emigrants from Jordan, instead of local migrants, to 
oil rich countries. 
Those elements which are related to population size and 
distribution play an effective role in the increased demand for food in 
all the Arab countries and create a variation of size of food demand 
from one country to another. No doubt the increase of Arab money 
surplus created, will create an increase in Arab national income. In 
1975 G.N.P. was $143 billion; it increased in five years to over $400 
billion in 1980.2 The fact is that financial and economic dependency 
among Arab states keeps the door open to spread the income between the 
rich and the poor. It should be mentioned that there is a problem of 
dessertification that creeps into Arab agricultural land, which 
1) liThe Security Foods in the Arab World", Ministry of Information, 
June 18-29, Iraq, 1981, (In Arabic). 
2) Smadi, M., "Problems Facing the Arab World", Jordan, 1982, pp.25-33. 
(In Arabic). 
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indicates a decrease in the land available for food production and 
pressure to import food stuffs. There is a rapid increase in the 
demand for food created by the increase of income and population 
growth. Available data on gross demand for food items in the Arab 
countries indicates that the increase in the annual average demand for 
agricultural production reached about 4.6% in the periods 1968-1970 and 
1977-1979. Because of the increased demand and shortage of production 
the gap has widened, which has stimulated increased food imports to 
satisfy the demand. 
Self-sufficiency has decreased between the beginning and the end 
of the past decade. The Arab countries reached 84% self-sufficiency of 
grain in 1968-1970, but this had dropped to 60% by 1979. This result 
can be said about all food items, sugar dropped from 40% to 30%, rice 
104% to 70%, beef 97% to 86% and animal production dropped from 81% to 
56% as Table No.4.4 shows. 
It should be mentioned that shortage of production to satisfy the 
increased demand has led to increased imports of food items. Wheat 
imports increased from 3,394 tons in 1970 to 10,961 tons in 1979.* 
Beef imports increased from 8,000 tons to 109,000 tons for that period. 
During the time when the volume of imports had become important, we 
should not forget that the increased prices of imported goods act as a 
stimulus to the transfer of inflation through the price increase of 
finished and intermediate goods. Average price increases for 
agricultural products between 1970-1978 reached for example 52% for 
orange juice and 43% for beef as Table No.4.5 shows. 
* For more details see Table 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.4. 
Self-Sufficiency of the Arab World from Main Foodstuff Commodities 
(1968-1979) (Selected Years) In Million of Tonnes. 
Commodities Avera~e of Pure mports 
1968-70 1977-79 
Cereals 4300 16230 
Wheat 4300 12500 
Rice 100 1100 
Barley 100 950 
Maize Corn 200 1700 
Sorghum & Millet - -20 
Sugar 1300 2600 
Animal Production 2.55 6100 
Beef 60 325 
Poultry & Eggs 40 375 
Dairy 1955 5400 
Coffeen Tea 240 430 
and To acco 
- --_ .. _---------- _._-
-- -- --- ----
(1) Imports - Exports 
(2) Imports + Production 
Volume Qf Productlon Aggreaafe Deman 2) 
1969-71 1977-79 1968-70 1977-79 
22650 24150 26950 40380 
8500 9000 12800 21500 
2700 2600 2600 3700 
4250 4400 4150 5350 
3050 3700 3250 5400 
4150 4450 4150 4430 
850 1150 2150 3750 
8670 11510 10725 17610 
1700 2050 1760 2375 
470 960 510 1335 
6500 8500 8455 13900 
47 53 287 483 
Percenta~e 9f Self-Suf ic y Average of Pure Imports 
1968-70 1977-79 Self-Sufficient Demand 
84 60 0.7 4.6 
66 42 0.6 5.9 
104 70 0.04 4.0 
- -
102 82 0.4 2.9 
94 86 2.2 5.8 
100 100 0.8 0.7 
40 30 3.4 6.4 
- -
81 56 3.2 5.7 
- -
97 86 2.3 3.9 
- -
92 72 8.3 11.3 
77 61 3.0 5.7 
16 11 1.3 6.0 
SOURCE: Arab Bank of Social and Economic Development and Arab League, Unified Arab World Economic Report, 
Jordan, 1980 (In Arabic). 
See Also: Dr. A. Smadi "Arab World Facing Problems", Jordan 1982, p.33 (In Arabic). 
TABLE 4.5. 
Agriculture Commodity Imports (1970-1979) in the Arab Worlds 
1970 1979 Percentage of annual evolution % 
Commodities 9uantity. Price Costs 9uantity. Price Costs Quantity Price Cost housanas $ Ton Mi 11 ion housanas $ Ton Mi 11 ion 
of Tons of $ of Tons of $ 
I I I 
Wheat 3394 69 235 10961 I 177 I 1948 I 14 11 I 26 
Rice 544 159 88 1624 I 470 I 762 I 13 13 I 27 
Barley 402 59 23 1292 I 172 I 222 I 14 13 I 29 
Corn 239 68 16 2018 I 150 I 2.3 I 27 9 I 39 
Sugar 813 107 87 1646 I 332 I 547 I 8 13 I 23 
N Oranges 183 113 21 447 I 304 I 136 I 10 12 I 23 w 
+=:a Orange Juice 18 230 4 365 I 504 I 184 I 40 9 I 52 
Coffee 76 712 54 118 I 3210 I 380 I 5 18 I 24 
Tea 136 879 120 210 I 2233 I 468 I 5 11 I 16 
Tobacco 50 1880 94 127 I 3992 I 507 I 11 9 I 21 
Cotton 25 569 14 93 I 1217 I 114 I 16 9 I 26 
Cows Beef 190 120 23 385 I 451 I 174 I 8 16 I 25 
Chicken 20 639 13 326 I 1300 I 424 I 36 8 I 47 
Eggs 37 520 14 93 I 1343 I 125 I 11 11 I 23 
Butter 49 371 18 140 I 1750 I 246 I 12 19 I 34 
Milk 85 309 26 240 I 968 I 233 I 12 14 I 28 
Cheese 33 715 23 112 I 1853 I 208 I 15 11 I 28 
Beef 88 984 8 109 I 1900 I 207 I 33 8 I 43 
I I I 
SOURCE: See A, Smade, op.cit., p.34. 
It must be asserted that some of the Arab states' imports have 
come to represent a high ratio of international export which has its 
economical and political implications, especially if we consider the 
strategic fact that only certain countries have a surplus. Wheat 
imports constitute 85% of the needs, 40% from the U.S.A., Canada 20X, 
France 10%, Austria lOX, Argentina 5%.1 No doubt the exporting 
countries have considered these items in the same way as technology and 
weapons, as in the case for exporting wheat to the Soviet Union from 
the United States of America in the past few years. 
We cannot therefore regard the strategic point for food items, 
since the increased demand and decreased surplus makes it difficult to 
satisfy the increased needs. 
4.4 FINANCIAL PRESSURES AND EMIGRATION OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE: 
THE "BRAIN DRAIN" 
The problem of emigration of qualified personnel from Third World 
countries to developed countries has been the subject of wide 
international debate. The main reason for this interest is the 
important role that these qualified people are supposed to play in 
development. Therefore, some people look at this emigration of skilled 
and scarce talents as a backward step in the development of the Third 
World countries. Most published works on the subject have been 
concentrated on the countries which have gathered information and 
published statistics on this area. Besides, most of the published 
material take into consideration only economic ideas which are mainly 
concerned with the costs and benefits. 
1) See: smadi, M., op.cit., pp.20-25. 
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Such a problem has been subject to wide interest and debate in the 
Arab world particularly during the 1970s. According to some available 
statistics, the percentage of emigrated physicans and engineers and 
Arab scientists to Western Europe and the United States up to 1976 were 
50, 23 and 13 percent respectively, out of the grand total of qualified 
Arabs. In figures, there were 24,000 physicans, 17,000 engineers and 
7,500 of those working in natural sciences. 1 The total number was 
70,698 person, as Table No.4.6 shows. 
This has been the case in the Arab world despite the fact that 
projects in most areas like defence, transportation, industry and civil 
engineering which depend on high qualifications have been growing fast. 
For example, the estimated expenditures on engineering projects under-
way at present in the Arab countries is around $400 billion. However, 
the problem lies in the fact that most such projects are being planned, 
designed and implemented by foreign companies for consultations and 
engineering. This process usually takes place on a "turn-key" basis 
with very limited participation from local institutions and manpower. 
Moreover, the on going pattern of such contracts does not include the 
transfer of technology in a proper way. Since most Arab countries as 
well as most developing countries do not have a science and technology 
policy, such projects do not open the door for engineers and scientists 
to gain the know how, except on a very limited basis. In other words, 
there is no link between the educational system and development 
applications. Moreover, the national help given to research and 
development activities is still very low, despite the high demand for 
knowledge and know how which is being bought on the international 
markets. 
1) Zahlan, Antoine, "Arab Brain Drain", Jordan. Paper Presented to the 
Seminar on Population and Development in the ECWA region, UN, ECWA, 
E/ECWA/POP/WG, 12/p.B19, 1978. 
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TABLE 4.6. 
Total and Professional Arab Immigrants Admitted to the U.S.A. by 
Country of Birth 1972-1976. 
Country 
Arab World 
Oil Countries 
Poor Countries 
Oil Countries 
Bahrain 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
U.A.E. 
Poor Countries 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Yemen AR 
Yemen PDR 
* Estimated 
Emigrants to U.S.A. 1972-1976 
% in Professional, Technical 
and Kindred Category 
Total No. 1972-1975 1975-1976 1977 * 
70,698 12.6 11.4 11.9 
11 ,740 14.0 12.1 15.7 
58,958 12.3 11.3 11.4 
116 7.3 31.7 28.6 
6,848 16.9 5.1 7.5 
2,342 40.4 18.6 14.3 
667 42.9 34.8 34.5 
60 35.7 26.6 18.2 
79 25.7 45.2 13 .5 
1,424 25.1 25.4 28.3 
204 33.3 8.8 22.2 
238 35.3 18.9 33.3 
10,763 28.6 29.4 18.7 
14,771 6.8 5.6 6.8 
23,066 10.1 8.7 9.7 
14 44.4 66.6 20.0 
1,133 14.3 16.1 11.3 
80 12.5 9.7 18.8 
197 17.7 21.4 5.1 
4,823 16.3 17.2 11.7 
201 28.0 26.9 15.4 
3,279 0.6 0.7 1.4 
393 0.3 0.0 7.7 
SOURCE: Department of Immigration and Naturalization, U.S. Government 
Microfiche, ASI, 1979, • 
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This is just a quick sketch of the reasons behind the emigration 
of qualified prople from developing countries to the developed world, 
taking into consideration in addition to the above, a wide range of 
issues such as the standard of living, the opportunities in both groups 
of countries, etc. In total there are a number of pushing factors from 
developing countries and other pulling factors from the developed 
world. Accordingly, there have been a number of models and ways which 
have studied this problem, each of which looks at the issue from a 
different perspective. 
Glazer, for example, in his study Brain Drain, commissioned by the 
United Nations Institute for R&D, looked at the pushing factors for 
foreign students, their distribution according to their fields of 
specialisation, their connections with their countries of origin and 
emigration. Here he sheds light on the receiving countries and what 
they provide those emigrants, but the country of origin has a very 
limited role in this model. He considers the main reasons to be the 
result of the lack of changes in the systems on the part of developing 
countriesl • J. Bhagwati, exceeds this pOint of view by making some 
connection between the pushing and pulling factors. He says: 
"In short the possibility of emigrating to the outside 
world, and the chance for qualified people, stops the 
process of "internal spread" which takes, even it only 
slowly, these s~illed talents to where it has larger 
social impact". 
However, whether the reasons for absorbing highly skilled people 
into developed worlds, comes from the country of origin or from the 
receiving countries, is not the main issue, which is that such a 
1) Glazier, w., The Brain Drain, Emigration and Return, Pergamon, 
Oxford, 1978, represented in Smadi, op.cit., pp.28-30, (In Arabic). 
2) Bhagwati, J.N., "International Migration of the Highly Skilled: 
Economics, Ethics and Taxes", "Third World Quarterly, Vol.l, 1979, p.20 
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brain drain is costing developing countries dearly both in 
financial and human terms as well as in terms of future development. 
The non-aligned movement may provide the forum for discussing the 
issues concerned and provide solutions both among the member countries 
or with the developed world through multi-lateral agreements, perhaps 
through the North-South Dialogue. 
In view of the above therefore, some non-aligned countries' 
planners, such as Iraq's have realized the importance of emigration and 
the 'brain drain' from Iraq to developed countries, and they take it 
very seriously. 
The Iraqi Government has tried to reverse the 'brain drain' and 
employ highly qualified immigrants to their home country. To do so, 
for example, Iraq has followed two methods. First, it has issued Law 
No. 154 to qualified personnel returning to Iraq, and secondly, it has 
issued another law by which it binds the qualified to research inside 
Iraq. For emigrant Iraqis with an equivalent of an M.A. and above, Law 
154 provides the following incentives for return. 1 
(1) The travel expenses of the professional and his dependants from 
abroad to Baghdad. 
(2) Transportation costs of his personal and household effects and 
their entry free of duty. 
(3) Tax exemption for one year. 
(4) A grant of a month's salary if the returnee gets married in Iraq, 
plus an advance equivalent to 6 months' salary. 
1) Shaw, R.P., "Manpower and Educational Shortages in the Arab World, 
an Interim Strategy", World Development, New York, July 1980, Vol.9, 
No.7, pp.649-650. 
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(5) A piece of land and a loan to build a home. 
(6) A number of other incentives related to the recognition of 
his previous experience abroad. 
As a result of the above law, within 18 months, 705 professionals 
returned to Iraq. This number may equal one-third of the total number 
of highly qualified professionals residing in Iraq with the equivalent 
of an M.A. Degree and above, as Table 4.7 shows. 
Secondly, the Iraqi Government made a law to bind their qualified 
people inside Iraq. This law contained the following points:-1 
(1) University graduates are not handed their degree until several 
years of work has been completed in Iraq. 
(2) The Government restricts undergraduates who study abroad, forbids 
Iraqis to work abroad in the United Nations Organisations, except 
for limited cases. 
(3) Requires that travelling physicans and engineers submit a 
guarantee to return. 
It seems to me that the Iraqi way of keeping or attracting back 
their qualified people may perhaps be used by other developing 
countries to get some benefits from their qualified citizens. 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has discussed the support of the Non-aligned Movement 
for national liberation movements trying to achieve political 
1) Shaw, R.P., Ope cit., pp649-650. 
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TABLE NO. 4.7. 
Qualified Personnel Returning to Iraq in Response to Law 154 by Degree, 
Specialization and Country of Study, 1975. 
Part A, Country of Study 
I I I 
I Degree U.S.A. 'U.K. West France Other 'U.S.S.R. Other Arab Other Total 
, I Germany Western I Socialist Countries 
I I I 
I I I 
IP.H.D. 115 I 177 34 16 15 I 17 19 19 412 
I I I 
IM.A. 94 I 120 1 1 5 I 8 1 7 1 238 
I I I 
'High Diploma 3, 5 46 I 1 55 
" , 
'TOTAL 212' 302 81 17 20 I 25 20 27 1 705 
I I 
Part B, Field of Specialization 
, I I I I I I , 
'Degree I Science , Medicine I Engineering I Agriculture Humanities I Petroleum I Total I 
I I , " '" 
, , , " 'I I I I I I I , 
I P .H.D. ,137 I 70 '81 I 47 71 I 6 I 412 I 
I I I I' I I I 
IM.A. I 33 I 19 I 106 I 15 62, 3 I 238 I 
I I I I I I' I 
IHigh Diploma I 1 I 39 I 12 I 1 2, '55 , 
I , I " '" \TOTAL I 171 I 128 I 199 I 63 135 I 9 I 705 I 
, , I ' '" 
SOURCE: Compiled from detailed records of the Iraqi Commission for Qualified Personnel, up to November 1975, 
See ECWA, 1978 and R. Paul Shaw, op.cit., pp.649-650. 
independence for their countries, and has also outlined some of the new 
ways and means followed by the super-powers to maintain the dependence 
of newly independent developing countries together with a consideration 
of the possible responses of these countries individually and of the 
Non-aligned Movement collectively to these new methods of domination. 
The significance of this is that just as the Non-aligned 
Movement's support for national liberation movements eventually led in 
most cases to a feedback of support for the Movement when national 
political independence was achieved, so collective assistance by the 
Non-aligned Movement to countries attempting to avoid other forms of 
dependence could also help to create the conditions necessary for 
individua1 member countries to pursue genuinely non-aligned foreign 
policies and thereby strengthen the whole Movement's chances of 
promoting its original ideals and achieving its goals. 
A quick glance over the agenda of the non-aligned movement summit 
conferences, historically shows that the non-aligned movement supported 
the National Liberation Movements in different ways. 
On the one hand the non-aligned countries invited the 
representatives of the National Liberation Movements to attend the Non-
aligned Movement summit conferences as observers and guests. Such 
moves gave the national Liberation Movement a kind of legitimacy for 
their existence*. On the other hand, the non-aligned movement also 
adopted many resolutions supporting the National Liberation Movements 
in their right to act against any kind of occupation and foreign 
domination, such as happened in the Middle East. For example, the non-
aligned countries at the Havana summit conference in 1979 resolved that 
* For more details, see chapter two. 
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liThe Pal est1 ne Liberati on Organi zation is the sol e 
legitimate representative of the palestinian peop1e". 1 
They added that 
"All measures taken by Zionists in the Palestinian and 
Arab countries since their occupation, including all 
arrangements, constructions, modifications and alterations 
designed to transform the political, cultural, religious, 
physical, geographi2 and demographic features are illegal and null and void". 
At the United Nations also, the non-aligned countries have 
supported the National Liberation Movements in their own struggles 
against colonialism and imperialism. This happened against the old 
colonialism and neo-colonialism (as we saw earlier). 
From the discussions of food security, armaments and the 
emigration of highly qualified people, we conclude that the super-
powers' new methods are:-
(1) Food Security: 
(a) The world food problem is not a technical problem but a 
political one. The onus of responsibility for resolving it lies not 
just with the developing countries but also with the industrialised 
nations. 
(b) As a result of the various relations which the 
industrialised countries have established with the developing countries 
and their adverse consequences, the industrialised countries are partly 
to blame for the existence of hunger and malnutrition in the world. 
1) The collection documents of the Non-aligned Countries, op.cit., 
pp.430. 
2) Ibid., p.430. 
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(c) The industrialised countries ought to import agricultural 
produce only from the developing countries whose export earnings are 
used primarily to secure their own food supply. 
(d) It would benefit the developing countries if the 
industrial sed nations were to make greater efforts to encourage them to 
be self-sufficient in the raw materials for the production of their 
foodstuffs. 
(e) The ultimate aim of the national governments and 
international organization should be to make the food supply of the 
world's population independent of the operation of market forces. 
One can conclude that the issue of food security brings out two 
closely linked problems: food dependence, and the use of food as a 
weapon*. 
The second problem is armaments and military dependency: we saw in 
the previous sections that the Third World countries are spending many 
times as much on weaponry as they receive in development aid. On the 
other hand, arms imports make the developing countries dependent not 
only on the economic side, but also have other aspects forming in the 
end a pressure to redirect developing countries' policies. This takes 
several forms, for example:-
(a) Banning highly advanced military equipment and attaching a 
wide range of strings to their use, which eventually limits their 
effectiveness. 
* For more details see for example: What chance for development: 
Options for the left, agenda 91, December 82, January 84, pp.19-29. 
- 244 -
(b) There are specific conditions laid down as to the possibility 
of transfer or re-export or of lending such equipment; conditions which 
in their scope totally limit the options available to developing 
countries. 
(c) Since the international market for military equipment is 
largely monopolised by developed countries, this limits the margin 
of choice facing developing countries, and in the end leads to the 
imposing of certain limits on the quality, quantity and effectiveness 
of military imports. 
(d) Technological advancement has its impact in transferring the 
real costs to the "consumer" countri es whi ch 1 eads to the i nfl ati ng 
of the military budgets of developing countries in an unprecedented 
way. 
(e) Weapons are used to maintain domination especially in the 
case of military dictatorships. With tiny elites defending their 
privileges and the great mass of the people subject to brutal 
repression, the supply of weapons for armies and police to stablise 
the position of the ruling groups, in the interest of the West or the 
East, whereas real stability can only come from improved social and 
economic conditions. 
The net outcome of this dependency has its impact on the societies 
of small developing countries not only through their devoting high 
percentages of their national income to armaments, but also through 
the limiting of their range of manoeuvre at the international and 
regional levels. 
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Finally, the issue of "Brain Drain" is considered a very important 
problem facing the development of developing countries both in 
financial and human terms as we argued earlier. 
What can the non-aligned countries now do against the super-powers 
new methods of imposing dependence on developing countries? It can be 
said that the non-aligned countries, may work individually or 
collectively to face the new ways followed by the super-powers to 
increase the dependence of developing countries. 
Collectively the non-aligned countries may co-operate together 
to solve the above problems, by negotiations instead of fighting and 
buying weapons from the super-powers. On the other problems, they 
may provide the forum for discussing the issues concerned and provide 
the solutions both among the member countries or with the developed 
world through multi-lateral agreements and through negotiations as 
argued earlier. 
Individually the non-aligned countries may face the problems 
mentioned, perhaps by following the points below:-
(1) By developing their economic, agricultural, industrial, trade 
and so on, under national and government control as argued in the 
Introduction (theoretical connections: development and non-alignment 
etc. ) • 
(2) By solving their internal problems by democratic means. 
(3) Solving their external problems by negotiations with others, 
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instead of fighting, according to the non-aligned movement's 
principles. 
(4) Taking lessons from others' experiences in the world, 
especially those who are successful in achieving their economic and 
political development (as mentioned earlier in the theoretical 
section). 
Iraq's economy for example was dependent on multi-national oil 
companies, for its arms supplies it was dependent on the Soviet Union; 
and internally it was an unstable country. During the 1970s, it has 
solved these problems and so has been able to become a more truly non-
aligned country. In what follows therefore, we will discuss the Iraqi 
case as regards development and non-alignment. 
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TABLE NO. 4.1 MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AND RELATED AGENCIES (1) 
\ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \ Organization (a) UN(b)\FAO\GATTIIAEA IBRDIICAOIICJ\IDAIIFC\ILOIIMCOIIMFIITU UNESCOIUPUIWHO WIPOIWMO 
\ I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 \ \ \ \ Members (c) 144 1351 85 1106 127 129 141 114 100 1261 88 11281147 135 156 145 61 1143 
\ Countries 1946 X 1 1 X X X X X X X \ 1 X I X X X X I X \ Afghanistan 1955 X \ X X I \ X X X X I X I Albania 1962 X \ X X X X X X X I X \ X X X X X 1 X \ Al geri a 1945 X X \ X X X X X X X X I X I X X X X I X \ Australia 1945 X X X X X X X X X X I X 1 X X X X X 1 X I Austria 1955 X X X X X X X X X X \ X I X X X X X I X I Bahamas 1973 X X X I X I X X X I X I Bahrain 1971 X X X X I X X X X X 
\ Bangladesh 1974 X X X X X X X X I X X X X X I X I Barbados 1966 X X X X X X X X I X X X X X I X I Belgium 1965 X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X X I X I Benin 1960 X X X X X X X X X X X X X I X 
N I Bhutan 1971 \ X IX +::> I Bolivia 1945 X X I X X X X X X X X X I X I X I X co I Botswana 1966 X \ X X X X X I X I X I X I Brazi 1 1945 X X X I X X X X X X X X X X I X I X X I X I Bulgaria 1955 X X I X X X X X X I X I X X 1 X I Burma 1948 X X X I X X X X X X X X X X 1 X I X 1 X I Burundi 1962 X I X I I X I X X X X X X X 1 X 1 X 1 1 X I Byelorussian SSR 1945 I X I I X X X X 1 X I X I X 1 X I Cambodia 1955 X I X I X I X X X X I X X X X I X I X I I X I Cameroon 1960 X X I X X I X X X X X I X X X X I X I X 1 X I X I Canada 1945 X X \ X X \ X I X X X X I X X X I X 1 X I X 1 X I X I Cape Verde Islands 1975 X I 1 \ I I I I I Central African 1960 X X I X I X I X \ X I X I X X \ X 1 X I X I X I X I Republic I \ \ \ I \ I I I Chad 1960 X X I X I X I X I X \ I X \ X X I X X I X X I X I Chil e 1945 X X I X X \ X I X I X I X I X I X X X I X X I X X I X I China, Peoples 1945 X I I X I X I I I X I X X I X X I X I X I Republic I I I I I I I I I Colombia 1945 X I X X I X I X I X I X I X I X X X I X X I X I X I Comoro Islands 1975 I I I I I I I I I Congo 1960 X X I X I X 1 X I X 1 1 X 1 X X 1 X X I X I X I Costa Rica 1945 X I X X 1 X I X 1 X I X 1 X 1 X X I X X 1 X I X 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Iraq - Non-alignment and Relations with the Super-powers and the 
Non-aligned Movement: Historical Background and New Developments. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
We discussed earlier the points necessary to enable a country to 
achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment, such as political 
independence, economic and social development, leaders committed to the 
ideal and goal of non-alignment, internal stability and so on. Also, 
we found in chapter two some non-aligned countries for example Cuba 
have tried and are trying to steer the non-aligned movement into 
alliance with one or other of the super-powers, while others have tried 
and are trying to achieve the ideal and goal of non-alignment by 
solving their internal problems, achieving new development and becoming 
closer to the other non-aligned countries. This of course leads one to 
seek an appropriate example from the foreign policies of developing 
countries, which is a particularly informative case. It seems to me 
that the best example to examine for my purpose is the foreign policy 
of Iraq for many reasons, the most important of which are the 
fo11owing:-
Internally, during the 1950s and 1960s, Iraqis socio-economic and 
political experience was that of underdevelopment. Her economy was 
exploited by Western multi-national oil companies; there was a low 
standard of education, her political parties were engaged in power 
struggles, etc. During the 19705, Iraqis aim was to become developed, 
by promoting economic development, gaining control of her own oil by 
nationalising it, achieving internal stability, making social 
improvements, etc. 
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Externally, in Iraq's relations with the super-powers and with the 
Third World countries, the Iraqi leaders have seen non-alignment as a 
means of enhancing the country's security and maximizing national 
ambitions. The Havana Summit Conference in 1979 elected Iraq host 
country for the next Summit Conference in 1982, (this has been changed 
to the eighth Summit Conference because of the war between Iraq and 
Iran), thus initiating a three year period of Iraqi chairmanship of the 
movement.* 
In what follows therefore, we will shed some light on Iraqi 
foreign policy towards non-alignment. Iraq's shift towards non-
alignment can be examined and explained in the following terms: 
Firstly, through an account of the historical background of her 
relations with the super-powers namely, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
during the period 1950s-1960s and its development in the 1970s. 
Secondly, we will shed some light on Iraqi development internally in 
the domestic and economic fields and finally, we will look at relations 
with non-aligned countries. 
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERVENTION OF THE USA AND USSR 
IN IRAQ WITHIN THE KURDISH REVOLT AND IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY 
From the time Iraq achieved independence in 1932, she entered into 
an alliance with Great Britain. The British forces were allowed to 
use Iraqi territory against rival powers that might threaten the region 
and Nuri al Said, the Iraqi leader before the 1958 Revolution, who 
depended heavily upon British and American support to remain in power. 
* The Lusaka Conference in 1970 appointed President Kaunda as 
spokesman for the movement until the next Summit Conference and ever 
since the leader of the host country of each summit has been recognised 
as Chairman of the Non-aligned, until the following Summit. 
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The Iraqi economic links also with Western Europe were of major 
importance, while there were yet no significant Iraqi economic ties 
with the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc nations. 1 
However, when Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952, Nuri and his 
Western allies tried to convince Nasser of the necessity of entering 
into a Western sponsored pact against the Soviet Union. Nuri tried to 
justify his policy for joining in a Western sponsored alliance by 
arguing that: 
"Iraq was weak and therefore needed the friendship of a Great 
Power which would provide her with weapons and technical 
assistance in order to stand on he2 feet. Also it needed protection against communist agression". 
Negotiations between Nasser and Nuri al Said to convince Nasser to 
enter into a Western alliance met with complete failure. 
After he had reached an impasse with Nasser, Nuri al Said decided 
to concentrate on negotiations with Turkey. At that time, Turkey 
already was a N.A.T.O. member, and strong supporter of Western policy 
in the Middle East. In fact after intensive negotiations between Iraq 
and Turkey, they announced on January 12th 1955, their decision to 
conclude the Turkish - Iraqi defence pact. 3 The pact would be open 
to all Middle Eastern countries with the exception of the Zionists 
regime. By her alliance with Western countries, perhaps Iraq aimed to 
entice small Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to join. 
1) Peretz, D., "Non-alignment in the Arab World", "The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science", Vol.363, Novemebr 
1965, p.38. 
2) Nash, M. Bou, National Interest and Neutralism in Nasser's Foreign 
Policy, Chaptel Aill, 1977, p.68. 
3) The New York Times, January 18th, 1955. 
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On the other hand, such action would have effectively isolated 
Egypt from leadership of the Arab States. It was clear therefore, why 
during his visit in January 15th-1Bth, 1955 to Syria and Lebanon, 
Menderes, the Prime Minister of Turkey, argued that they should join 
the pact and also why the Egyptian leaders were the obvious target of 
his criticism due to their violent attacks on the proposed pact. l 
The Egyptian reaction was indeed strong. She invited the premiers 
of five other Arab collective security pact nations (members of the 
Arab League) to meet in Cairo to discuss Iraq's proposed action. They 
announced on January 16th, 1955 that the pact threatened the Arab 
League and Arab Unity.2 
It could be said that the activities of Iraq and Egypt showed that 
both of them were seeking to entice other Arab countries to join their 
own side. Nevertheless, Iraq failed to induce any Arab country to join 
the pact and the other Arab efforts to dissuade Iraq from signing the 
pact with Turkey in February 1955 also failed. 
On February 24th, 1955 therefore the Iraqi Government signed and 
joined the Baghdad pact. This pact was made up as shown in table no. 
5.1 in the next page. 
The period between the Baghdad pact, February 24th, 1955 and July 
14th, 195B, witnessed important events, such as the Bandung Conference 
in April 1955, the nationalisation the Suez Canal and the Suez invasion 
I} The New York Times, January 14-1Bth, 1955. 
2) For more details on the above Conference see the New York Times, 
January 2B-30th, 1955 and February 2-6th and 16th, 1955. 
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TABLE NO. 5.1 The Baghdad Pact, February 24th, 1955. 
Power Shifts in the Middle East in 1955. 
January - February 1955 
Proponents Uncommitted Opponents 
IRAQ SYRIA EGYPT 
TURKEY LEBANON SAUDI ARABIA 
BRITAIN JORDAN SOVIET UNION 
U.S.A. YEMEN INDIA 
IRAN SUDAN YUGOSLAVIA 
PAKISTAN ARAB NORTH AFRICAN STATES COMMUNIST 
FRANCE CHINA 
SOURCE: M.B. Nash, op.cit., p.l1. 
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in 1956 and the Union between Egypt and Syria (the United Arab 
Republic) in February 1958. 
Such events made Nasser a hero in the Arab World and isolated Nuri 
al Said of Iraq. Also, it might be added that such events among 
others led to the overthrow of Nuri which happened on July 14th 1958. 
When the July Revolution took place in 1958, the new leaders 
declared Iraq to be a republic and also a peoplels republic elected by 
and for the people. Also, three points were stressed in its 
proclamation towards Iraqis foreign policy, as follows:-1 
(1) Respect for agreements and pacts which were in the interests of 
the country, including the Bandung Conference principles. 
(2) Conformity with the United Nations Charter. 
(3) Co-ordination of brotherly ties with Arab and Muslim states. 
In view of the above points, it seems that the new regime 
preferred Iraq to be a non-aligned country. With regard to agreements 
with other powers, such as the Baghdad pact, it did not repudiate any 
essential commitments and made it clear that agreements which were 
consistent with Iraqi interests would be respected. Therefore, the 
question will be asked: did Qasim and Arif, who made this proclamation, 
put it into practice? If they could not put it into practice we might 
add another question: why could they not do so? 
In fact they could not put it into practice because two of the 
1) Khaduri, M., Republican Iraq, a Study in Iraqi Politics since the 
Revolution of 1968, London, New York, 1969, pp.180-183. 
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ideological groups*, the Pan-Arabs and the Iraqi Communist Party 
demanded an immediate withdrawal from the Baghdad pact and other Iraqi-
Western agreements, such as that for American military and technical 
assistance. Indeed as a result of these demands, Iraq withdrew from 
the Baghdad pact on March 24th 1959. 1 This step was considered the 
first break in the relationship between Iraq and Western Europe. 
The Qasim - Arif regime also found that the Kurdish Democratic 
party demanded complete internal autonomy and also opposed union with 
Egypt. It could be said that the United States of America, Iran and 
the Zionists found their opportunity to act against the new regime in 
Iraq. They supported the Kurdish Democratic Party against Qasim and 
Arif's regimes, aiming perhaps to stop Soviet influence in Iraq and on 
the other hand to win Iraq to their own side. 
* In terms of ideology, inside Iraq there were many political parties, 
the most important of which were the Arab Ba'ath Party, the Communist 
Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party. 
The most powerful of these were the Iraqi Communist Party and the Arab 
Ba'ath Party. 
The Arab Ba'ath Party favoured close relations with Egypt and an 
ultimate union of the two countries, while the Iraqi Communist party 
favoured close relations with the Soviet Union. One can mention here 
that the Qasim era was an important period in the history of the Iraqi 
Communist Party. The party for example, created both para military 
formations and various front organisations which encompassed such 
diverse elements as the peasants, workers and university students and 
they carried out the Kirkuk massacre. The 1959 Kirkuk massacre was a 
seventy-two-hour long, savage, large scale battle in 1959 in which many 
civilians were killed. 
Qasim and Arif were officers in the Iraqi Army. They were not 
members of any Iraqi political party. They played Iraqis political 
parties off against one another (The Communists against the Pan-Arab 
Groups). It could be said that while Qasim's regime succeeded in the 
short run in playing Iraqis political parties off against one another, 
that regime failed to do so in the long term. 
For more details see: Smo1ansky, O.M., A Study in Arab Politics: 
State and Politics, London 1972, pp.151-179. 
1) Khaduri, M., op.cit., p.183. 
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However, the year 1959 witnessed a new development in the polit-
ical life of Iraq. On the one hand, it witnessed the growth of 
Communist strength, while on the other hand, there had been a gradual 
decline of Arab Nationalist influence. For example, on February 7th, 
1959, six Pan-Arab Ministers resigned from the Iraqi cabinet because of 
the differences of views between the Iraqi Communist party and the Pan-
Arabs on Arab Unity.1 In fact their departure left the Iraqi cabinet 
without Arab Nationalist representation and marked the failure of one 
of the first steps in Qasim's drive to maintain and consolidate the 
unity of the Iraqi people. The new regime's increasingly heavy 
dependence on Soviet military, economic and cultural assistance becomes 
understandable.* 
The honeymoon of the Communist Party in Iraq did not last long. 
Qasim himself was quite aware of the Communist influence in Iraq and 
the nationalists started moves to throw out Qasim and the Communist 
Party, because they considered them guilty of betraying the prinCiples 
of the July 1958 Revolution. The first nationalist revolt against 
Qasim's regime was in March 8th, 1959 led by colonel Abdal Wahab Al-
Shawwaf and started from Mosul, but Al-Shawwaf failed. 1 
It could be said that the domestic problems and the bad relations 
between Iraq and other Arab States, beside other problems, brought a 
corresponding growth of the nationalists in Iraq. 
* For more details about Iraq-Soviet relationship see later. 
1) The New York Times, March 9th, 1959. Also Hottinger, A., "Mosul-
Failure of a revolt", "Swiss Review of World Affairs", April 1959, 
pp.16-17. 
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Therefore, when Qasim ordered the arrest of some leaders of the 
Arab Ba'ath Party between 3-8th February 1963, such as Saleh 
Mahdi-Ammash, the Ba'ath Party threw out Qasim's regime and formed 
a government on February 8th, 1963.1 
During Qasim's rule in Iraq, three developments arose, firstly, 
the Kurdish problems promoted by the United States of America, the 
Zionists and Iran; secondly, the Pan-Arab/Communist problem and 
finally, Iraq became more tied economically and militarily to the 
Soviet bloc. 2 
When the Arab Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963, they faced these 
problems and tried to solve them, but within a few months, the Arab 
Ba'ath Party was faced with a further big problem. Arif took power and 
arrested most of the Ba'athist leaders.** 
1) M. Khadouri, op.cit., p.190. 
2) Ibid., p.190 (and for more details see later). 
** The Arab Ba'ath Party began as an intellectual movement in Syria and 
was organised into a political party by Michel Aflag and Salah Aldin al 
Bay tar, who received their education in France after World War II. 
The party advocated Arab Unity, freedom and socialism. Arab Union 
became the principle goal in the party's programme and its aim was not 
only to establish political union, but the creation of an Arab Society 
forming a single nation based on nationalism, freedom and socialism. 
The Ba'ath Party appealed to the Arab people in all Arab countries to 
work for the realisation of Ba'athist ideals. The Ba'ath ideology 
entered Iraq after World War II through Syrian teachers and students 
who went to teach in Iraq. Its regional leader Fuad al-Rikabf having 
informed Aflag, leader of the national command of the founding of an 
Iraqi Ba'ath, the Iraqi group became the regional branch of the 
national command whose headquarters were in Damascus (Syria). Rikabi's 
chief task from 1952 to July 1958, was to consolidate the party and to 
attract to it young men in civil and military ranks. In 1957, the 
party participated in the founding of the National Union Front, a step 
which enabled it to playa more active role in the internal politics of 
the country. After the collapse of Shawwaf and the rising tide of 
communist influence, Ba'athist leaders became restless and began to 
consider the possibility of eliminating Qasim by assassination. 
Assassination was opposed by some Ba'athists but it seemed to others 
the only way to eliminate Qasim and to put an end to the communist 
Cont'd 
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Under Arif's rule the trends in the internal and external politics 
of the country may be characterized as fo110ws:-1 
(1) Arif like Qasim was an Army officer and he had no desire to rely 
on political parties, but while Qasim played off one party against 
another, Arif ordered their dissolution and relied on a set of Pan-Arab 
officers for support. 
(2) Arif continued to call for union with Egypt and it was the offica1 
policy of his regime. Iraqis foreign policy had a definite pro-
Egyptian orientation, and Arif publicly supported Nasser in the Arab 
Summit Conferences and in international councils. 
(3) Arif showed no initial interest in socialism and insisted that his 
social and political views derived from Islam rather than from foreign 
sources. 
(4) From 1963 to July 1968, there were serious attempts at bringing 
Iraq back to the Western fold by ignoring Iraqis treaty with the Soviet 
Union and resuming economic and commercial relations with Western 
countries. For example, Premier Bazzaz's visits to Britain and the 
U.S.A. in 1966-67, to promote economic and technical co-operation with 
the West on the one hand and to end the Kurdish War on the other 
hand. 2 This was brought to an end by the 1967 War between Arabs and 
Zionists when America supported the Zionists, as it is still doing. 
** (cont'd) 1nfluence 1n the country. Therefore a group of act1v1sts 
from among members of the party was selected to carry out the plan. 
One of them was Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq at the present 
time. The group attacked Qasim on his way to attend the celebration of 
a national day at the Embassy of East Germany on October 7th, 1959. 
The group thought that Qasim had been killed for he fell inside the car 
but he was still alive though seriously wounded. Saddam Hussein was 
hit in that attack. Qasim remained in power until the Ba'athists ' took 
power in 1963. 
* More details see: Devlin, J.F., The Ba'ath Party a History from its 
Origins to 1966, Stanford, C1aifornia: Roover institution press, U.S.A. 
1976. See also: Moalla, The Long Days, Baghdad, Iraq, 1980. 
1) Khadouri, M., op.cit., pp.220-221. 
2) Khadouri, Socialist Iraq, U.S.A., 1978, p.172. 
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It can be said that from the rise of Qasim and throughout Arif's 
rule northern Iraq witnessed daily bloodshed with no foreseeable end 
between the Arabs and the Kurds. During this time, the U.S.A., Iran 
and the Zionists supported the Kurdish movement against Iraqi 
governments. 1 On the other hand, the U.S.A. supported and is still 
giving support to the Zionist movement against the Arabs in general and 
against the Palestinian people in particular. Such events among others 
made the Iraqi government break off any relations with the U.S.A. and 
such events led the Arab Ba'ath Party to overthrow the regime and take 
power in July 1968. 
The Arab Ba'ath Party was opposed and is still opposed to the 
recognition of Zionism in Palestine and diplomatic relations were 
not resumed with the U.S.A. Also, they nationalised Western oil 
interests in 1973 and reduced trade relations with the United States of 
America and some Western European countries replacing these by trade 
with countries considered friendly because they refused to support 
Zionism in the wars of 1967 and 1973, such as France, Italy and 
Spain.* On the other hand, to get more stability and to stop the 
foreign powers such as Iran, the U~S.A. and Zionism intervening in its 
country, the Iraqi government seriously considered the Kurdish question 
and tried to solve this problem. Because of the importance of the 
Kurdish question in Iraq, our analysis will now be concentrated on the 
solution of this question. 
1) Iskander, A.I. Saddam Hussein, the Fighter, the Thinker and the Man, 
Iraq, 1980, Chapter 10, pp.lo,-Iott 
* For more details see: The Economic Section. 
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5.2.1 THE ARAB BA'ATH PARTY'S SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH QUESTION: 
The Kurdish Democratic Party was an offshoot of the Kurdish 
Nationalist movement which became active after World War II. Under 
Nuri al Said's rule, the Kurdish movement was discouraged. After the 
July 1958 Revolution, a group of Kurds began to co-operate with the 
Communists in the hope that the cause of their people might be served 
by this party if it ever achieved power, but such hopes were dashed. 
After 1960 there started a struggle against Qasim's regime and their 
demands, as they stated them were: 
"We struggle to obtain for the Kurdish people the right of 
representation and service in all Government Departments and in 
all official and semi-official organizations i~ proportion to the 
percentage of the Kurdish population in Iraq". 
In fact the struggle between Qasim's and Arif's regimes on the one 
hand and the Kurdish movement on the other hand continued until 1968. 
Since the July Revolution the Ba'ath Party Government has striven to 
solve the Kurdish question which grew extremely complicated as a result 
of numerous factors, particularly foreign intervention, the high handed 
chauvinism with which earlier dictatorial and reactionary regimes had 
handled the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people, the long years of 
fighting, the situation in the Kurdish movement itself and so on. 
Therefore the Arab Ba'ath Party's views on the Kurdish question and its 
efforts to solve it were based on many considerations, the most 
important of which was the recognition of the Kurdish movement as a 
nationalist movement within the limits of its demands for the legal and 
national rights of the Kurdish people of Iraq. 
1) al-Durra, M., Al-Qadiya al-Kurdiya, Beirut, 1966 pp.290-29S· 
.... - ., 
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The Arab Ba'ath Party Government stated that it understood the 
legal rights of the Kurdish people, on the one hand, and the government 
had the basic responsibility of legally and constitutionally securing 
these rights. In order to secure and guarantee these rights, and to 
stop as much as they could, the foreign powers I intervention in Iraq 
on the other hand, the government issued a practical and political 
formula to solve the Kurdish question. The government invited the 
leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party to join the progressive 
patriotic and national front in Iraq. This solution consisted of two 
main elements: 1. The maintenance and strengthening of Iraqis National 
Unity and 2. The granting of National rights to Iraqi Kurds including 
autonomy, to be achieved over a period of four years. 1 
It is clear from the Arab Ba'ath Party's efforts to solve the 
Kurdish question that, the Ba'ath Party leaders by no means ignored the 
mistaken policies pursued by some Kurdish Democratic Party factions, 
such as their suspect connections with imperialism and reaction, or 
their isolationist tendencies. Also, it may be said that this effort 
is considered a historic turning point not only in the struggle of the 
Kurdish people for their rightful nationalist aspirations, but also in 
the struggle of the Iraqi people, Arabs and Kurds alike, to build a 
progressive democratic society. 
However, the efforts were not put into practice as effectively as 
the Ba'ath party had hoped. Indeed, the traditional leadership of the 
Kurdish movement was not content to oppose the effort, but they took up 
arms against it. 
1) See the Eighth Congress, Political Reports, op.cit., p.62. 
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Perhaps for historical reasons, the Kurdish people were drowned in 
ignorance, fanaticism and religious loyalty to their leaders. On the 
other hand, they refused such efforts at reconciliation because many 
Kurdish leaders regarded these efforts and alliances with the Arab 
Ba'ath party as provisional tactics from which the Ba'ath party might 
win advantages and improve their position while waiting for an 
opportunity to make more demands. 1 In addition, certain Arab 
elements, particularly within the Iraqi armed forces, even at 
commanding level opposed the policy or at least did not believe in its 
essence. This was because they were considering their own positions in 
the ranks and regarded this effort as tantamount to stripping them of 
any means of self defence because of the conditions within the Iraqi 
society, as President Saddam Hussein himself said in this respect:-
"The Party leader therefore had a difficult struggle with 
himself and with Society to produce the proclamation of March 
11th 1970.,,2 
In addition to the March 11th 1970 proclamation guaranteeing the 
national rights of the Kurdish people, it was followed by a series of 
laws passed by the Revolution Command Council. These guaranteed 
cultural rights for all other national minorities in Iraq, which in 
terms of population have little weight. These other minorities such as 
the Turkomans had the right to be educated in their own languages -
although everyone would still learn Arabic - to retain their heritage 
and traditions and to express themselves through their own press. 
Also on March 11th 1974, the autonomy law for the Kurdish movement 
was declared by which it gave the representatives of the Kurdish 
1) The Eighth Congress, op.cit., p.63. 
2) Hussein, Saddam, Ahdath fil Qadhaya al Rahina, (Events at the 
Present Time), Iraq, 1976, p.36. 
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Democratic party two weeks grace to join the Progressive Patriotric and 
National Front. 1 The Kurdish Democratic Party's representatives gave 
no reply even after two weeks. They continued to take refuge in the 
mountains and maintain their ties with the Shah of Iran and with the 
U.S.A. and Zionism. The fight between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish 
movement grew more savage. During one year for example, there were 
more than 60,000 casualties from both sides. 2 
The leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Party refused all solutions 
offered by the Iraqi Government until March 6th, 1975, when a meeting 
was held between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran during the OPEC 
Summit in Algeria.3 They made an agreement to solve the border 
problem between Iraq and Iran and have relations based on mutual 
respect for sovereignty. In fact, the signing of this agreement by the 
two sides settled the question of border control and put an end to the 
assistance being given to the Kurdish movement. It may be added that 
this agreement put an end to the Kurdish question itself because 
assistance and support from the U.S.A. and the Zionists also came 
across the Iranian border. 
It must be admitted however, that the errors of the period under 
review did great damage to the progress of Iraq. But despite the 
errors and the damage, the government's preference for a peaceful 
democratic approach to the Kurdish question was the right one and 
yielded significant results. 
It is clear that after a few years of indefatigable searching for 
1) Iskander, A., op.cit., Chapter 10, pp.101-109. 
2) Iskander, A., op.cit., Chapter 10, pp.l01-109. 
3) Ibid., Chapter 10, pp.101-109. 
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a peaceful and democratic solution, the political and economic 
orientation of the Kurdish people is not what it was before the 
Declaration of March 11th 1970. Indeed, many of the Kurdish people 
enjoy more security and satisfaction in their lives than ever before. 
Moreover, the Iraqi Government created new economic conditions in the 
Kurdish area, which means that many more Kurdish people are now 
involved in agriculture, industry and commercial activity linked to a 
greater or lesser extent to the economic life of the Iraqi people. 1 
It can be seen why the above solution is considered an important 
step in the political life of Iraq towards stability. Such stability 
was necessary it can be argued, as it gave the government some chance 
to solve another problem i.e. the control of Iraqis oil by means of 
nationalisation and altogether made the Iraqi Government able to playa 
role in the non-aligned movement and to lead the more committed non-
aligned countries. On the other hand, the solution of the Kurdish 
question ended the intervention of Iran, the United States of America 
and the Zionist movement in Iraq within the Kurdish area. But the 
Iraqi Government still faced the intervention of the United States of 
America in Iraq via the multi-national oil companies. (For more 
details see later in, the economic section of this chapter). 
As we stated in the previous section, during Qasimls rule in Iraq, 
three developments arose. and we have seen the Arab Balath Partyls 
solution to the first question namely the Kurdish question. Now we may 
ask: What about the other problems such as the Pan-Arab/Communist 
problem? In what follows therefore, we will discuss this issue. 
I) The Eighth Congress, op.cit., pp.61-64. For more details on the 
Kurdish Question, 1958-1970, see for example: Salad N. Jawad: The 
Kurdish Question 1958-1970. A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph.D., 
Aberyswyth, 1977. 
- 268 -
Its importance stems from its impact on the role of Iraq in the 
non-aligned movement nowadays, and its impact on the period prior to 
Iraqis active role in the movement. This effect has its working 
mechanism on both the domestic level and in Iraqis international 
relations. 
5.2.2 THE ARAB BAIATH PARTY AND THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY 
DEFICIENCIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL FRONT IN IRAQ AFTER 
THE 1968 REVOLUTION 
As we argued earlier, during Nuri al Saidls rule in Iraq, there 
were no significant relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union, 
because Iraq was aligned to the Western bloc. When Qasim took power in 
1958 in Iraq, the new government turned its relations towards the 
Soviet Union, but there were two schools of thought concerning this 
relationship: the Iraqi Communist Party preferred full co-operation 
with the Soviet Union, while the Pan-Arabs warned against this and 
sought resumption of relations with the West. 1 Qasimls policy was 
supported by the Iraqi Communist Party, perhaps because he preferred 
Iraqi independence rather than Arab Unity. 
Against this background Qasim became increasingly dependant on 
Soviet military, economic and cultural assistance which is 
understandable. To do so, he chose as his Minister of Economics, 
Ibrahim Cubba, who was persona grata to the Communist Party, to head an 
Iraqi delegation to the Soviet Union to negotiate an agreement for 
Soviet economic assistance. 
1) Khadouri, M., Socialist Iraq, op.cit., p.143. 
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The negotiations between Iraq and the Soviet Union began in 
Baghdad early in 1959. The negotiations dealing with Soviet economic 
assistance lasted from February 25th to March 16th 1959. They signed 
the agreement in Moscow on March 16th, 1959 and Khrushchev, explaining 
the purpose of this agreement, said:-
"The agreement provides for the construction in Iraq, with our 
technical assistance, of metallurgical, engineering and chemical 
plants, light and food industry enterprises, irrigation 
installations and other projects. We are helping the people of 
Iraq in a fraternal way to eliminate in the shortest possible 
time, the grave aftermath of colonialism. Our economic and 
technical assistance to Iraq is friendly and disintereste~; 
It has no political, military or other strings attached". 
In addition after his return from the Soviet Union, Cubba said 
that:-
"Soviet assistance was to enable Iraq to carry out some twenty-
five economic projects, including the construct~on of steel, 
cement, chemical and other related industries". 
Despite Khrushchev1s claim and Cubba1s claim that the agreement 
would help lay the foundation of a sound national economy for Iraq 
without involving dependence, it seems to me nevertheless that Iraq 
under Qasim1s rule, having left her alliance with Western powers, 
became more economically and militarily dependant on the Soviet Union. 
1) For Khrushchev1s speech and Cubba1s reply in Arabic see: Itti had al 
Sha1b, March 17th, 1959. 
2) The economic assistance agreement was the first of a series in which 
Iraq sought Soviet economic as well as military and cultural 
assistance. It consisted of twelve articles plus a preamble, a final 
act and two agendas. Soviet experts would help Iraq in geological 
exploration and in a variety of other technical matters and the Soviet 
Union would grant Iraq a loan of 550 million roubles (about £150 
million) at 2.5% interest per annum. This credit would be used within 
seven years from the coming into force of the agreement. 
* For the text of the Agreement, see United Nations Treaty series, 
Vol.346, 1959, pp.142-52 and annexes, pp.154-64. 
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During Qasim's rule though hundreds of Communists were tried for 
their alleged role in the Kirkuk disturbances and other riots in 1959. 
But it was not until the violent overthrow of the Qasim regime in 
February 1963 that there came a suspension of Communist activities in 
Iraq. Between February and November 1963, the Ba'athists who came to 
power in Baghdad carried out a policy of persecution and of vengeance 
against their erstwhile allies. 1 During the regimes of the Arif 
brothers, however, (November 1963 - July 1968), the Communists did not 
fare too badly, considering that the Arifs reputedly were fiercely 
anti-Communist. Although they were not allowed to function openly, the 
Communists were not hunted down by state policy. There seemed to be a 
cautious truce between the military regimes and the Communists during 
this period. Perhaps one reason was Arif's efforts to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union. Another reason could be that there 
was a real desire on the part of the government to unite the Iraqi 
people, regardless of their ethnic and ideological orientations. 2 
The second 8a ' ath government which came to power in the July 1968 
Revolution, at first manifested much more tolerance towards the 
Communists. From the beginning, it endeavoured to form a united front 
of the various political factions in the country. In other words, the 
Arab Ba'ath Party was the first to extend its hand to the other 
political forces including the Iraqi Communist party, in order to unite 
progressive nationalist political action among the Iraqi people. On 
1) For more details see: Mclaurin R.D., and Mughisuddin, M., The Soviet 
Union and the Middle East, Washington, D.C., American Institute for 
Research, 1974, pp.275-314. 
2) Mughisuddin, M., Ibraham, R., Wagner and Mclaurin, R.D., Foreign 
Policy Making in the Middle East, "Iraq Foreign Po1icy", U.S.A. 1977, 
p.140. 
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July 30th 1968 for example, Saddam Hussein invited all the progressive 
forces to join the government. He said: 
"All progressive forces are call ed upon to be aware of thei r 
responsibilities in this delicate stage in the life of our people 
and our nation and to make a serious contribution to defending the 
Revolution and maintaining its progressive path by active partic-
ipation in bearing the burden of responsibility. In following 
this route, the Revolution will not take off from positions of 
weaknesses, but intends to confirm its belief in the need to have 
wider mass participation in pushing the wheels of the Revolution 
forward" .1 
It is clear that the above invitation to all forces to participate 
in the responsibilities of patriotic action, as Saddam said, was not 
because of a position of weakness of the 8a'ath party, but because the 
8a'ath party's leaders believed that the struggle by a united front 
against opposing forces and domination by multinational oil companies 
and Zionist aggression was the only formula capable of meeting the 
needs of the Arab struggle during this stage, which had been made more 
complex and significant by Zionist imperialist aggression. 
However, the above invitation was not the last one, it was 
reiterated more than once by the Ba'ath party leaders. In December 
1968 and in July 1970, the Arab 8a'ath Party invited others to join the 
government. 2 In spite of these efforts and invitations, the Iraqi 
Communist party refused. 
1) From Communique No.27, from the Revolution Command Council on July 
30th, 1978 on the Flank Movements by the Counter Forces to the 
Revolution. 
2) Aziz, T., Thawrat at-Tariq al-Jadid, (The Revolution of the New Way) 
Iraq, 1974, p.lOS. 
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From the above situation, we may ask: Why did the Communists 
refuse to join the front and what were the factors ruling their 
attitude at this stage just after the Revolution? In reply to these 
questions, it may be said that their attitude was due essentially to 
the differences between the two political parties about many things, 
among which was that of Arab Unity. The main aim of the Arab 8a 1ath 
party was Arab Unity in a single state, while the official Arab 
Communist parties did not devote any time to Arab Unity and their 
advisers came directly from Moscow. 
In addition, on its attitude towards the Palestine issue, the 
Iraqi Communist Party followed the Moscow line and called for a 
peaceful solution of the conflict. For example, when the Ba1ath Party 
Government of Iraq rejected the Rogers peace plan in 1970, the Iraqi 
Communist party called for a peaceful solution of the Arab - Zionist 
conflict. 1 
It may be added that on the organizational level, the Iraqi 
Communist Party was suffering the effects of internal divisions of 
which no Communist movement in any Arab country is free except that of 
South Yemen, perhaps because of the Arab people1s belief in God and 
religion. 
It could be said that the rivalry factor for the leadership in 
Iraq also led the Iraqi Communist Party to refuse to join the Arab 
8a 1ath Party in the National Front at that time. 
1) Mughisuddin, M., and Mclaurin, R.D., op.cit., p.141. 
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It is clear that during Qasim's period there was a struggle 
between the Communists and the Arab Ba'ath Party to rule the Iraqi 
people. When the Ba'ath party's leaders first invited them and called 
for a national front, the Communists refused, while later they demanded 
equal leadership for the different parties within the front. 1 This 
was, to the Ba'aths, neither practically nor theoretically acceptable, 
because in relation to front action, the Arab Ba'ath Party, which 
brought the Revolution to life and held power, always has a leading 
role irrespective of whether a front has been established or not. 2 
The Iraqi Communist Party refused the above invitations and others 
in 1971, and was still doing so until Iraq signed a friendship and co-
operation treaty with the Soviet Union in 1973. After this agreement 
the Iraqi Communists agreed to join the Iraqi cabinet and two members 
of the Communist Party's central committee, namely Amir Abdullah and 
Makram al-Talbani, subsequently did so. In addition, after the above 
treaty, the Iraqi Communist Party issued a communique on the occasion 
of the treaty which said: 
liThe Iraqi Communist Party expresses its great welcome of the 
Iraqi-Soviet Treaty. It has followed with interest the devel-
opment of the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union, 
particularly after the visit of the Iraqi party and government 
delegation to the Soviet Union in February 1973. Today, the 
efforts of the two friendly sides have cumulated in success with 
the signing of the treaty of friendship and co-operation. The 
Iraqi Communist Party truly values this positive step and declares 
its total willingness to work with all its energy and without 
restraint to co-operate with the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party so 
that the banner of Iraqi-Soviet friendship remains flying high. 3 
1) Al-Thawra, Iraqi Newspaper, July lOth, 1970. 
2) Iskander, A., op.cit., pp.264-265. 
3) Ibid., pp.264-268. 
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A few months later, after a series of meetings between the Arab 
Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party, the latter joined the 
National Front on July 17th 1973 and the Communists made open 
acknowledgement of the fact that the Arab Ba'ath Party had a 
distinctive position in the leadership of the Front and its different 
bodies and it had the leading political authority in the State and its 
constitutional establishments. l The text clearly stipulated a 
commitment from all parties, other than the leading party of the 
Revolution to refrain from activity within the armed forces. This was 
because the latter represents an important Revolutionary Organization 
and any intrusion into its ranks by other political parties and organs 
constitutes a threat to this unity. 
It could also be said that the Arab Ba'ath - Communist agreement 
can be considered an important achievement of the Iraqi Revolution 
after 1968. This was because the Ba'ath Party leaders perhaps aimed to 
import policy ideas from this ideology along the road to positive 
interaction between the two streams of thought in the Arab World and on 
the other hand, the interaction between the political parties in Iraq 
and the solidarity between all of them could give Iraqi leaders a 
chance to playa role in international affairs within the non-aligned 
movement. 
Unfortunately, such aims and hopes to make Iraq a non-aligned 
country were unacceptable to the Communists, because the Communists I 
aim was to steer Iraq closer to the Soviet Union. 
1) Iskander, A., op.cit., pp.264-270. 
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It is clear from this discussion that only after Iraq signed the 
friendship agreement with the Soviet Union, did the Communists in Iraq 
immediately join the National Front, they issued a communique on the 
occasion of the treaty and so on. 
After this discussion, we may ask: Does the National Front in Iraq 
still exist, and what happened to the relationship between the Arab 
Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party? In answering this 
question, we must examine Iraqi - Soviet relations after 1975, which we 
shall proceed to do. 
5.3 IRAQI - SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1975 
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the period 1968-1975, the Iraqi Government signed many 
different agreements with the Soviet Union to improve its economic 
base, to buy weapons and make trade agreements apart from friendship 
and co-operation agreements. Such agreements with the Soviet Union 
perhaps assisted Iraq to attain substantial economic and military 
power along with firm control at home *, but from the non-aligned 
pOint of view, could we consider that such agreements made Iraq more 
aligned to the Soviet Union? 
In fact, Iraq has adopted an independent foreign policy despite 
her agreement with the Soviet Union, perhaps because her aims and 
principles are different from the aims and principles of Communism. 
* Since such an agreement led ICP to join the National Front in Iraq. 
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For example, the Arab Ba'ath Party aims to unite Arab countries in a 
single state, while it seems to the Iraqi leaders that the Communists 
aim to spread their ideology throughout the world, by means of which 
they divide up the world between themselves and the United States of 
America. Iraqi radio therefore has warned of events and developments, 
planned and supervised by the United States of America ** and the 
Soviet Union, which are tending to divide the world between them. 1 
In addition, the Iraqi leaders have long aspired to keep the 
super-powers out of the Middle East oil region, because Iraq saw that 
the Soviet Union was interested in the Arab countries, such as the Arab 
Gulf States, South Yemen, and so on, not because of their resistance to 
imperialism as they claim, but rather because they are strategically 
situated to serve as a bridge by which to enter the region. 2 Also 
the Iraqi Government rejected the Soviet policy in Somalia, Eritrea and 
Afghanistan. 
Since 1977 for example, the Soviet Union has used South Yemen as a 
base for intervention in Ethiopia. The Iraqi Government disliked this 
situation and they have supported the Somalis and the Eritrean rebels 
against Soviet-controlled Ethiopia. 
** Under the "Carter Doctrine", the USA was increasingly willing to use 
military force to achieve its aims in the Gulf region, and following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Iraqis repeatedly expressed 
concern over a potential U.S. military response or at least 
mobilization to counter the Soviet move and they warned other Arab 
States not to allow the Soviet intervention to serve as a pretext for 
signing mutual defence pacts with the U.S.A. See Kashkett, S.B., op.cit 
p.489. 
1) Voice of the Masses (Baghdad), as quoted in FBIS, daily report, 
(Middle East and North Africa), January 24th 1980, p.E.1. 
2) Iraq Ministry of Infonmation, Iraq, 1980, p.28. 
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On the other hand, the Iraqis have announced the formation of a 
united front of all groups opposed to the Soviet-supported Marxist 
regime of South Yemen with the intention of "Liberating South Yemen 
from the Communist agents and their masters".1 In March 1980 also, 
the Iraqi Government gave aid of about $300 million to the North Yemen 
Government to prevent her from moving closer to the Soviet Union. 2 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran War have 
worsened Iraqis relations with the Soviet Union even more. The Arab 
Ba'ath Party leaders condemned the intervention calling it "blatant 
interference, political expansion" and totally unjustifiable. 3 In 
the war with Iran, while publicly stating their neutrality, Moscow have 
offered military aid to Tehran and on the other hand, Moscow chose 
Iraqis moment of maximum danger to enter into a new political and 
military relationship with Syria one of the few Arab countries openly 
critical of Iraq in its war with Iran. 4 
On the diplomatic level, there has been some trouble between Iraq 
and the Soviet Union. For example, because of the Soviet Embassy in 
Baghdad was close enough to the Presidential Offices to spy on the 
Palace, the Iraqi Government forced them to accept quarters elsewhere 
after they had refused to move. 5 
1) Dawish, A., "Iraq the Westls opportunity", "Foreign Policy", Nu.41, 
Winter 1980-81, p.138. 
2) Ibid., pp.137-138. 
3) Al-Thawrah, January 4th, 1980, (Iraqi Newspaper). 
4) See: "Arab Communi sm at Low Ebb", Probl em of Communi sm, July-August 
1981, p.22. 
5) See: Financial Times, May 23rd, 1978. 
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Also in the same year in 1978, Iraq refused to permit overflights 
of Soviet transports destined for the Horn of Africa, and Iraqis have 
refused Soviet requests for a naval facility at Um-Qasser. 1 The 
military issue has caused deep concern in Iraq and the Iraqi leaders 
threatened to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union over 
this issue. 2 Furthermore, on the military issue, the relationship 
between Iraq and the Soviet Union has also declined. It seems to me 
that the military relation is revealing because this issue is important 
on many levels such as economic, defence, security and so on. In what 
follows therefore, we will examine the Iraqi-Soviet relationship on the 
military issue. 
5.3.2 IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE fIELD Of MILITARY SUPPLIES 
AfTER THE 1968 REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 
As stated earlier in Chapter four, the super-powers are following 
new tactics (such as armaments dependancy) to make developing and non-
aligned countries dependant on them. from this argument we ask: Is 
Iraq dependant on a super-power over this issue? 
During the period 1968-1972 indeed, Iraq military supplies were 
nearly 95% from the Soviet Union, for example the number of tanks which 
were received from the Soviet Union during the period 1971-1972, 
increased from 200 T54-55 heavy tanks to 1300 tanks including T62 
tanks. 3 
1} See: "World Affairs", Report, Vol.8, No.4, p.427. 
2) Al-Siyasah, (Kuwait Newspaper), May 26th, 1978. 
3) International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 
1971-1972 and 1974-1975, London: IISS. p.28. 
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The dependence perhaps happened for many reasons among which were 
the fact that the Western multi-national oil companies controlled Iraqi 
oil and on the other hand, the United States of America and her allies 
supported Iran and Zionism against the Arab countries. Because of 
these facts, Iraq considered the United States and her allies as the 
enemies of the Arab nation. After 1972, the Iraqi Government cont-
rolled her oil because of the nationa1isation. By means of this she 
increased her military expenditure in current prices from 153 million 
Iraqi dinars to 790 million Iraqi dinars during the period 1972-1979, a 
jump of 637 million Iraqi dinars as Table No.5.2 shows. 
As she increased her expenditure to this huge sum, and because 
France and other Western European countries refused to support Zionism 
against the Arab countries in 1973, Iraq gradually warmed to Western 
Europe politically and bought more of its weapons. French arms sales 
to Iraq during 1978-1979 for example amounted to $2.2 billion and the 
figure should prove to be even higher in 1980 when figures are known. 1 
France has supplied Iraq with a nuclear research centre containing two 
reactors and three years' supply of enriched uranium *. Iraq has also 
signed agreements with Brazil and Italy for the supply of uranium and 
nuclear technology. 
1) See: Dawisha, A.I., op.cit., pp.136-137. Because of security 
reasons, I could not find figures for weapons in the 1980s. 
* France sold Iraq 24 Mirage F1 aircrafts in early 1980. Also France 
sold to Iraq more than 100 AMX-30 medium tanks, scores of light 
armoured cars equipped with 55-II anti-tank missiles and a large number 
of helicopters. Eventually, France may become Iraq's main supplier. At 
the same time, Iraq agreed to become France's principal oil supplier. 
Also, Iraq received 60 Mirage 2000s, a sophisticated radar system etc. 
5ee for more detail s: "Iraq shops around for arms", "Middle East", 
June 1979, p.20. 
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TABLE NO. 5.2 
World Military Expenditure in Current Prices: 
Figures for Selected Countries for the Period (1972-1979) 
Country 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Currency 
Mn dinars 
Mn dinars 
Mn dinars 
Mn dinars 
Mn dinars 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
4.9 5.8 9.3 5.8 9.3 14.3 19.6 22.0 
650 1250 1530 1631 1564 1845 1300 1200 
153 199 422 470 
44.1 47.3 50.2 55.2 
61.3 70.9 147 190 
520 593 587 790 
103 94.5 95.3 130 
250 298 296 267 
SOURCE: SIPRI, Yearbook 1981, London 1981, Table 6A.3. p.163. 
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In addition, according to the "Middle East Journal", "Spain is 
expected to become Iraq's third biggest supplier of weapons under a 
projected five year deal worth around $900 million".1 From this 
discussion we can see why Iraqi military supplies from the Soviet Union 
declined from 95% in 1970-1972 to 63% in 1979.2 On the other hand, 
the more distant relationship between the Iraqi Government and the 
Soviet Union resulted in the following events: 
a) A break in the relationship between the Arab Ba'ath Party and the 
Iraqi Communist Party which led to; 
b) Most of the Iraqi Communists leaving Iraq for Syria, Moscow and 
other Eastern bloc countries, and the ICP is therefore no longer 
a member of the National Front, or of any importance in the 
country. 
c) Iraq's trade with the Soviet bloc over the last few years has 
declined, whereas its trade with the Western countries, 
particularly Western Europe and Japan, has increased markedly. 
(For more details see the economic section in this chapter). 
d) As stated above Iraq's military imports from the Soviet Union fell 
from 95% in 1972 to 63% in 1979, perhaps even lower in 1980, 
especially after the war with Iran started. 
Alongside the above discussed facts, there are other facts that 
affect the external relations of Iraq and its role in the non-alignment 
movement. One of the major factors is the state of the economy. It is 
therefore rather important to discuss economic developments in the 
Iraqi domestic market hand in hand with the political developments that 
have been taking place. 
1) See "Middle East", op.cit., p.20. 
2) Ibid., p.20. 
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5.4. THE IRAQI ECONOMY BEFORE AND AFTER THE JULY 1968 REVOLUTION 
Through the Qasim-Arif period, Iraq played no role in the 
management of Iraqi oil. It is therefore not surprising perhaps to 
argue that this resulted in leaving the Iraqi economy controlled and 
dominated by the foreign multi-national oil companies. This basis for 
domination created a huge set of problems especially in the industrial 
and agricultural sectors in Iraq. In addition, the Qasim-Arif regimes 
left an economy tottering into chaos and an almost empty treasury.1 
It could be said that the Iraqis recognized the impact of the 
emerging problems as early as the 1960s, yet were in no position to 
redress their effects until the period between 1972-1973, when the new 
revolution nationalised Iraqi oil. In the light of the above, the 
present section will place attention on a number of problems which 
collectively should be dealt with as a priority, taking into 
consideration the fact that these are the most important issues, but 
not the only ones. Such issues include oil nationalisation and the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. 
5.4.1 THE IRAQI OIL SECTOR 
The Iraqi economy during the 1950s up to 1968, was marked by the 
complete domination of the multi-national oil companies over the oil 
resources in terms of extraction, production, marketing and 
transportation. Its oil interests for example were distributed equally 
between the share holders of the operating oil companies as follows:-
1) The Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba1ath Party, 1974, Iraq, 
Chapter 4, p.52. 
- 283 -
TABLE NO. 5.3 
The Multi-National Oil Companies in Iraq before 1968 
Company/Nationality Percentage 
(1) Near Eastern Development 23.75 
Corporation (American) 
(2) Royal Dutch Shell Group 23.75 (British-Dutch) 
(3) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 23.75 
(British) 
I (4) Compagnie Fran~aise Des I 
Petroles (French) I 
23.75 
I 
(5 ) Other participation and I 
Exploration Companies I 
I 
5.00 
I 
I 
TOTAL I 100.00 
I 
SOURCE: F.I. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950-1957, Part III, 
Chapter 8, p.130. 
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American 23.75%, British 23.75%, French 23.75%, British/Dutch 23.75% 
and others 5.00% as Table 5.3 shows. 
Consequently, the oil sector was isolated from the rest of the 
Iraqi economy during this period, because the foreign oil companies 
concentrated on the difficulties which might face their productive 
operations and also their primary aim was always obtaining profits. 
They paid attention to the needs of the world oil markets rather than 
to the needs of the economies of the producing countries. In fact, 
Qasim's government tried to get more benefits from Iraq's oil, by 
inviting representatives of the companies to discuss points* of 
differences, but these discussions between them resulted in nothing 
new. 
After this invitation by Qasim, there were several meetings 
between the Iraqi Government and the representatives of the oil 
companies **. The principle points of discussion centred on Iraq's 
* The points of difference which the Iraqis submitted for discussion 
were as follows:-
1. Calculation of the cost of oil production and its elements to ensure 
Iraq's rights. 
2. The method used in fixing prices, according to which Iraq's oil 
royalties are calculated. 
3. Abolition of the discount taken by the companies. 
4. Appointment of Iraqi Directors and their participation in the Board 
of Directors in London and control of the companies' expenditures by 
the Iraqi Government in a manner which would safeguard Iraq's 
interests. 
5. Relinquishment by the companies of the unexploited areas so that 
Iraq would benefit from them. 
6. To guarantee the use of Iraqi tankers in transporting Iraqi oil. 
7. The necessity of Iraqis participation in the share capital of the 
companies to minimum extent of 20% of the general total. 
8. The necessity to increase Iraqis share of oil royalties. 
9. Payment of royalties in convertible currency that would guarantee 
Iraqis interests. . 
** In April 1961 for example there were two meetings and in August 
another meeting. 
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demand for an increased share of profits.! 
No agreement was reached and at the final meeting on October 11th 
1961, Qasim stated that: 
"The oil companies will keep their existing wells and relinquish 
90% of the concessionary area and the government's share of 
profits should be increased. The government and the companies 
will be partners in the remaining 10% of the relinquished area on 
a new basis to be negotiated. There will be share participation 
in existing companie2, but there will have to be an increase in the share of profits". 
A month later, on December 11th 1961, Qasim issued Law No.80, 
designed to dispossess the oil companies of all land not yet used for 
oil production, and its enforcement amounted to the dispossession of 
99.5% of the area over which the companies held prospecting rights 
under the oil agreements. 3 It was neither in Qasim's interest to go 
beyond the enforcement of this Law, nor could the companies do anything 
other than register a protest on the matter, because of the absence of 
planning for economic development in the Qasim-Arif eras. In fact, oil 
production continued as before and both Iraq and the companies dealt 
with each other on the basis of the de facto situation pending future 
arrangements. 
The Arab Ba'ath Party took power in July 1968 in Iraq under the 
following aims: 
"Economic independence is one of the central aims of the 1968 
Revolution. It is as important as political independence and 
complementary to it, for without it political independence loses 
its principal support and essence and remains exposed to constant 
danger".4 
1) Khaduorl, M., Op.Clt., pp.162-164. 
2) Khaduori, M., op.cit., p.164. 
3) See: Statement giving the reasons for the enactment of Law 80, 
Shawwaf, pp.189-200. Iraq. 
4) The Eight Regional Congress, op.cit., p.49. 
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In accordance with these aims and principles, the Iraqi Government 
nationalised the country's oil. The question which needs to be asked 
at this juncture is: Why and how did she do it? 
The fact was that the Government's position in Iraq was not 
against the multi-national oil companies' purely commercial operations, 
but against their policy of reducing oil output which was based on 
political motives besides economic ones. The companies kept the 
production of Iraqi oil at a low level in comparison with other 
neighbouring countries whose production reached the levels of 168.1, 
148.6 and 129.5 million tons in Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait in 1969, 
while Iraqis oil production was just 73.3 million tons for the same 
year. 1 It seems that this policy of the oil companies actually 
caused Iraq a material loss of 1.0. 450 million or about 1.3 billion 
dollars for the period froln 1961-1970. Also, the oil companies' 
investments dropped sharply from 1.0. 23 million in 1961 before Law 
No.80 to only half million in 1971. 2 In addition, the companies 
refused to give Iraq the benefit of the royalty - expensing agreement 
negotiated by OPEC and given effect in the other exporting countries 
and on the other hand, the level of oil output was low, particularly 
from Basrah, where production was below the export capacity of the port 
facilities. Therefore, the Iraqi Government recognised that in view of 
this serious situation it would either have to take firm action against 
the companies or the latter would have to respond to its demands, but 
before it nationalised the Iraqi 011, the government of Iraq renewed 
its demands for the increase in both oil production and government 
royalties etc. 
1) I.N.D.C. Publications, Oil in Iraq from the Concessions to the 
direct National Development. 1961-1972. Baghdad, April 1973, pp.l0-11. 
2) Almosawl, M., Iraq's Oil, the Peoples' Struggle Against Oil 
Companies Covets, Mlnistry of Information, Iraq, 1973, p.129. 
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These demands failed to produce an adequate response. (For more 
details about the Iraqi demands see earlier). 
After the failure of negotiations between the government and oil 
companies, the government took two steps, firstly it signed an oil 
agreement with different countries in the World, the most important of 
which were agreements with the Soviet Union and with France. Secondly, 
it started to prepare for nationalisation. 
On the 4th July, 1969 the Iraqi Government signed an oil agreement 
with the Soviet Union. This agreement was important because it gave 
the Soviet Union the first foothold for influence in the Middle East 
oil producing countries. It also gave Iraq some self-confidence for 
its ability to operate the oil industry without reliance on the I.P.C. 
or its associates and increased the skill and efficiency of the Iraqi 
cadres in operating the oil fields. Moreover, it guaranteed an 
immediate market for the Iraqi National Oil Company.1 On the other 
hand, to be a more committed non-aligned country and to get more 
benefit from Western technology, Iraq had also signed many friendship 
agreements with Western Europe and Japan, the most important of which 
was the ten years friendship agreement between Iraq and France. This 
agreement was announced under the following points:-
1. The Compagnie Fran~aise des Petro1es, would be able to contract to 
buy 23.75% of the production of the former I.P.C. fields. 
1) Stoking. G.W., Middle East Oil, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, 
Part II, Chapter 14, pp.314-31S. Also See: Khwater, Ali., The Oil 
Development in Iraq, 1968-1978, Keele University, 1980, p.46. (Thesis 
M.A.). 
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2. France also promised to increase technical and financial assist-
ance for oil and other projects 1n Iraq and later agreed to 
guarantee bank loans direct to Iraqi importers for the finance of 
Iraqi industrial projects. 
3. France agreed to extend credit valued at $500 million to Iraq for 
specified projects to be implemented by French firms in many 
sectors of the economy, including oil. 
4. In addition, the two Governments were to develop more relation-
ships between the two countries over a wide area, including 
cultural co-operation and the diffusion of the French language in 
Iraq and the Arabic language in France. 1 
In addition to the above agreement, the Iraqi Government signed 
many agreements with different countries in Western Europe. In May 
1974, Iraq and Italy signed a general economic co-operation agreement. 
The value of this agreement was reported to be over 3,000 million 
dollars and Italy received an additional 10 million tons of oil a year 
for ten years over and above the 20 million tons contracted for in 
March 1972. 2 
Iraq did not neglect the less industra1ised countries in Europe 
and the Third World in her widespread search for assistance and markets 
from countries able and willing to provide the goods and services 
needed to develop her oil industry and her economy generally in return 
for supplies of crude oil. 
1) Le monde, June 20th, 1972. For a useful summary of the discussion 
communique and agreement see: MEES, 1th-28th June 1972, and June 30th 
1972. 
2) Penrose, E., Iraq: International Relations and National Development. 
London 1978, p.420. 
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As to developing countries, agreements were made with a large 
number of countries, among which were China, India, Brazil and 
others. 1 
The second step taken by the Iraqi Government against the multi-
national oil companies was nationalisation. Indeed, after the failure 
of negotiations between the Iraqi Government and the multi-national oil 
companies, on June 1st 1971, the Revolutionary Command Council headed 
by A. Hassan Al-Bakr, issued Law No.69 of 1972, by which the government 
nationalised the I.P.C. and set up the Iraqi company for oil 
operations. 
of Iraq.2 
I.C.O.C. to take over the I.P.C. facilities in the North 
After the communique issued by the Iraqi Government, new 
development immediately took place. On the one hand, the companies 
refused the Iraqi proposals and a spokesman for the I.P.C. stated that: 
liThe company would take legal action against anyone buying the 
nationalized oil".3 On the other hand the Syrian government also 
immediately issued her own legislative Decree No.40 which nationalised 
the I.P.C. pipelines and other I.P.C. property in Syria, including the 
Banias terminal and the I.P.C. share of the oil stocks therein. 4 
After the nationalisation or even before, the Iraqi Government had 
signed a large number of trade agreements in addition to the general 
1) Ibid., p.439. 
2) The Ministry of Information, Baghdad, Iraq, 1978, p.103. 
3) Nadim al Pachachi, Secretary General of OPEC, issued a statement in 
support of Iraqis action and condemned the I.P.C. for reducing 
production of its Northern oil as a deliberate and premeditated 
measure, aimed at punishing Iraq and exerting pressure. See Penrose 
op.cit., p.420. 
4) Ibid., p.420. 
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loan, co-operation and technical agreement such as those we have 
described earlier. Furthermore, hundreds of contracts and sub-
contracts had been signed connected with the general investment 
programmes of the country. In reply to the questions asked earlier: 
Why did Iraq sign all those agreements? and why did she nationalised 
Iraqi oil? It could be said that there were many reasons and 
considerations underlying these moves by the Iraqi Government in the 
1970s. The most important of which were two. There was the economic 
necessity of finding markets for oil in return for supplies of goods 
and services it wanted in order to develop its economy or to increase 
its military strength, and there was the political consideration by 
which Iraq extended general friendship and co-operation arrangements. 
On the political level, Iraq was the first country to bring oil 
into the arena for a political purpose when on October 7th, 1973, she 
decided to retaliate against the United States for her support of 
Zionism by nationalising with compensation the American interests in 
the Basrah Petroleum Company. In'addition, Iraq also called on Arab 
countries to nationalise American interests in their lands and to 
withdraw funds from United States Banks and employ them in the 
development of Arab countries or deposit them in the banks of friendly 
countries. 1 The Iraqi demands that withdrawn funds should be used to 
develop Arab or African countries could only increase, directly or 
indirectly exports from the U.S.A., since oil revenues in foreign 
exchange can be spent only on foreign goods and services. 2 
1) Penrose, E., op.cit., p.507. 
2) Ibid., pp.507-508. 
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As for the economic consideration, after nationalisation, the 
governmentls royalties rose from 50 to 100% from the national oil 
resources, the revenues from oil amounted to $7.42 billion in the same 
year as nationalisation 1973-1974, as Table 5.4 shows. 
The nationalisation of oil in Iraq transferred the industry from 
foreign to national control and it helped to overcome some difficulties 
in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Having discussed the oil 
sector in the Iraqi economy, our analysis will now examine the agricul-
tural and industrial sectors in Iraq and some developments to solve 
Iraqis economic problems during the 1970s which gave the Iraqi Govern-
ment support in shifting its policy towards genuine non-alignment. 
5.4.2 AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ AFTER THE 1968 REVOLUTION 
Iraq since ancient times has suffered from the major problem of 
land fertility deterioration. Its annual loss of fertile land for 
example is estimated at 70,000 donums. 1 Also the fertile land in 
Iraq was controlled by small groups of people while millions of Iraqi 
people were without land. For example, of 94,398,115 donums, the 
private land belonging to Iraqi people was only 1,236,236 donums, while 
the other land was registered as public land, Waqfs and Miris. 2 
When the Arab Balath Party took power in Iraq after the 1968 
Revolution, it faced serious agricultural problems in Iraq and it had 
1) The Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.63. 
2) IIMiddle East Annual Review 1976-1977 11 , by the Middle East Review Co. 
Ltd., 1977, p.308. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Iraqis Oil Production and Revenues Between 1968-1977 
Year 
1968 - 1969 
1969 - 1970 
1970 - 1971 
1971 - 1972 
1972 - 1973 
1973 - 1974 
1974 - 1975 
1975 - 1976 
1976 - 1977 
TOTAL 
Oil Production 
(Mi 11 i on tons) 
72.6 
73.3 
77 .0 
82.4 
71.1 
97.8 
95.5 
109.2 
119.2 
798.1 
SOURCE: Ali Kuwater, op.cit., p.53. Table 2.9. 
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Revenues 
(Million $) 
476.2 
483.5 
521.2 
840.0 
575.0 
1,317.0 
5,700.0 
7,600.0 
7,700.0 
25,212.9 
to plan to solve these problems and to develop this sector. To do so 
for example, the government issued a new agrarian reform Law No.117, by 
which they reduced the maximum holding of irrigated land to between 10 
hectares and 150 hectares depending on the type of irrigation, crop and 
type of land; and of non-irrigated land to 250-500 hectares depending 
on the average rainfall of the region. 1 
Before we examine the new developments in the agricultural sector 
in Iraq after the 1968 Revolution, it seems to me that it is worth 
shedding some light on the condition of this sector before the 1968 
Revolution. 
5.4.2a: THE IRAQI LAND: TOTAL AREA, SOIL CONDITIONS AND LAND USE 
The total area of Iraq is 438,446 square kilometres, which 
includes deserts, mountains and rivers. In fact, in accordance with 
the widely differing soil conditions and vegetation, some writers 
divide Iraqi land into six areas. 2 Firstly, the alpine region in the 
high mountains; secondly, the forests on the mountain slopes; thirdly, 
the grasslands of the Northern plateau, fourthly, the great deserts in 
the West and South-West and the Jazira desert between the rivers; 
fifthly, the alluvial plains of central Iraq composed of silt deposited 
by the two great rivers; and finally, the marsh lands of the extreme 
South, subject to regular annual flooding. 
In addition, the Iraqi land in terms of land use is divided into, 
arable land about 75,364 square kilometres; pasture land 230,000; 
1) For more details about Law No.II', see: Agricultural Development in 
Iraq after the 1968 Revolution, Iraq, 1978, (In Arablc). 
2) Kelidar, A., The Integration of Modern Iraq, London 1979, p.138. 
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woodland 51,000 and fruit and vines about 1,280 square ki10metres. 1 
Also the actual cultivable area is estimated at 23 million donums. 
Table 5.5 shows the classification of cultivable land according to the 
method of irrigation. 
Faced with the above features of the Iraqi land and its problems, 
the Qasim-Arif regime tried to solve the country's agricultural 
problems. They announced they intended to carry out progressive land 
redistribution. But despite the fact that they issued some agrarian 
reform laws, it seems to me that they did no more than in the oil 
sector, perhaps because of the political instability in Iraq during 
their rule and on the other hand the empty treasury of Iraq at the same 
time.* Such factors meant that the Qasim-Arif regimes played no role 
in solving agricultural problems in Iraq. 
5.4.2b NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN IRAQ UNDER THE 
RULE OF THE ARAB BA'ATH PARTY AFTER 1968. 
The Iraqi Government led by the Arab 8a ' ath Party recognised the 
importance of the agricultural sector and they tried to solve the 
problems which faced this sector. Also the leaders of the Arab Ba'ath 
party knew that efficient agriculture requires skilled management and 
this is especially true of irrigated agriculture under conditions such 
as those imposed by nature in Iraq. 
A new agrarian reform law was issued, (Law No. 117). The purpose 
of this law was to reduce the area open to private ownership in 
1) Relidar, A., op.cit., p.138. 
* As we discussed earlier, the main sector of the Iraqi economy namely 
the oil sector was then dominated and controlled by the multi-national 
oil companies. 
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TABLE NO. 5.5 
The classification of cultivable land according to the method of 
irrigation in Iraq 
Type of Irrigation Area 1000 donums 
Area Irrigated by Rainfall 11.000 
Area Irrigated by Flow 7.000 
Area Irrigated by Water-Pumps 4.600 
Area Irrigated by Water-Wheels 200 
Area Irrigated by other means 200 
TOTAL 23.000 
SOURCE: The Economy of Iraq, Development and Perspective, Ministry 
of Information, Iraq, 1978, p.29. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Proposed and Actual Expenditure by the Development Plan in the 
Agricultural Sector in Iraq, 1973-1975 (Thousands of Iraqi Dinars) 
1973 - 1974 1974 - 1975 
Annual Plan Expenditures 310,000 1,169,000 
Annual Plan Expenditure - actual 243,985 565,511 
Actual as % Estimate 79 48 
Agricultural Expenditure - estimate 65,000 190,000 
Agricultural Expenditure - actual 37,786 77 ,751 
Actual as % Estimate 58 41 
SOURCE: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1975, Ministry of Planning, Iraq 
TABLE NO. 5.7 
Agriculture Education in Iraq Between 1974-1980 
Year No. of Classrooms No. of Teachers 
1974 - 75 
1975 - 76 
1976 - 77 
1977 - 78 
1978 - 79 
1979 - 80 
Total Increase 
Average Increase 
150 
205 
289 
409 
554 
722 
572 
114 
237 
327 
439 
626 
851 
1,138 
901 
180 
SOURCE: From Ministry of Information op.cit., pp.143-144. 
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4,176 
5,784 
8,268 
11 ,986 
19,490 
21,650 
17,474 (418%) 
3,495 (84%) 
accordance with the general policy of the Ba'ath regime to bring 
agriculture as well as industry largely into government hands. Thus, 
up to 1975, 2.6 million hectares had been sequestrated. This 
was nearly 46% of the agricultural area. 1 
To manage the above land, the Government established a number 
of collective farms, the number of these farms increased between 1972 
and 1975 from 6 to 78 farms, in which year collective farms accounted 
for 144,000 hectares and 10,543 farmers. Also there were 8 state farms 
with a total area of 9,408 hectares. 2 The Government made efforts to 
invest money in agricultural development. Indeed the proposed and 
actual expenditure under the development plan in agriculture 1973-1975 
was increased from 310,000 to 1,169,000 in thousands of Iraqi dinars, 
as Table 5.6 shows. 
In addition, and to improve the agricultural sector in Iraq, the 
government made some canals, such as Al-Thartharl canal, about 40km.; 
also a canal in Shat al Basra made about 40km long and 60m wide. Also 
the government increased the number of schools and students to improve 
agricultural education between 1974 and 1980. In 1974-5 the 
agricultural schools had 237 teachers and 4,176 students. This number 
has increased in 1979-1980 to 722 classrooms, with 1,138 teachers and 
21,650 students as table 5.7 shows. Despite their efforts to develop 
agriculture in Iraq, the government faced the problem of migration 
of workers and the highly skilled within Iraq from the countryside to 
cities and towns, leaving agriculture in order to work in industrial 
sectors. 
1) See the Ministry of Information, op.cit., "Agriculture Sector" 
pp.140-144. 
2) Ibid., pp.140-144. 
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On the other hand it also faced the problem of migration outside 
Iraq in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. During 1975, 
for example, while Iraq received about 15,200 migrant persons from the 
Arab countries, it lost about 20,625 persons in the same year, as Table 
5.8 shows. 
The Iraqi Government recognised the emigration problem and to stop 
this, it issued laws in 1975 to retain its skilled people inside 
* Iraq. Indeed as a result of these laws, the number of Iraqi 
migrants declined from 20,600 in 1975 to 18,000 persons in 1976. 1 
5.4.3 THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN IRAQ: 
Until the July 17th 1968 Revolution, the industrial sector in Iraq 
suffered from neglect. Before reviewing the important developments in 
this sector during the years since then, we should present a historical 
review of this sector1s growth and problems and the difficulties it 
faced in the course of its development. 
At the end of the nineteenth century until the middle of the 
twentieth century there was no industry worth mentioning in Iraq. 
Consumer goods and other things came from abroad or were produced by 
traditional methods. During the 1950s, the government witnessed a 
significant increase in oil revenue. Following the advice of British 
experts, a so called IIDevelopment Board ll was established in 1950 to lay 
down the planning and execution of government industrial projects. 
* For more details about Iraqi Laws: See Chapter 4, The Non-aligned 
Movement and the National Liberation Movements. 
1) Source: Birks, J.S., and Sinclair, C.A., International Migration and 
Development in the Arab Region, op.cit., p.166. 
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TABLE NO. 5.8 
COUNTR I ES OF 
E~LOYMENT 
J FROM 
COUNTRY 
OF ORIGIN 
SAUDI 
ARABIA 
EGYPT YEMEN 
(Y.A.R.) 
JORDAN AND 
PALESTINE 
ARAB MIGRANT WORKERS BY NATIONALITY IN CAPITAL-RICH STATES, 1975 
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN (% DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF EMPLOYMENT) 
YEMEN 
(P.R.D.Y.) 
SYRIA LEBANON SUDAN TUNISIA OMAN IRAQ 
95,000 (23.9)1210,400 (96.6) 175,000 (66.1)155,000 (77.9)115,000 (21.3) 20,000 (40.3)135,000 (76.3) 17,500 (45.6) 2,000 (9.7) 
(13.6) I (40.1) I (25.0) I (7.9) I (2.1) I (2.9) I (5.0) I I (2.5) I (0.3) I 
LIBYA 
I I I I I I I I I I 
229,000 (57.9)1 I 14,150 (5.3)1 113,000 (18.5)1 5,700 (11.5)1 7,000 (15.3) 38,500 (99.6)1 I I 
(7].9) I I (33.3) I I (4.2) I (1.8) I (2.3) (12.4) I I I 
KUWAIT 
JORDAN & 
~ WEST BANK J 
o 
IRAQ 
QATAR 
BAHRAIN 
YEMEN (YAA) 
J 
I I I I I I I I I 
37,558 (9.4) 2,757 (1.0)1 47,653 (18.0) 8,658 (12.2)116,547 (23.4) 7,232 (14.6)1 873 (1.9) 49 «0.1) 3,660 (9.5)117,999 (87.3)1 
(26.2) (1.9) I <33.3) (6.0) I (11.5) (5.0) I (0.6) (0.0) (2.6) I (12.7) I 
I I I I I 
12,500 (3.1) 4,500 (1.6) 14,500 (5.5) 4,500 (6.4) 4,500 (6.4) 4,500 (9.0)1 1,500 (3.2) 14,000 (36.4) 500 (2.4) 
(7.3) (23.4) (7.3) (7.3) (7.3) I (2.3) (22.5) (0.8) (20.2) 
5,300 (1.3) 
(16.2 ) 
7,000 (1.8) 
(46.1 ) 
2,850 (0.7) 
(19.2) 
4,600 (1.2) 
(52.3) 
1,237 (0.3) 
(20.0) 
2,000 (0.5) 
(85.1) 
1,250 (0.4) 
(8.4) 
100 (0.0) I 
(1.1> I 
I 
1,121 (0.4)1 
(18.1> I 
5,000 (1.9) 
(32.9) 
6,000 (2.3) 1,250 (1.8) 
(40.3) (8.4) 
1,600 (0.6) 
(18.2) 
100 (0.1) 
(1.1> 
614 (0.2) I 
(9.9) I 
1,122 (1.6)1 
I 
200 (0.1> I 
(18.1) I 
I 
I 
I 
20,000 (28.4) 7,500 (15.1)1 
(61.0) (22.8) I 
I 
3,000 (6.0) I 
(19.7> I 
I 
750 (1.1) 500 (1.0) 
(5.0) (3.4) 
400 (0.6) 1,100 (2.2) 
(4.5) (12.5) 
68 (0.1> 
150 (0.2) 
(6.4) 
129 (0.3) 
(2.1 ) 
200 (0.4) I 
(1.3> I 
I 
400 (0.9) I 
(2.7> I 
I 
500 (1.1)1 100 (0.3) 
(5.7> I (1.1> 
I 
400 (0.9) I 
(6.5) I 
I 
I 
I 
1,870 (4.9) 
(12.6 ) 
1,383 (3.6) I 
(22.2) I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I I I I I 
(8.5) I I 
126 (0.6) 
(2.0) 
TOTAl 1397,545(100.0)1290,128(100.0)1264,717(100.0)170,630(100.0)170,415(100.0)149,661(100.0)145,873(100.0)138,649(100.0) 38,413(100.0)120,625(100.0) 
J I (30.0) I (22.4) I (20.4) I (5.5) I (5.4) I (3.8) I (3.5) I (3.0) (3.0) I (1.6) 
I I I I I I I I I 
SOMALIA 
5,000 <76.4) 
(0.6) I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
247 (3.8) I 
(0.2) I 
1,000 (15.2) 
(1.6 ) 
300 (4.6) 
(3.5) 
I 
ALGERIA AND 
MOROCCO 
TOTAL 
2,500 (98.2)1699,000 (100) 
(0.8) I (100.0) 
I 
47 (1.8) 310,350 (24.0) 
(0.0) (100.0) 
143,280 (11.1) 
(100.0) 
62,000 (4.8) 
(100.0) 
32,000 (2.4) 
(100.0) 
1 5 , 200 (1 .2) 
(100.0) 
14,870 (1.1) 
(100.0) 
8,800 (0.7) 
(100.0) 
6,200 (0.5) 
(100.0) 
2,350 (0.2) 
(100.0) 
6,547(100.0) 2,547(100.011295,750 (100) 
(0.5) (0.2) I (100.0) 
I 
SOURCE: See: Birks, J.S., and Sinclair, C.A., "International Labour Migration In the Arob Middle East", In "Third World Quarterly", Vol.l, No.2, April 1979, Tobie 4, p.98. 
The policy adopted by the royal regime in the field of industry 
was mainly based on the idea that Iraq was an agricultural country and 
therefore, should not expand in the industrial field. This was clearly 
evident from the volume of investments. For example, on the industrial 
projects, the government had spent only 1.0. 2.58 million from the 
original 1.0. 14 million allocated in the first amended programme. 1 
After the 14th July, 1958 Revolution, the industrial sector 
experienced some development and occupied the leading position among 
the sectors which the revolutionary regime began to develop in 
accordance with the 1961 detailed economic plan. The industrial sector 
received 1.0. 160 million from the 1.0. 5562 million allocated to 
various economic sectors *. The regime did not give any importance to 
the development of the oil sector and did not take the necessary 
political and economic measures to free the country from the control of 
the multi-national oil companies. 
After the 1968 Revolution and the rise in oil prices, the 
nationalisation of the industry made large additional funds available 
to the economy and the financial allocations to the plan were greatly 
increased. The 1970-1975 development plan introduced by the Ba'ath 
Government was designed to promote an even faster rate of industrial 
investment, yielding a 75% increase in value added in manufacturing 
between 1970-1975, or a 12% annual rate between 1971 and 1975, 85% of 
the allocations for industry were in fact spent. 2 
1) Economic Development in Iraq after 17th July Revolutlon, op.cit., p. 
* The industrial sector received 1.0. 160 million of which 1.0. 95 
million was covered by two agreements signed with the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, i.e. 30% of the total allocations. See: Ministry of 
Information, op.cit., p.69. 
2) Hashim, J., Development Planning in Iraq, Historical Perspective and 
new Directions. Six Lectures, Baghdad, April 1975, and the Abstract of 
Statistics, 1975. 
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In addition, the government nationalised about 30 large 
industries, all of the banks and insurance companies and this was 
accompanied by other decrees allocating 25% of corporate profits to 
workers, providing for workers representation on boards of directors, a 
limitation on the size of individual share holdings in large companies, 
and the formation of an economic organisation to own and operate the 
nationalised establishments in the public sector. 
Furthermore, the government policy of admission to industrial 
schools was defined on the basis that the share of these schools in 
1974-1975 was to be 590 teachers and 8,719 students. The number had 
increased by 1979-1980 to 3,337 teachers and 42,272 students. See 
Table 5.9. 
During the period 1970-1975, Iraq had already witnessed some 
significant development in the industrial sector. While Table 5.10 
shows the production increase in the industrial sector during 1970-
1975, we can add that the percentage of the industrial sector1s 
participation in the national income for example amounted to 12%. In 
addition, the activity of the processing industries in the region grew 
at an average of 14% during 1969-1974. This growth was reflected in 
the averages of employed manpower which increased from 2.4 million 
persons in 1969 to 2.87 million in 1974. Besides this, the general 
quantitative unit number of industrial production in 1974 rose from 
that of 1969 *. 
* For more details of statistical data, see: Economic development in 
Iraq, Al-Thawra publications or from the special file on the Mlnlstry 
or-Tndustry and Minerals, Baghdad, 1978. (In Arabic). 
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TABLE 5.9 
Industrial Education in Iraq between 1974-1980 
Year No. of Students No. of Classrooms No. of Teachers 
1974 - 75 8,719 
1975 - 76 13,259 
1976 - 77 18,540 
1977 - 78 25,250 
1978 - 79 33,105 
1979 - 80 42,272 
Total Increase 33,553 (385%) 
Average Increase 6,711 (77%) 
277 
429 
608 
840 
1,102 
1,409 
1,132 
226 
SOURCE: Ministry of Information, op.cit., pp.143-144. 
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590 
730 
1,035 
1,425 
1,870 
3,337 
1,747 
349 
Further to the earlier discussion of the problems of the Iraqi 
economy and their solution under the Arab Ba'ath Party after the 1968 
Revolution, we may add that despite its nationalising Iraqi oil in 
1972-1973, it did not immediately control the majority of its oil 
resources. It was not until the end of 1975 that Iraq gained full 
control of the large Basrah Petroleum Company. Expanded export 
pipelines have taken years to construct and exploration for new oil did 
not commence fully until 1977. 1 In addition, in recent years, new 
oil reserves have been discovered and some estimates of proven and 
probable Iraqi oil reserves have increased from thirty-five billion 
barrels in 1978 to as many as ninety billion barrels, which would make 
Iraq the wor1d ' s second richest country in oil, after Saudi-Arabia. 2 
To protect its oil wealth from becoming totally dependent upon the 
U.S. dollar or upon Western economies, Iraq has adopted the fo11owing:-
1. The Iraqis have carefully controlled the ratio of oil production 
to capacity in order to maximize revenues in the long term, 
particularly when they expect the real value of oil to be higher. 
2. It has tended not to keep its surplus funds in U.S. dollars, 
preferring its holdings to be in a mixed basket of currencies. 
3. Iraq has attempted to channel its oil revenues into direct 
investment projects. 
4. It has transferred large sums into gold holdings under Iraqi 
control. 
1) Kashkett, S.B., op.cit., p.480. 
2) See: Wright, C., "Iraq New Power in the Middle East", "Foreign 
Affairs", Winter 1979-1980, pp.257-277. 
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TABLE 5.10 
Important Items Produced by the Public Sector in Iraq, 1970-1974 
Item Unit 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Cement 1000 ton 1,542 1,575 1,591 2,800 
Concrete products 1000 ton 76 108 229 
Asbestos Products 1000 ton 21 22 25 
Bricks Millions 45 55 58 2,000 
Glass 1000 ton 8 9 20 
Oai ry Products & Milk 1000 ton 25 29 84 66 
Sugar 1000 ton 51 91 104 70 
Canned Vegetables 1000 ton 4 7 14 20 
Vegetable Oils 1000 ton 62 83 71 100 
Detergents & Soap 1000 ton 29 36 32 60 
Cigarettes 1000 carton 14,818 15,575 15,768 23,000 
Matches 1000 carton 189 157 169 
Chemical Fertil izers 1000 ton 0 76 99 200 
Paper & Other Products 1000 ton 41 
Shoes 1000 pairs 3,272 2,653 2,727 29,500 
Ready-made Garments 1000 dozens 375 916 835 3,8 
Socks & Bandages mi 11 ion 
units 
SOURCE: Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.74, Table No.5. 
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5. It has arranged bilateral "oil for imports" barter agreements with 
some Western European States and Japan, by which Iraq receives 
needed military or development product in exchange for crude 
oil .1 
This policy has· allowed Iraq to use oil for political leverage 
without fearing economic repercussions and generally to pursue Iraqi 
national interests independently of super-power related concerns. For 
example it used it against the U.S.A. for supporting Zionism. On the 
other hand, as oil prices climbed and Iraq's revenues increased, the 
Iraqi leaders also began to exert greater independence of the Soviet 
bloc in economic policies. Indeed to do so, it had decreased its 
imports from the Eastern bloc and increased them from Western Europe 
and Japan. 
For example between 1973-1975, Iraqi imports declined from 23.8 
to 12.1; from 14.9 to 10.3 and from 6.4 to 2.1 from three major Eastern 
bloc countries namely, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany, while they increased from 10.8 to 105.3; from 18.2 to 102.6 
and from 15.0 to 60.9 from West Germany, Japan and the U.S.A. in the 
same years, as Table 5.11 on the next page shows. 
The Iraqi armed forces during 1970-1977 were completely supplied 
by the Soviet bloc, but after oil nationalisation, Iraq widened its 
policy, buying some arms and weapons from Western Europe, especially 
from France *. Also, the financial independence of Iraq made the 
Iraqi Government ambitious to develop projects within Iraq. 
1) New York Times, September, 17th, 1980. 
* For more details of Iraqi Military Supplies: see the section on 
Iraq's arms supplies. 
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TABLE NO. 5.11 
Imports by Countries in Millions of Iraqi Dinars 
in the period 1973-1975 
. I 
Imports by Country 1973 I 1975 
I 
I 
I 
West Germany 10.8 I 105.3 
Japan 18.2 I 102.6 
U.S.A. 15.0 I 60.9 
France 22.7 I 34.4 
U.K. 23.3 I 31.7 
Italy 8.8 I 20.2 
India 5.4 I 13.8 
U.S.S.R. 23.8 I 12.1 
Sweden 4.9 I 10.9 
Czechoslovakia 14.9 9.1 
Belgium 11.6 7.5 
Netherlands 4.3 7.2 
China 10.8 5.2 
Poland 5.0 5.4 
Switzerland 3.4 5.4 
Australia 1.2 5.4 
South Korea 0.1 5.0 
Canada 0.6 4.8 
Austria 3.0 4.6 
Spain 6.1 4.1 
Hungary 2.4 3.8 
Bul gad a 3.2 3.2 
Romania 1.6 2.7 
Yugoslavia 1.6 2.2 
East Germany 6.4 2.1 
Total Inc. Others 270.3 545.5 
SOURCE: "Middle East Annual Review, 1976-1977", by the Middle East 
Review Co. Ltd., 1977, p.198. 
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The benefits of these projects and of high public spending 
from the treasury, have included a greatly improved standard of 
living for Iraqis, full employment, free medical care and 
education, also a relatively low inflation rate and a virtual absence 
of food shortages. All these benefits have led to a degree of domestic 
stability and this stability has also made the Iraqi leaders able to 
act more freely in the international arena. 
Furthermore, nationalisation of oil gave them a sense of power and 
superiority within the Third World, enabling them to assert a demand 
for a new international economic order and for the establishment of 
more extensive Third World economic co-operation. After the above 
discussion of Iraq's relations with the super powers and Iraqi 
development projects, we will look at Iraq's relations with the non-
aligned movement. 
5.5. IRAQ - RELATIONS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
In the two sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 we have discussed the 
relationship between Iraq and the super-powers and came to the 
conclusion that genuine Iraqi non-alignment started only in the early 
1970s. From this conclusion therefore, we may ask: Did Iraqi non-
alignment policy work together with the non-aligned countries? Or in 
other words, what did the Iraqi non-alignment policy do towards the 
non-aligned movement? 
It seems to me that in answering this question, we should consider 
Iraqi assistance to the other non-aligned countries on the one hand and 
her suggestions and plans for changing and establishing more co-
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operation among the non-aligned countries on the economic level in 
relation to information and so on, on the other hand. 
Firstly, Iraq as a developing country needs all its natural 
resources for its development and the evolution of its economy, but is 
convinced at the same time that the developing countries and first and 
foremost, those of the non-aligned movement cannot get out of under-
development except through aid from other countries. Such aid (as we 
discussed in Chapter Three), has made and is making some underdeveloped 
countries liable to accept the political influence and intervention of 
imperialism because their economic dependence can only be overcome by 
aid and loans. Therefore, the Iraqi Government has given aid and 
assistance to the non-aligned countries as a humanitarian policy and 
according to the non-aligned principles of "co-ordinating among the 
non-aligned countries" etc. In this respect Saddam Hussein, the 
President of Iraq, said that: 
"It is our duty to make unusual economic sacrifices in order to 
help the Third World countries, and thus it is that Iraq honours 
its engagements vis-a-vis its principles, its nation and 
humanity".1 
The aid advanced by Iraq and also the development loans made by 
the intermediary of its external development budget have attained from 
its foundations in 1974 up to January 1981, about 516 million Iraqi 
dinars for 27 developing countries, and this in order to participate in 
1) Hussein, Saddam., Speech to the Council of Ministers, July 10th 
1979, See: Althawrah, Iraqi Newspaper, September, 11th 1979. Iraq, (In 
Arabic) • 
- 309 -
the execution of development projects in these countries. 1 
Iraq also participates with important aid to regional and 
international budgets destined for the development of developing 
countries, for example, the Arab budget for African loans, Islamic Bank 
of Development, the OPEC Budget for International Development. The 
Iraqi donations and loans granted to the developing countries within 
OPEC, during the period 1974-1980, was increased from $422.8 million in 
1974 to $854 million in 1980, while the total loans and donations 
during 1974-1980 was $2827,8 million as Table 5.12 shows. All the 
financial engagements of Iraq including the loans given to the above 
budget, and other international organisations attained in 1979 the 
equivalent of 3.2 of the G.N.P. 2 
On the other hand, Iraq as a non-aligned country has elected to 
work with 19 co-ordinating Bureaus such as those for: co-operation in 
Raw Materials, Transport, Marketing, Industry, Fishing, Tourism, 
Health, Insurance, Sports etc. (For more details see the documents of 
the co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned movement). In addition, 
Iraq has hosted two smaller conferences of the non-aligned movement, 
one dealing with the status of women in the Third World and the other a 
gathering of Information ministers from member states of the non-
1) This loan was given by the Iraqi Government to the non-aligned 
countries at the Havana Summit Conference 1979. The interest rates on 
this loan are symbolic and do not exceed 3%, the period of refunding 
varies between 10-20 years according to the nature of the project and 
means of the State that benefits. It varies between 3 and 7 years. 
The benefiting countries were 5 countries in Asia, 11 in Africa and 
countries in Latin America. For more details see: Always, R., The 
Iraqi role in the non-aligned movement, France, 1982, pp.160-169. ---
2) Intervlew wlth Dr. AI Anbarl, Abdel Amir., President of the 
Management Council of the Iraqi Budget. For External Development, 
published by the Review of OPEC and Documents of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, August 1975. 
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17 
PREFERENTIAL TABLE NO: 5.12 
Donations & Loans granted by the OPEC Countries to other Developing Countries from 1974 to 1980 
~-I 
COUNTRY 1974 1975 1976 1971 1978 1979 \ 1980 
I 
TOTAL 
I I I I I I 1 1 1--1 
GNP%I $m I GNP%I $m GNPtl $m GNPtl $m GNPtl $m GNPtl $m GNP%I $m 1 GNP%I 
1 1 I I I 1--1 
NIGERIA 0.6 15.3 0.04 14 0.19 83 0.13 64 \0.0661 38 0.041 31 1 0.05\ 42 1 0.3 
I 
ALGERIA 0.41 46.8 0.28 41 0.33 54 0.24 47 I 0.18 44 0.87 272 0.28 83 1.5 
I 
IRAN 1.58 408.3 1.12 593 1.16 752 0.29 221 I 0.371 218 0.03 21 0.03 29 6.1 
I 
VENEZUELA 1.66 58.8 0.11 31 0.33 103 0.14 52 I 0.271 109 0.17 82 0.23 130 1.5 
1 
IRAQ 4.14 422.8 1.64 218 1.44 232 0.33 61 I 0.761 172 2.60 868 2.19 854 75 
1 
SAUDI ARABIAI 7.02\ 1029.1 5.62 1992 5.13 2407 4.09 2409 \ 2.211 1470 3.011 2298 2.601 3033 38.7 
1 1 
LIBYA 2.21\ 147.1 2.3 261 0.63 94 0.65 115 I 0.991 169 
1 I 
KUWAIT 10.8 I 622.5 8.11 976 4.52 616 10.02 1517 I 7.361 1268 
1 1 I 
ARAB EMIRATESI11.121 510.6111.68 1046 9.21 1059 8.05 1175 I 4.821 684 
I \ I QUATAR 10.9 I 185.2\15.63 339 7.90 195 7.90 197 I 3.561 106 
I I I 
0.46 
4.081 
\ 
6.17\ 
I 
5.891 
1 
108 0.92 281 3.1 
1053 3.871 1186 19.1 
1113 3.961 1062 117.6 
I 
277 4.5 299 1 4.2 
1 
$m 
287.3 
587.8 
2302.3 
565.8 
2827.8 
4643.1 
1115.0 
7238.5 
6649.6 
1598.2 
Figures cited by the International Bank: "Report of development by the year 1981 10 Pg.160. The 1974 figures are based on 
development and international marketing statistics - UNUCED 1980. Tables from liThe influence of inflation exported over the 
developing economics and the propositions concerning their resolution (solving)". 
A study presented by the Iraqi delegate to the meeting of the experts of the "Group of 77" from the 1st to 4th March, 1982. 
p.35. 
aligned movement. 1 Also, Iraq was elected at the Havana Summit 
Conference in 1979 to host the next Summit Conference in 1982, and she 
spent much time and money preparing to host it. 
In spite of this, when the Iraqi Government found that some 
countries were trying to divide the movement, for example Iran, Syria, 
Libya, Cuba and others, who have different policies from those of Iraq, 
Iraq agreed to change the hosting place from Baghdad to New Delhi in 
March 1983. (For more details see Chapter Two, the Non-aligned 
movement in the early 1980s). Secondly, Iraq has made suggestions and 
plans for changing and establishing more co-operation among the non-
aligned countries on the economic level in relation to information 
etc., as illustrated in table 5.12. 
Iraq considers today that energy is one of the real forces in the 
Third World's hands, and by this, developing countries should know how 
to exploit this power. She believes that countries should fully and 
freely dispose of their natural riches and have the right to the 
nationalisat10n of their resources, their exploitation for the 
independent development of their people, and the elimination of 
foreign domination such as that of the multi-national oil companies. 
It is from that angle that the nationalisation of oil companies in Iraq 
in June 1972 could be explained. It estimates that economic 
negotiations cannot be serious unless they have a solid base. In the 
absence of power, the movement can only exercise moral pressure on 
international public opinion and with this means cannot realize real 
justice. In this respect, Suddam Hussein the President of Iraq, 
declared to the other delegations at the Havana Summit Conference in 
1) Kashhett, 5.8., op.cit., p.491. 
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1979, that 'it was in the movement's interest for all non-aligned 
countries to preserve the right to control their natural resources 
through producers' cartels and price fixing,.l 
By encouraging others to form cartels for their own raw materials, 
he hoped to generate a kind of reciprocal approval for the OPEC cartel 
and its high prices which have produced hardship in many developing 
countries. 
The Iraqi Government also called for a search for solutions to 
counter the effects of inflation in industralised countries, exported 
to the developing countries. During the period 1974-1980, the 
inflation exported to developing countries from the developed countries 
and also from the oil exporting countries was remarkable. For example, 
that of Benin increased from 25.2 in 1974 to 105.7 in 1980 in Ethiopia 
from 57.3 in 1974 to 134.7 in 1980 and so on in other developing. 
countries as Table 5.13 shows. Iraq questions the attitude of the 
industrialised countries vis a vis OPEC, and holds it responsible for 
the monetary inflation and the world wide stagnation. 2 
At the Havana Summit Conference in 1979, the Iraqi delegation was 
extremely outspoken in its suggestions for the achievement of a new 
international economic order, such as termination of all bilateral debt 
negotiations of all foreign owned enterprises on Third World soil, and 
a long term inflation fund. Also, Iraq would still like to see the 
establishment of more extensive Third World economic co-operation, 
1) Ibid., p.483. 
2) A1thawrah, Iraqi Newspaper, November 21, 1981. 
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TABLE NO. 5.13 
Financial Burdens inflicted by Inflation on the Developing Countries. 
1974-80. Some examples in Millions of Dollars. 
Countries 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Benin 25.2 10.2 1.6 15.3 20.2 60.0 105.7 
Cape Verte 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.9 7.3 13.6 
Central Africa 9.2 2.2 1.2 3.8 4.8 13.3 21.8 
Chad 20.9 3.5 1.4 7.6 11.1 10.6 5.5 
Ethiopia 57.3 13.3 6.3 18.8 22.8 80.8 134.7 
Liberi a 60.1 18.0 6.1 32.1 31.2 083.0 286.0 
Togo 21.4 8.4 1.5 21.3 33.1 82.3 110.7 
Haiti 29.1 7.4 5.0 13 .5 12.9 83.6 125.8 
Honduras 79.4 18.1 9.2 27.7 37.9 121.1 176.5 
Arab Republic 28.6 8.7 5.6 37.7 45.9 164.3 258.3 
Malta 91.4 19.5 10.9 36.3 37.7 145.3 225.4 
Argent; na 235.6 158.4 37.0 221.7 252.3 877.8 1974.5 
Chile 371.4 55.9 34.7 86.2 88.3 588.9 1057.6 
Guatemala 119.6 33.4 11.4 58.1 85.2 172.0 235.7 
Lebanon 428.7 79.3 2.8 100.4 132.7 37.3 554.6 
SOURCE: R. Alwayies t op.cit' t Table No.3. p.169. (In French). 
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which would solve some problems facing the non-aligned countries. For 
example, at the non-aligned Foreign Ministers l Conference in New Delhi 
in February 1981, Saadoon Hammadi the Iraqi foreign Minister stated 
that:-
"Iraq considers economic co-operation among the non-aligned 
states to be among the princi~al factors in establishing a new 
International Economic Order. 
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As we saw earlier in the theoretical introduction the conditions 
necessary to enable a country to achieve the ideal and goal of non-
alignment include political independence, economic and social 
development, leaders committed to the ideal and goal of non-alignment 
internal stability and so on. In this chapter a particularly 
informative case was chosen from the foreign policies of developing 
countries as an example to support my argument. I chose Iraq for many 
reasons, some of which are, Iraqis socia-economic and political 
experience was that of underdevelopment, her economy was exploited by 
mUlti-national oil companies, her political parties were engaged in 
power struggles, and so on. I examined Iraqi non-alignment in terms 
of: (a) an account of the historical background of her relations with 
the super-powers, namely, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. during the period 
1950s-1960s and developments in the 1970s. (b) a discussion of Iraqi 
development internally in the domestic political and economic fields 
and finally, (c) we looked at her relations with non-aligned countries. 
1) Iraq News Agency, February, 10th, 1981. 
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From the earlier discussion on Iraqi non-alignment during the 
1950s and 19605 we saw that: 
During the 1950s and up to 1958, Iraq under Nuri was aligned to 
the West, namely with the Baghdad Pact. When the new leaders took over 
in 1958, they declared a people's republic elected by and for the 
people. Also, three points were stressed in its proclamation towards 
Iraq's foreign policy, as follows:-
(1) Respect for agreements and pacts which were in the interests 
of the country, including the Bandung Conference principles. 
(2) Conformity with the United nations Charter. 
(3) Co-ordination of brotherly ties with Arab and Muslim states. 
In fact they could not put the above points fully into practice 
but instead they became more close to the Soviet bloc. During that 
regime 1n Iraq, three developments arose, firstly, the Kurdish problems 
promoted by outside powers; secondly, the pan-Arab/communist problem; 
and finally, Iraq became more tied economically and militarily to the 
Soviet bloc. 
Under Arif's rule in 1963-1968, the trends in the internal and 
external politics of the country may be characterized as follows:-
(1) Arif like Qasim was an Army officer and he had no desire to 
rely on political parties, but while Qasim played off one party against 
another, Arif ordered their dissolution and relied on a set of pan-Arab 
officers for support. 
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(2) Arif continued to call for union with Egypt and it was the 
official policy of his regime. Iraqis foreign policy had a definite 
pro-Egyptian orientation, and Arif publicly supported Nasser in the 
Arab summit conferences and in international councils. 
(3) Arif showed no initial interest in socialism and insisted 
that his social and political views derived from Islam rather than 
from foreign sources. 
(4) From 1963 to 1968 there were serious attempts at bringing 
Iraq back to the Western fold by ignoring Iraqis treaty with the Soviet 
Union and resuming economic and commercial relations with Western 
countries. (For more details see earlier). 
As we stated earlier, during Qasimls rule in Iraq, three 
developments arose. The Kurdish problems, the pan-Arab/communist 
relations and the mUlti-national oil companies. When the Arab Balath 
party took power in 1968 Revolution in Iraq, they started to tackle 
these problems aiming for more internal stability and to stop foreign 
powers intervening in the country. So the Iraqi government seriously 
considered the Kurdish question and reached a solution under the 1975 
agreement with Iran. 
Also, the Iraqi government after the 1968 Revolution started 
negotiations with Iraqi communist party to join the Iraqi National 
Front, and they reached an agreement by which the Iraqi Communist 
Party joined the National Front in Iraq as mentioned earlier. 
It could be said that the Arab Balath partysl solutions to the 
Kurdish problem on the one hand and to that of the communist Iraqi 
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party gave stability to the country and such solidarity between all of 
them could give Iraqi leaders a chance to playa role in international 
affairs within the non-aligned movement. 
Alongside these moves, a major factor affecting the external 
relations of Iraq and its role in the non-aligned movement was the 
state of the economy. The Iraqi leaders took this problem very 
seriously and they tried to solve it by nationalising Iraqi oil. Apart 
from achieving the exclusion of the multi-national oil companies, this 
move meant that after nationa1isation the government's royalties rose 
from 50 to 100% from the national oil resources, the revenues from 
oil amounted to $7.42 billion in the same year as nationa1isation 1973-
1974. 
The nationa1isation of oil in Iraq transferred the industry from 
foreign to national control and its revenues helped to overcome some 
difficulties in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Also, to 
protect its oil wealth from becoming totally dependent upon the U.S. 
dollar or upon Western economies, Iraq has adopted the fo110wing:-
(1) The Iraqis have carefully controlled the ratio of oil 
production to capacity in order to maximize revenues in long term, 
particularly when they expect the real value of oil to be higher. 
(2) It has tended not to keep its surplus funds in U.S. dollars, 
preferring its holdings to be in a mixed basket of currencies. 
(3) Iraq has attempted to channel its oil revenues into direct 
investment projects. 
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(4) It has transferred large sums into gold holdings under Iraqi 
control. 
(5) It has arranged bilateral "oi1 for imports" barter agreements 
with some Western European states and Japan, by which Iraq receives 
needed military or development products in exchange for crude oil. 
This policy as we argued earlier has allowed Iraq to use oil for 
political leverage without fearing economic repercussions and generally 
to pursue Iraqi national interests independently of super-power related 
concerns. 
Furthermore, nationalization of oil gave then a sense of power 
and superiority within the Third World, enabling them to assert a 
demand for a new international economic order and for the establishment 
of more extensive Third World economic co-operation. 
Having settled the above problems, one can say here that, Iraq 
became a more stable state. The Arab Ba'ath party was strengthened 
by several measures after 1976 that broadened national Ba'athist 
control over the regional parties and increased co-operation between 
civilian and military elements within the Arab Ba'ath Party. These 
measures included expanding the Revolutionary Command Council from 
five to twenty-two members in order to include all members of the 
Ba'ath regional commands as well as a Ba'athisation of military. 
Elections took place for a National Assembly in 1980. 
These points perhaps have allowed the Iraqi government to turn 
her attention increasingly to international affairs particularly within 
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the non-aligned movement and to follow a more genuinely non-aligned 
foreign policy. 
My purpose in this chapter has been to use the example of Iraq 
as a revealing case study to illustrate some of the most important 
conditions needed to enable any Third World country to follow a 
genuinely non-aligned foreign policy. As argued in the theoretical 
introduction, a genuine non-aligned policy, as I see it, requires full 
independence, which means that a country must be succeeding in 
achieving economic social and political development on its own terms. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: VIEWS ON THE fUTURE OF THE 
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF THE NON-ALIGNED 
MOVEMENT 
The non-aligned movement is the institutionalised embodiment of 
co-operation agreements among developing countries. It was orginally 
established when most of the Third World countries were still subject 
to colonialism and their human and natural resources were utilised to 
benefit those colonial powers. The world at large was in the late 
'forties and early 'fifties just recovering from the destructive 
consequences of the Second World War and the new development era 
especially in Europe was on its way. By then the super-powers were in 
the process of formation and they were trying as they are still doing 
today, to divide the world into spheres of influence. These pressures 
on the Third World countries made these countries realise what was 
happening, and an effort on their part was necessary to free themselves 
both from colonialism and from de facto domination by such super-powers 
through the exploitation of their resources. 
In this international situation, the non-aligned movement was 
created by intellectual leaders from the Third World who were well 
aware of these developments and who took it upon themselves to bring 
developing countries together on a basic philosophy that entailed 
freedom, development and respect for human beings. Co-operation rather 
than confrontation was the theme of such gatherings. 
Questions were asked at the time as to why there was a need for 
such an organisation. 
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Do we not have the United Nations? In fact, the understanding was 
and I believe still is, that the United Nations Organisation serves a 
need in international relations but the non-aligned movement 
specifically serves the interests of Third World countries both within 
and outside the United Nations system. 
The latter in actual fact is a system which is still dominated to 
a large extent by a small number of developed countries. To that 
extent it should not be surprising that part or all of the system may 
be geared to meet the requirements and interests of those countries. 
The right of veto in the Security Council is one aspect of this 
domination, and the control of the United Nations institutions through 
their financing is another aspect. 
Such an attitude towards the United Nations Organisation alongside 
the then existing world circumstances may have strongly helped the 
formation of the non-aligned movement, and later on supported its 
continuity and development. 
Non-alignment was taken to mean a social and political ideal 
around which the Third World countries gathered. It was taken to mean 
that a member country rejected the danger created by the established 
military pacts, and for that matter rejected alignment with such pacts. 
Non-alignment was meant to be the basic understanding among Third 
World countries that they were facing similar problems coming from the 
same quarters, and by the same token this needed a unified stand in 
order to alleviate their consequences. Non-alignment was recognised 
as giving future hope for Third World countries, of independence, 
development and a lessening of human sufferings, and therefore 
providing the basic needs for these countries. 
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Non-alignment was seen as an essential manifestation of a 
primordial urge for freedom and an expression of solidarity and mutual 
understanding. 
Credit for the establishment of the movement belongs to a few 
distinguished leaders of Third World countries who lived the sufferings 
of their people and took the responsibility to minimise them for 
others to the largest extent possible. It was the open mindedness, 
understanding and political wisdom of people like, Nasser, Nehru, 
Sukarno and Tito which brought the other leaders and nations to share 
with them their understanding of the needs of Third World countries. 
The non-aligned movement started from their initiative and it is a fact 
that their political, social, human and economic understanding of the 
world system were reflected strongly in the basic philosophy of the 
movement. 
Because of the occupation and exploitation of most Third World 
countries, the issue of ending colonialism was a top priority one. 
Freedom from external influence and individual countries' development, 
be it economic, political, social or cultural, was in the forefront of 
the non-aligned movement's mandate. It was the dominating factor 
during the fifties. It was a period during which, finding an identity 
for the movement, and agreeing on the basic principles and approaches 
to solve the problems confronting them were essential. Recognising the 
then wide spread ideological differences among member countries and 
dealing with them logically was a basic necessity at least until the 
movement stood on its feet. Only then did a deep argument as to the 
relevance of such ideological differences and their impact on the 
movement take place. 
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The member countries were basically the poor countries of Asia and 
Africa and it was therefore not surprising to see the issue of economic 
development as an overriding objective, if the sufferings of the 
peoples of those nations were to be alleviated. It was therefore a 
period for building the movement, and for identifying objectives, aims 
and needs of Third World countries. It was simply an inward-looking 
phase in which the member countries wanted to understand themselves and 
the participating countries' problems. 
identification with others. 
It was at best a period of 
The 1960s provided new challenges and therefore the movement faced 
the first crisis of its own development. This was because new problems 
necessitated new approaches and a fresh look was needed to confront 
such arising problems. It was a period in which the movement freed 
itself from looking only inward to one that started looking at regional 
issues. Emphasis on international issues was necessary if the movement 
was to establish itself as a social and political structure which had a 
role to play in the world's international affairs. This period was 
characterized by a relative stability and certainly the movement had 
its founder leaders. World peace was of major concern and by having it 
as a major issue the movement departed significantly from its original 
self-centred thinking and approach. Disarmament and world security 
were the main issues occupying its leaders' minds on the level of the 
worlds at large, and the movement's member countries foresaw themselves 
as having a major stake and therefore as having a major role to play. 
These two issues received more attention than the development 
problem simply because development in those countries was thought to be 
going on satisfactorily and the flow of resources seemed to be enough 
to get such development going. 
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There was also a change in the developed world which at least at 
the time believed in mutual dependence and the mutual benefits of co-
operation between developed and developing countries for the benefit of 
all. By the mid 'sixties and early 'seventies, with the world facing 
huge economic problems, the issue of development came back to the 
forefront of debate. By the mid 'seventies, especially after the oil 
price boom and the economic difficulties faced by developed countries 
which were going through a depression, the problems of Third World 
countries were compounded. Hence economic development and capital 
transfers were of main importance. However, it was perhaps recognised 
for the first time, that the movement should work as a group within the 
United Nations system in order to push forward the needs of its member 
countries. It was therefore rather obvious that such a development 
could bring with it some misunderstandings between member countries on 
the issues presented in the United Nations. 
By the end of the 'seventies and in the early 'eighties, more 
problems arose and the movement was not seen to be highly effective in 
attending to such problems even if they fell within its basic domain of 
interest. The problems of the Iraq - Iran war is an outstanding 
example. By this time questions had been raised as to the effective-
ness of the movement in handling its affairs. 
Over the last few decades, as has been discussed in this thesis, 
the economic development issue has been and still is the main issue. 
The international monetary system which regulates the world economic 
system has been subject to wide debate. Among the main issues of this 
debate was the fact that the international monetary system had always 
been dominated by advanced countries with huge economic and political 
power. 
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This control not only compounded the problems of developed 
countries, but also created new ones. Right after the war and up to 
the early 'sixties, the system was unilaterally managed by the United 
States of America. Its economic power was needed in Europe for the 
latter to get out of the war's aftermath. The world needed also a 
convertible, powerful and stable currency, characteristics which were 
to be found in the United States dollar. However, like the currencies 
of most industrialised countries, the dollar was weak by the early 
1960s, reflecting the weaknesses of the American economy. 
Such developments on the world economic stage had their bearing on 
the economies of developing countries. It was the first time that some 
developing countries started having liquidity problems. The IMF was 
interested in lending to these countries only after close examination 
of each country's economY. By the early 'seventies, when the United 
States terminated the Bretton Woods agreement, the whole monetary 
system was 1n a chaotic state. This was followed by the oil price 
increase in 1973 and the subsequent inflationary pressures which 
resulted from the U.S. action. However, despite the negative impact of 
oil prices on developing countries, it was for the first time clear 
that the voice of the Third World countries was beginning to be heard. 
It was apparent by then that the available institutional framework 
in the international system was not enough to cope with the arising 
economic problems. Therefore, calls for the creation of a new 
international economic order were voiced. 
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Such an international order would potentially involve fundamental 
change in areas like international trade; inflows of international 
resources to developing countries; energy and development; multi-
national corporations and transfer of technology. It is clear that 
such issues were not the only issues, but rather the most important. 
Trade between developed and developing countries was against the latter 
both in volume and in value. The terms of trade were deteriorating 
against developing countries. Developed countries were slowing down 
the volume of aid given to developing countries, and the international 
institutions were also reluctant to expand their lending operations 
because of what they thought were increasing risk factors. On the 
other side of the issue, the multinational corporations were exploiting 
the natural resources of developing countries and at the same time 
expanding the absorptive capacities of those countries' markets for 
consumer goods. Developing countries on the other hand identified the 
technological difference between developed and developing countries as 
the area which needed great improvement. Without the transfer of 
appropriate technology, the production capabilities of developing 
countries would not be increased and their problems would be increased 
rather than decreased. 
It was within this international economic fragmentation that the 
non-aligned movement's role in development came into effect. It was 
felt that the movement should operate in two directions. Firstly, 
great leverage should be sought after in the international 
institutions, especially those of the United Nations. This was of 
vital importance if issues of regulating the international trade market 
and solving the aid problem by lessening the debt and debt service 
obligations on the one hand, and increasing the flow of resources on 
the other hand were to be tackled. 
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Secondly, a better co-ordination and co-operation among the 
movement's member countries should take place. This was important 
because the movement had among its ranks two extremes. At the one end 
there were oil producing countries with large surplus funds; and at the 
other end there were a number of the poorest countries of the world who 
badly needed such funds. The question was why should such surplus 
funds be circulated to the needy countries through the international 
institutions? Why not establish institutions within the regional 
boundaries of these developing countries? This move was welcomed by 
all concerned because while it provided the necessary rate of return to 
lender countries it also provided the liquidity needed for development 
by the borrower countries. It was felt that it was an era in which the 
non-aligned movement could and should play an important role. 
Apart from economic development and raising the living conditions 
of the people of the member countries, one of the objectives, dear to 
the non-aligned movement was that of freedom for Third World people. 
In the early stages of the movement's establishment, freedom was taken 
to mean political independence of all nations from direct control by 
the great military powers. However, the disappearance of this direct 
colonisation did not necessarily mean that gaining independence by 
itself guaranteed freedom. We live in an ever changing world in which 
dominating countries do not easily leave developing countries once they 
are simply asked to do so. They find other ways and means to keep 
their interests alive as long as it is necessary to do so. Therefore, 
once a developing area gains political independance these new means are 
put into operation. Among these ways and means three are outstanding. 
Firstly, newly independent countries are usually kept dependant on the 
previously colonizing country for their security and means of survival. 
- 328 -
Hence, even if these countries leave the area physically, they re-
enter through the back door and they have enough leverage to continue 
their domination of the independent country. Secondly, a newly 
independent country would not normally have enough productive capacity 
to feed its people, therefore food dependency is usually used to 
enhance this dependency. The need for financial aid in the early 
stages of independence is inevitable if new institutions are to be 
established and development is to start. This obviously increases the 
political clutch the dominating country would still have even after 
independance. The National Liberation movements in most cases find 
themselves as dependent on their occupiers after independence as 
before. 
The role of the non-aligned movement is one of two parts. On the 
one hand it helps National Liberation Movements to achieve independence 
through their armed struggle by helping them politically, economically 
and sometimes militarily. But the need arises more after independence 
for the non-aligned movement to provide the necessary help to these 
newly established countries. However, once these new countries are 
well established then they may form the backbone of the non-aligned 
movement. It is therefore rather obvious that this relation is a two-
way one, and such interaction is highly needed for the non-aligned 
movement to achieve its objectives. 
In several parts of this thesis, there has been discussions of the 
role of member countries in global terms. However, focusing on one 
specific country entails a review of the whole process of interaction 
between the member country and the movement in both directions. Iraq 
was taken as a case study in order to examine in some detail how this 
process takes place. 
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In the mid 'fifties, Iraq was a member of the non-aligned 
movement, but at the same time it joined the "Baghdad Pact", a move 
from the regime at the time to align the country more closely to the 
Western World. By the late 'fifties a new regime came to power and 
tried to re-align the country with the Eastern bloc. This 'tug of war' 
process between the West and East brought back the Western World to try 
to regain influence through supporting the Kurdish movement. This 
process was also supported by the fact that the Iraqi economy was 
dominated by the multinational companies. It is therefore rather 
obvious that at this stage, even though Iraq was a member of the non-
aligned movement, it was nevertheless not in a position to contribute 
significantly to the movement. 
This situation dragged on until 1968 when the Arab Ba'ath Party 
gained power. The top priority for the party was to finish the Kurdish 
revolt hence eliminating Western influence from the country. This was 
done alongside a process of nationalisation during which the country 
regained control of its national resources. By the mid-'seventies 
with a stable political system and growing economy backed by enormous 
financial resources, the time had come for Iraq to enhance its position 
in the non-aligned movement. Adhering to its principles, the 
government and the party started sharing their resources with needy 
developing countries through a significant package of aid. On the 
political scene, Iraq came to playa significant role in revitalizing 
the non-aligned movement. This role was recognized by the movement's 
member countries when Baghdad was selected as the venue for the 1982 
non-aligned movement's conference. 
This process of interaction between the country and the movement 
may be considered a representative case for a wide number of developing 
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countries. Iraq's emerging role within the movement came to be 
recongised though it took a relatively long period of time for Iraq to 
play such a role. However, as was discussed earlier in this thesis, 
without a strong economy; a stable political system and a strong belief 
in the movement's aims and objectives no serious participation could 
have been expected earlier. 
Having discussed the above, one can safely argue that the movement 
is now subject to heavy pressures emanating from world economic and 
political factors. There are two potential scenarios for the future of 
the movement. One is that the pressures might be more than the 
movement can handle hence it may be subject to disarray. The second is 
that the movement may be able to cope with the arising problems and 
sooner rather than later, it will overcome these problems. The facts 
involved in both cases and their impact are discussed below, in order 
to give some future perspective for the movement. 
As has been argued, it was very obvious that during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the non-aligned movement faced and is still facing a wide 
range of serious dangers. Some of these dangers emanate from today's 
international relation variables, others stem from accumulated negative 
aspects that the movement has faced during its history of a quarter of 
a century. On that basis, the first scenario, which suggests that the 
movement is facing great problems that it cannot handle was presented. 
Certainly the movement is facing problems from outside factors and 
from within, as was said above. There are factors coming from the 
current international situation, which has deteriorated drastically 
over the last decade or so. 
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Detente between the super-powers and the relations between them 
have been loosening and accordingly, competition over spheres of 
influence in the world has been increasing very rapidly. This is 
aggravated by the re-emergence of an era of cold war of the 1950s type 
which in turn threatens once again the independence of the non-aligned 
countries and their sovereignty. These facts have been increased by 
the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan and Poland on the one 
hand and on the other, a new conservative American administration which 
increasingly is resorting to force or threats of using force to solve 
problems. 
More importantly, there is a wide range of internal difficulties 
that the non-aligned movement is facing which may be summarized as 
follows:-
a. The movement's membership has increased significantly to include 
almost all Third World countries. This entails the gathering together 
of all ideological and political backgrounds with all the problems that 
come with this. 
b. The movement has not been following the original principles of 
non-alignment that were set out in the first conference of the movement 
as criteria for country's membership. 
c. There has been a significant number of member countries whose 
governments have been toppled by military and political takeovers 
and who therefore have gone back to their original spheres of influence 
and alignment. But because a country can stay a member until it 
decides otherwise, those countries have remained members of the 
movement. 
d. Friction among the movement's member countries has been increasing 
and their relations deteriorating to the extent of going to war as was 
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mentioned earlier in the case of the Iraq - Iran conflict. This has 
been a new experience in which the movement has so far failed to have 
any leverage to solve this problem. 
e. It has been obvious over the past few years that the movement has 
been avoiding difficult problems by deferring them for a long time, 
either not wanting to solve them or being unable to do so. This 
approach has accumulated wide and varied problems to which there is no 
obvious or quick solution. 
Because of the extent of these internal facts, combined with the 
previously discussed external facts, this scenario suggests that the 
movement has not been able to face up to these problems nor is it 
expected to be able to face up to them. Therefore, the movement sooner 
or later will go into disarray and the 1980s may witness the disruption 
of all the non-aligned movement's activities. 
We have noted that the second scenario assumes that the non-
aligned movement will succeed in overcoming the problems it faces. 
This assumption is founded on a number of facts drawn from the history 
of the movement on the one hand and on the nature of the international 
situation and the facts affecting it on the other. 
One of the above mentioned facts is the understanding that non-
alignment was born after the cold war, and since the original cold war 
era is over, it might be thought that there is no more need for the 
movement. However, as has been discussed in this thesis, even though 
the cold war ended long ago in the formal sense, yet new developments 
in the international situation in the early 'eighties have more or less 
returned the super-powers to a new cold war era. 
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Moreover, Europe's role as a new centre of gravity beside the two 
super-powers has never materialised and it has continued to back the 
United States position on all or at best most major issues. Such a 
situation may enhance the chances for the non-aligned movement to 
survive its difficulties. In actual fact member countries feel more in 
need of the non-aligned movement in times of challenges and problems, 
therefore this scenario assumes that the more the problems, the more 
member countries will feel the need to stick by the movement. 
It was obvious that during the 'sixties and 'seventies inter-
national power centres moved from having only the two super-powers into 
multidimensional ones. During the 'eighties this has been more 
pronounced in the fact that international relations have changed 
significantly in that independence is seen not so much as following a 
particular ideology, but rather as looking after the interests of the 
state concerned. This makes it easier for the movement to revitalise 
its role on the world stage. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that an agreement needs to be 
reached on the nature of the non-aligned movement. Is it a leading 
force in the Third World or is it a grouping on the bare minimum of 
issues? In actuality it is my belief that it has been and should 
always be a leading force in the Third World and in the issues which 
concern it. 
To conclude, one tends to suggest that since the major weakening 
factors of the movement are internal ones, and since the member 
countries tend to rally behind the movement in times of hardship and 
difficulties, then it is reasonable to suggest that the movement will 
pull itself together and solve its problems. 
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If this is coupled with some relaxation of world tensions, along 
with a better relationship between the super-powers, then the Third 
World countries would be under less pressure to spend money on 
armaments which could otherwise be used for development and will lend 
support to the internal factors. In order to hold the second scenario 
as I believe, the non-aligned movement needs to keep free from the 
super-powers' domination and to do so, as we argued earlier in the 
theoretical discussion of development and non-alignment in this thesis, 
the non-aligned countries must respect the following principles:-
1) The movement needs: independence, development, peace and 
disarmament because as I believe, without independence there is no non-
alignment, without development, there is no independence and finally, 
without peace and disarmament, there is insufficent development. 
2) The problems of borders between the member countries must be 
resolved by means other than armed clashes. 
3) The dialogue between the developed and developing countries should 
be resumed on a new basis that would lead to the establishment of a New 
International Economic Order. To ensure the success of this dialogue, 
more co-operation among the non-aligned countries should be carried 
out, in order to enable them to exert effective pressure. 
4) Finally, the non-aligned countries need national leaders, or in 
other words, they need leaders committed to the ideal and goal of non-
alignment. 
From a sociological point of view one cannot be content with 
seeing non-alignment as simply an abstract fine ideal merely requiring 
well intentioned leaders in order to carry it out. It has to be seen 
as a widely held set of social values and aspirations which emerged 
within a particular condition of the world's social structure at a 
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certain historical period; and its subsequent history and future 
prospects must also be seen as being conditioned by, and linked with, 
the changing structure of world society. 
The most salient aspects of this world social structure during 
this period has been, and continue to be:-
1: Political and military rivalry between two big power-blocs and 
2: Economic exploitation and cultural domination by colonial and 
neo-co10nia1 developed societies, which are also ranged against 
each other in the two power-blocs. 
To avoid involvement in super-power military rivalry -i.e. Non-
alignment- necessarily requires liberation from the super-powers' 
economic and cultural domination also if it is to stand any chance of 
long term success. 
It should be clear from the discussion of theories of development 
in the introduction of this thesis that in general terms, though not 
necessarily in detail, I tend to agree with the type of theory put 
forward by A.G. Frank in so far as he sees underdevelopment as a 
process involving domination and exploitation of dependent societies by 
more powerful societies which developed at their expense, and in so far 
as he argues that in order to develop Third World countries need to 
free themselves from this domination. 
But I differ from him if he is seeing the Soviet model as a means 
of liberation from domination. Rather I see that as another form of 
domination which also has to be avoided by means of socio-economic 
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and political development of the Non-aligned countries on their own 
terms and through co-operation with each other. 
Success in achieving such development and so being in a position 
to pursue genuine non-alignment will continue to depend on the internal 
social structures of each member country and on the condition of the 
world social structure in all its aspects. 
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APPENDIX ONE The Agendas of the Conferences of Heads of State or 
Government of the Non-Aligned Countries. 
The First Summit Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
1. Belgrade 1st - 6th September 1961 
l.a - Exchange of views on the international situation. 
International problems facing the developing countries. 
l.b - Establishment and strengthening of international peace and 
security. 
l.b.l Respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-
determination, struggle against imperialism, 
liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
1.b.2 Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of states; non-interference and non-intervention in 
internal affairs of state. 
1.b.3 Racial discrimination and apartheid. 
1.b.4 General and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear 
tests; problem of foreign military bases. 
1.b.5 Peaceful co-existence among state with different 
political and social systems. 
1.b.6 Role and structure of the United Nations and the 
implementation of its resolutions. 
1.c - Problems of unequal economic development; promotion of 
international economic and technical co-operation. 
1.c.1 Economic development and trade between the developed 
and developing countries. 
1.c.2 Economic and technical assistance to the developing 
countries. 
l.d - Other matters 
I.e - Communique of the Conference 
SOURCES: The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned 
Countries, Belgrade, 1961. See also, Willetts, op.cit., p.240 and the 
Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, op.cit., p.lO. 
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The Second Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
2. Cairo 5th - 10th October 1964. 
2.1 General discussion of the international situation. 
2.2. The safeguarding and strengthening of world peace and 
security, promotion in the settlement of international 
problems of the positive role of New States and of National 
Liberation Movements. 
2.2.a 
2.2.b 
2.2.c 
2.2.d 
2.2.e 
2.2.f 
2.2.g 
2.2.h 
2.2.i 
Concerted action for the liberation of the countries 
still dependent; elimination of colonialism, neo-
colonialism and imperialism. 
Respect for the right of people to self-determination 
and condemnation of the use of force against the 
exercise of this right. 
Racial discrimination and the policy of apartheid. 
Peaceful co-existence and the codification of its 
prnciples by the United Nations. 
Respect for the sovreignty of states and their 
territorial integrity; problems of divided nations. 
Settlement of disputes without the threat of use of 
force, in accordance with the principles of United 
Nations Charter. 
General and complete disarmament; peaceful use of 
atomic energy; banning of all nuclear weapon tests; 
establishment of nuclear-free zones, prevention of 
dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of all 
nuclear weapons. 
Military pacts, foreign troops and bases. 
The United Nations; its role in international affairs, 
implementation of its resolutions and amendment of its 
Charter. 
2.3 Economic Development and Co-operation. 
2.3.a Effects of disarmament on world economic development. 
2.3.b United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
2.4 Cultural, Scientific and Educational co-operation and 
consolidation of International and Regional Organizations 
working for this purpose. 
2.5 Any other subjects. 
SOURCE: The Collected Documents of Non-Aligned Countries, 1961-1982, 
op.cit., p.18. 
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The Third Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-Aligned 
Countries. 
3. Lusaka 8th - 10th September 1970 
3.1 Charter for peace, freedom, development and international co-
operation and general discussion of the international 
situation. 
3.2 Preservation and strengthening of world peace and security in 
the changed world situation. 
3.2.a The role of the non-aligned Nations. 
3.2.b Strengthening of the United Nations. 
3.2.c Problems of disarmaments. 
3.2.d Military pacts, foreign troops and bases. 
3.3. Preservation and strengthening of national independence, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality among states 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. 
3.3.a Action for the liberation of countries under colonial 
domination and support to liberation movements. 
3.3.b abolition of all forms of racial discrimination and 
apartheid. 
3.3.c Neo-colonialism. 
3.3.d Presevation and strengthening of the independence of 
non-aligned countries. 
3.4 Economic Development and Economic Independence (Dependence 
on one's own resources). 
3.4.a Bilateral, regional and inter-regional co-operation 
between non-aligned countries and developing countries 
3.4b Trade and assistance policy. 
3.4c The second decade of the United Nations development. 
3.5 Strengthening of co-operation among non-aligned countries. 
3.6 Miscellaneous. 
SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, 
op.cit., pp.44-45. 
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The Fourth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
4. Algiers, September 5th - 9th, 1973. 
4.1 General review and appraisal of the international situation. 
4.2 Role of non-alignment and future prospects for the movement 
in the light of the evolution of the international situation. 
4.3 Consideration of political issues and co-ordinated action of 
non-aligned countries for strengthening world peace and 
security. 
4.3.a 
4.3.b 
4.3.c 
4.3.d 
4.3.e 
4.3.f 
4.3.g 
4.3.h 
4.3.i 
Promotion of positive trends in international 
relations, efforts for relaxation af international 
tension, democratization of international relations 
and the universal application of the principles of 
peaceful co-existence. 
Joint measures and concerted efforts for combating 
aggression, eliminating foreign occupation and threats 
to independence and security of non-aligned countries, 
including all forms of interference and subjugation. 
Intensification of measures to combat colonialism, 
apartheid, racial discrimination and to provide 
effective support for national liberation movements. 
Strengthening of international security, creation of 
zones of peace and intensification of efforts directed 
towards general and complete disarmament. 
Measures to combat threats to permanent sovereignty of 
states over their natural resources including in 
particular the threat posed by the activities of trans 
national corporations. 
Co-ordination of policies in relation to the 
forthcoming conference on the law of the sea. 
Measures to assist people and countries which are 
victims of aggression, colonialism and foreign 
occupation. 
Strengthening of the role and efficacy of the United 
Nations. 
Advancement of co-operation and solidarity among the 
non-aligned countries and co-ordination of their 
action at the United Nations and other international 
bodies. 
4.4. Consideration of economic issues and international action 
aimed at accelerating economic and social progress of non-
aligned countries. 
4.4.a State of international economic relations and 
deterioration of the economic position of the 
developing countries, commitments of the developed 
world in international action of development. 
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4.4.b Biennial review and appraisal of the implementation of 
the international development strategy and the need 
for urgent solution of problems arising as a result of 
subsequent development in international economic 
relations including in particular the multilateral 
trade negotiations and the reform of the international 
monetary system. 
4.4.c Follow-up action on the Lusaka Declaration on non-
alignment and economic progress and the Georgetown 
Action programme for economic co-operation among non-
aligned countries. 
4.4.d Special measures in favour of the least developed 
including the land locked among developing countries. 
4.4.e Promotion of favourable trends in regional, inter-
regional and international economic co-operation. 
4.4.f Advancement of co-ordination of action of non-aligned 
countries on economic issues at the U.N. and other 
international forums. 
4.5 Measures for promoting co-operation and co-ordination among 
non-aligned countries, including Educational, Cultural, 
Scientific, information and other areas. 
4.6 Future meetings of the non-aligned countries including the 
date and venue of the next summit conference. 
4.7 Any other Business: 
4.7.a War damages. 
4.7.b The problem of mercenaries. 
SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, 
op.cit., p.91. 
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The Fifth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
5. Colombo, August 16th - 19th, 1976. 
5.1 General review and assessment of international political 
situation and the role of non-alignment with special emphasis 
on the following:-
5.1.a 
5.1.b 
5.1.c 
5.1.d 
5.1.e 
5.1.f 
5.1.g 
S.l.h 
S.l.i 
S.l.j 
Southern Africa and other colonial situations. 
Situation in the Middle East. 
The question of Palestine. 
The question of Cyprus. 
The question of Korea. 
Latin America questions. 
The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
International implications of detente. 
Interference in the internal affairs of states. 
Disarmament and international security. 
5.2 Review and appraisal on international economic situation and 
development problems, with special emphasis on the sixth and seventh 
special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, establishment 
of the New International Economic Order, the Charter of the Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, meeting of Finance Ministers in Kingston, 
United Nations Conferences of Food and Population, second General 
Conference of UNIDO, UNCTAD and the Paris Conference of International 
Economic co-operation. 
5.3 Survey and evaluation of measures to strengthen economic 
solidarity and co-operation among non-aligned countries and other 
developing countries with particular reference to the following:-
S.3.a The Lima programme of mutual assistance and solidarity 
of non-aligned countries. 
5.3.b Resolutions of the Dakar Conference. 
S.3.c Trade and assistance policies. 
S.3.d Agriculture and food production. 
5.3.e Financial and monetary co-operation. 
5.3.f Industrialization, science, technology and peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. 
5.3.9 Foreign investment. 
S.3.h Transnational corporation and information centre on 
transnational corporation. 
S.3.i Management of public enterprises. 
S.3.j The Solidarity Fund for economic and social 
development of non-aligned countries. 
S.3.k Assistance for the reconstruction of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos. 
5.3.1 Assistance to countries exposed to foreign economic 
pressures. 
S.3.m Consideration of the report of the countries co-
ordinating the action programme of developing 
countries, adoped at the Algiers Summit Conference. 
S.3.n United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea. 
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5.4 Strategy for the strengthening of peace and international 
security and measures for the promotion of solidarity and 
mutual assistance among non-aligned countries with a view to 
countering more effectively threats, pressures, aggressions, 
etc., taking into account their political and economic 
aspects. 
5.5 Measures for the promotion of co-operation and co-ordination 
among non-aligned countries in the field of education, 
information and in other fields. 
5.6 The strengthening of non-alignment and jOint action of non-
aligned countries in international relations: strengthening 
of the role of the United Nations and promotion of co-
operation and solidarity among non-aligned countries and co-
operation of their activity in the United Nations and 
elsewhere. 
5.7 Future gathering of non-aligned countries, including the date 
and venue of the next summit; constitution and mandate of the 
co-ordinating Bureau. 
5.8 Miscellaneous. 
SOURCE: The collected documents, op.cit., pp.187-188. 
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The Sixth Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
6. Havana, September 3rd - 9th, 1979. 
6.1 Strengthening of the role and policy of non-aligned movement 
as an independent, positive and equitable alternative to bloc 
policies and great power rivalries in international 
relations. 
6.2 General review and appraisal of the international political 
situation and of the measures of solidarity of the non-
aligned countries in the implementation of their policy, and 
decisions with particular reference to:-
6.2.1 The situation in Southern Africa - Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa: the system of apartheid; the aggression 
of the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia 
against the front-line states and assessment and 
implementation of the decisions adopted at the 
extraordinary ministerial meeting of the co-ordinating 
bureau in Maputo. 
6.2.2 The question of Western Sahara. 
6.2.3 Other colonial issues such as the Camorian Island of 
Mayotte and intensification of the struggle against 
colonialism, racism and racial discrimination. 
6.2.4 The question of Palestine. 
6.2.5 The situation in the Middle East. 
6.2.6 Latin American issues. 
6.2.7 The question of Cyprus. 
6.2.8 The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
6.2.9 The Mediterranean as a zone of peace and co-operation. 
6.2.9a Withdrawal of foreign military bases from 
Malta as of March 31st, 1979. 
6.2.9b New concerted efforts by the Mediterranean 
non-aligned countries in matters of security 
and co-operation in accordance with paragraph 
144 of the Belgrade Declaration. 
6.2.10 Promotion of positive trends in international 
relations, efforts to bring about a relaxation of 
international tension, democratization of 
international relations and the universal application 
of the principles of peaceful co-existence. 
6.2.11 Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states. 
6.2.12 Peaceful settlement of disputes between non-aligned 
countries on the basis of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles and decisions of the non-
aligned movement, including the recommendations of the 
ministerial Conference in Belgrade. 
6.2.13 The question of Korea. 
6.2.14 Situation of South East Asia. 
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6.2.15 Disarmament and its implications for international 
security and economic and social development. 
Implementation of the decisions of the special session 
of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to 
Disarmament convened on the initiative of the non-
aligned countries. 
6.3 General review and appraisal of the world economic situation, 
international economic relations and the position of 
developing countries in the world economy, and 
intensification of efforts by non-aligned and other 
developing countries for the establishment of the New 
International Economic Order, with special reference to:-
6.3.a The negotiations in the United Nations system for the 
establishment of the New International Economic Order. 
6.3.b Assessment of the fifth session of UNCTAD. 
6.3.c The contribution of the non-aligned movement to the 
formulation in the context of the establishment of the 
New International Economic Order of an International 
Development strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade. 
6.3.d Formulation of guidelines for the preparations for and 
the joint stand of non-aligned and other developing 
countries at the special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1980. 
6.3.e The United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea. 
6.3.f The position of the least developed countries. 
6.3.g The position of the land-locked, islands and most 
seriously affected developing countries. 
6.4 Analysis of the measures and further action, including 
programmes of mutual assistance, designed to strengthen the 
solidarity and social and economic co-operation among non-
aligned and other developing countries, taking into 
consideration the report of the co-ordinating countries on: 
Raw materials, Trade, Transport and Industry, Financial and 
Monetary co-operation, Fisheries, Health, Insurance, Sports, 
Tourism etc. 
6.5 Strengthening of the efficacy of the United Nations in the 
promotion and preservation of international peace and 
security and in equitable international co-operation and the 
enhancement of the pivotal role of non-aligned countries in 
the United Nations system. 
6.6 Ways and means of strengthening unity, solidarity and co-
operation among non-aligned countries on the basis of the 
principles of non-aligned movement and improving the 
functioning of and decision making in, the non-aligned 
movement with reference to the initiative taken at the 
Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade 
relating to Agenda item XV. 
6.7 Co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries 
in the field of information and concerted action by them 
directed towards the establishment of a new, more just and 
effective world information and communication order. 
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6.8 Further gathering of non-aligned countries, including the 
date and venue of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or 
Government of non-aligned countries. 
6.9 Composition and mandate of the co-ordinating Bureau. 
6.10 Other matters. 
SOURCE: The collected documents of non-aligned countries, 1961-1982, 
op.cit., pp.500-501. 
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The Seventh Summit Conference of Head of States or Governments of Non-
Aligned Countries. 
7. New Delhi, 7th-11th, 1983. 
1. The economic question of the non-aligned countries occupied a 
central position in the discussions, and overshadowed the 
political ones. They called for a New International Economic 
Order. 
2. The question of armament in the Third World was discussed, 
especially that the developing countries spent on armament 
more than 81 billion dollars. 
3. The relations between the advanced industrial countries and 
colonialism and neo-colonialism, on one side, and the 
developing countries on the other were also discussed in 
the conference. 
4. The question of the deterioration of International Relations 
was discussed. The discussions dealt with the cold war 
atmosphere and the emergence of new tendancies threatening 
with nuclear war. 
5. Other matters were discussed. 
SOURCES: 1) Dr. Ghaleb, M •• "The Seventh Non-aligned Conference", "The 
Arab Alternative Futures Dossier Third World Forum - Middle 
East Office", U.N. University, No.9, July 1983, pp.6-9. 
2) The Times, March 12. 1983. p.6. 
3) International Tribunes, March 5-14th, 1983. 
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APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences. 
African Countries 
AI gerl a 
Angola 
Benin 
Bostwana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
C.A.R. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Dj i bouti 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Libed a 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Mal awi 
Mali 
Mauritani a 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Ni ged a 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Senegal 
Seychell es 
S1 erra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
Zambia 
1961 1964 1970 1973 I 1976 1979 
Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers I Colombo Havana 
I 
A* A A A I A A 
I A A 
N A N A I A A 
A A I A A 
A A A I A A 
N A A A I A A 
I A A 
N A A A A A 
N A A A A N 
A A 
N A A A A A 
A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A 
A A A A A A 
N N N A A A 
N A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A 
N N N A' A A 
A A A A A 
A A A A 
N A A A A A 
N A A A A A 
N N N A A A 
A N N N A 
A A A A A A 
N A A A A A 
N A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A 
N N N A A A 
N A A A A A 
N A A A A 
A A 
N A A A A A 
A A 
N A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A 
N A A A A A 
N A A A A A 
A A A A A A 
A A A A A 
N N N A A A 
A N A A A A 
A A A A A 
* The Algerian Representation 
KEY: A: Attended as a full 
N: Not Represented. 
n 1961 was a provisional Government. 
member. G: Guest. 
0: Observer. 
Not Independent. SS: "Special Status". 
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APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences. 
1961 1964 1970 I 1973 I 1976 1979 
Asian Countries Belgrade Cairo Lusaka I Algiers I Colombo Havana 
I I 
Afghanistan A A A I A I A A 
Bahrain I A I A A 
Bangladesh I A I A A 
Bhutan I A I A A 
Burma A A N I A I A A 
India A A A I A I A A 
Indonesia A A A A I A A 
Iran N N N N N A 
Iraq A A A A A A 
Jordan N A A A A A 
Kampuchea A A N A* A N 
Korea (North) N N N N A A 
Kuwait A A A A A 
Laos N A A A A A 
Lebanon A A A A A A 
Malaysia N N A A A A 
Maldives N N A A 
Nepal A A A A A A 
Oman N N N A A A 
Pakistan N N N N N A 
Philippines N N N N G a 
Qatar A A A 
Saudi Arabia A A N A A N 
Singapore A A A A 
South Yemen A A A A 
Sri Lanka A A A A A A 
Syria A A A A A 
U.A.E. A A A 
Vietnam A A 
Yemen A A A A A A 
* The Kampuchean Representation in 1973 was the Royal Government - in exile. 
1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
Caribbean Countries Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 
Dominica 0 
Grenada a A 
Guyana A A A A 
Jamaica 0 A A A A 
St. Luci a a 
Surinam N A 
Trinidad & Tobago 0 A A A A 
Bahamas has never been associated with the non-aligned movement. 
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APPENDIX TWO: Attendance by Governments at Non-Aligned Summit Conferences. 
1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
European Countries Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
Austri a N N G G G G 
Cyprus A A A A A A 
Finland N a G G G G 
Ireland N N N N N N 
Malta N N A A A 
Portugal N N N N G G 
Romania N N N N G G 
San Marino N N N N N G 
Spain N N N N N G 
Sweden N N N G G G 
Switzerland N N N N G G 
Yugoslavia A A A A A A 
La t in Affieri can 1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
Countries Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
Argentina N p P A A A 
Bolivia a a a a a A 
Brazil a a a a a a 
Chile N a a A N N 
Columbia N N N N N a 
Costa Rica N N N N N a 
Cuba A A A A A A 
Dominican Republic N N N N N N 
Ecuador a N a a a a 
E1 Salvador N N N N a a 
Haiti N N N N N N 
Honduras N N N N N N 
Guatemala N N N N N N 
Mexico N a N a a a 
Nicaragua N N N N N A 
Panama N N N a A A 
Paraguay N N N N N N 
Peru N N 0 A A A 
Uruguay N a 0 a a a 
Venezuela N a 0 a a a 
other Groups accord- 1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
ed full recognition Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
at some point 
Angola FNLA a A N a N N 
Belize SS SS 
Namibia SWAPO a ? N a a A 
Palestine PLO G a A A 
South Vietnam PRG 0 A 
Zimbabwe 
Patriotic Front * a ? G a a A 
* The participants from Zimbabwe before 1979 were the forerunners 0 the patriotic front, namely the National Democratic Party in 1961, ZANU and ZAPU 
in 1970 and 1973 and the ANC in 1976. 
SEE: Willetts, Peter., The Non-aligned in Havana, London, 1981, p.65-67. 
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APPENDIX THREE: Number of attendance Governments at each Summit Conference 
of Non-aligned Movement Conferences. 
SUMMIT CONFERENCE 
Venue 
L Belgrade 
2. Cairo 
3. Lusaka 
4. Algiers 
5. Colombo 
6. Havana 
Date 
1-6 September 1961 
5-10 October 1964 
8-10 September 1970 
5-9 September 1973 
16-19 August 1976 
3-9 September 1979 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Number of D.N. 
Members Document 
Attending Number 
25 a NO UN DOC 
47 b A/5763 
53 NV/209 
75 c A/9330 
85 d A/31/197 
92 e A/34/542 
NOTES: (a) Including the Algerian Provisional Government; (b) Including 
Holden Roberto Leader of the FNLA from Angola; (c) Including the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and a representative of Prince 
Sihanouk's Cambodian Government - in exile; (d) Including the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, but not including Belize which was granted a 
special status including the right to address the Summit; (e) Including the 
Patriotic Front of Zimbabawe and SWAPO, not including Belize which was again 
given special status: including P.L.O. 
SUMMARY OF ATTENDANCE AT EACH SUMMIT CONFERENCE 
I 1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
Full Members I Belgrade Cairo Lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
I 
I 
Countries I 24 46 53 73 84 89 
Provisional Govern- I 
ments I 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Liberation movements 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Special status 0 0 0 0 1 1 
-zs- 41 -;r -rr- --go -gr 
OBSERVERS 
Countrles 3 10 9 8 9 12 
Provisional Govern-
ments 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Liberation movements 17 ? 0 15 6 2 
Other NGO or INGO 17 ? 0 2 2 2 
U.N. Organization 0 0 1 1 1 1 
O.A.U. 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Arab League 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Islamic Conf. 0 0 0 1 1 1 
-:rr 12+ --rz- £r -zr --w-
Cont I d •• 
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SUMMARY OF ATTENDANCE AT EACH SUMMIT CONFERENCE Contld 
I 1961 1964 1970 1973 1976 1979 
Full Members I Belgrade Cairo lusaka Algiers Colombo Havana 
I 
I 
GUESTS I 
Countries I 0 0 2 3 7 8 
liberation Movements 0 0 10 0 0 0 
Other NGO or INGO 0 0 1 0 0 0 
U.N. Organization 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Other 10 1 S 0 0 0 0 0 4 
0- 0- --rr- T I 19 
Total Governments* 28 56 65 86 100 109 
Total of all 
Organizations 62 59+ 78 107 114 132 
+ For the lusaka Summit different sources identify different numbers of 
liberation movements present as guests: Ten includes all these mentioned 
in the separate sources. 
* Governments here include full members, observers and guests that were 
widely recognised countries, plus the provisional governments, but not 
including the liberation movements or Belize. 
See: Willetts, Peter., Non-aligned in Havana, 1981, op.cit, pp.60-63. 
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